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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of information security demands and organisational and personal 
resources on Information Technology (IT) users’ security compliance behaviour in different 
organisations in Vietnam. IT users’ security compliance is essential to the overall effectiveness of 
information security programs and policies in organisations. Users’ failure to comply with 
security policies and/or procedures results in cyber risks and compromises the security of the 
organisation’s information systems. By employing an exploratory sequential design of the mixed 
methods approach, this PhD research proposes and tests a theoretical model of stress-based 
security compliance. Specifically, the research demonstrates that security engagement mediates 
the impact of security demands and organisational and personal resources on employees’ security 
compliance. Existing research to date has not yet focused on mediating factors between security 
demands, organisational and personal resources and users’ security compliance. 
The developed research model interrogated the extended Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, 
which is usually used to assess individuals’ work stress or burnout caused by fulfilling job 
demands, to explain security compliance. This research proposes that fulfilling security demands 
leads to compliance burnout, which consequently reduces security compliance. Adequate 
organisational and personal resources would not only reduce employees’ compliance burnout but 
also promote security engagement (i.e. the energy and enthusiasm in performing security tasks), 
which motivates user security compliance. 
The extended JD-R model has not been applied to ascertain determinants of security behaviour, 
therefore some qualitative research is required to check that the theory still applies. The first stage 
of the research (Study One) involved a qualitative study using in-depth interviews with 17 
participants in three organisations to explore the ability of using characteristics of security 
requirements, types of organisational and personal resources to explain security compliance. In 
particular, Study One identified three characteristics of security demands (security overload, 
access to security policies, and security skill requirements), four types of organisational resources 
(security communication efficacy, skill use and development, rewards and sanctions) and two 
personal resources (self-efficacy and security exposure) that affected the participants’ security 
compliance. Findings from Study One helped further refine the studied theoretical model, as well 
 xx 
 
as develop the survey instrument to test the model in the second stage of the research (Study 
Two). 
Study Two involved a quantitative study using a survey to empirically test the theoretical model 
developed from literature review and Study One. Four hundred and forty three (443) participants 
from different organisations in Vietnam took part in the survey. The study employed several 
procedural remedies during data collection to control the common method bias. The data collected 
from the survey was analysed using structural equation modelling and the results of the analysis 
supported the theoretical model with some exceptions. Study Two found that factors drawn from 
the JD-R model, such as organisational resources, self-efficacy, and security engagement, have a 
much stronger impact on security compliance than security demands and compliance burnout do. 
In particular, security engagement partially and positively moderates the impact of organisational 
resources on security compliance and fully moderates the impact of security self-efficacy, security 
exposure, and security skill requirements on compliance. Study Two also demonstrated that 
security compliance burnout has little impact on security compliance if users receive effective 
organisational security resources and possess security self-efficacy.  
The findings of the research offer a number of theoretical and practical implications for advancing 
behavioural security research and for the organisations to develop effective security compliance 
programs respectively. By extending the extended JD-R model, this research offers a theoretical 
explanation and empirical support for the mediating effects of security compliance burnout and 
engagement on security compliance. For security practitioners, the results showed that specific 
implementations and operations of IT security systems can have negative impacts on users’ 
burnout and engagement, which to some extent influence compliance with security policies. 
Security practitioner should focus on providing adequate resources to promote engagement and 
compliance.
 1 
 
 - INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
This study investigates the mediating effects of compliance burnout and engagement of security 
demands, and organisational and personal resources on security compliance. User security 
compliance is essential to the overall effectiveness of information security programs and policies 
in organisations. Users’ failure to comply with security policies and/or programs results in cyber 
risks and compromises the security of the organisation’s information systems. Drawn from the 
Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, a work stress model, the research developed and validated 
a stress-based compliance model. Using a mixed method approach, the research study 
incorporated findings from both in-depth interviews and a survey to assess the extent that 
compliance burnout and engagement affect security compliance. 
Section 1.1 of this chapter outlines the thesis statement. Background of the research context is 
discussed in Section 1.2. In particular, the importance of security compliance to an overall 
organisational security program is explained. Section 1.3 presents rationales for conducting this 
research. Research objectives are covered in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 outlines the research 
approach taken to address the research questions. A summary of research findings and 
contributions of the thesis is presented in Section 1.6 and 1.7 respectively. Finally, Section 1.8 
describes an overview of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
 THESIS STATEMENT 1.1
The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of security demands, and organisational 
and personal resources, on employees’ security compliance. Employees in organisations, by not 
adhering to the organisation’s security policies and by behaving insecurely, enable attackers to 
access an organisation’s data and information. This research aims to understand security 
behaviours based on a work stress model, with a view to establishing an organisational security 
strategy to increase security compliance. 
 BACKGROUND TO SECURITY COMPLIANCE 1.2
The risks to an organisation’s information resources are constantly growing due to rapid 
deployment of networked enterprise information systems. Loss of sensitive information continues 
 2 
 
to be a major concern for businesses due to the ease of accessing information online. 
Organisations often implement a wide range of security measures to protect their digital resources 
and physical assets. As part of the overall security program, employees play key roles in reducing 
security risks to enterprise-based information resources and assets. However, the majority of 
organisational security problems are indirectly caused by employees who violate or neglect to 
abide by information security measures in their organisations (Warkentin et al. 2007). Employee 
attitudes, positive or negative, towards information security tasks either improve or detract from 
security compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Colwill 2009, Herath and Rao 2009a).  
Traditionally, information security measures are designed to address four phases of organisational 
security risk management: deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery (Warkentin and 
Willison 2009). Information security compliance (from now on referred as security compliance) 
aims to improve the effectiveness of the ‘prevention’ phase through improvements in user 
compliance.  
Research has shown that users are often the weakest link in an information security system 
(Crossler et al. 2013). Users may ignore organisational security policies and the associated 
business processes that ensure adherence to safe security practice. The result for businesses are 
incidents of unsafe security activities, such as downloading unverified software from the Internet, 
using simple and obvious passwords, or sharing computer accounts. Unsafe security acts have the 
potential to compromise the entire security system despite the creation of sophisticated 
organisational security programs.  
Prevention of users’ security violations require more than the traditional technical security 
controls. Users need to be motivated to exercise proper security compliance with security policies 
or measures. Security compliance research mostly addresses factors that affect employees’ 
behaviour when they do not follow their organisations’ security policies or do not demonstrate 
expected safe security behaviour. Treating security compliance as a rule-following behaviour 
general deterrence theory has been studied to explore the effect of sanctions on and rewards for 
compliance behaviour (Hu et al. 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b). Security compliance can also be 
motivated as a response to reduce fear of security risk consequences using Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) (Vance et al. 2012, Herath and Rao 2009b). PMT theorises that protection 
motivation mediates the impact of threat and coping appraisal on protective intention or behaviour 
 3 
 
(Rogers 1975, Rogers 1983). Another approach to understand security compliance is drawn from 
the Rational Choice Theory (Becker 1968). The theory puts forward two premises for the 
consideration of an offence: (1) balancing of both costs and benefits of the offending behaviour, 
and (2) the decision maker’s perceived or subjective expectation of reward and cost. 
Through an understanding of factors that influence security behaviour, organisations can 
introduce security training, communicate potential security risks to users, or enforce sanctions for 
non-compliance. Security training and risk communications provide users with necessary skills 
and knowledge to evaluate and respond to security threats (Cox 2012, Furnell and Rajendran 
2012, Vance and Siponen 2012). The main premise is that people with better security skills and 
risk awareness would be more likely to comply with security policies; and due to being fearful of 
sanctions, people would be less likely to violate security policies (Guo and Yuan 2012, Vance and 
Siponen 2012). 
 RESEARCH RATIONALE 1.3
A number of studies have examined organisational and personal aspects of security compliance, 
drawn from a wide range of behavioural theories. Four research gaps identified in the literature 
have motivated the research conducted in this thesis. 
First, complying with security requirements requires additional effort, time, and skills that can 
lead to employees’ physical and psychological exhaustion over extended time (Demerouti et al. 
2001). However, the impact of compliance cost on security intention and behaviour has been 
reported inconsistently (Vance and Siponen 2012, Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Workman et 
al. 2008, Furnell and Rajendran 2012). Few studies have examined how users develop their 
cognitive and emotional stress due to continuing fulfilment of security demands. Furthermore, 
little research has explored the characteristics of security demands that constitute negative or 
stressful compliance, which can detrimentally affect security behaviour. 
Second, most security compliance studies have examined factors that influence users’ 
involvement with security tasks. However, the energetic state or intrinsic motivation of such 
security involvement has not been fully investigated (Naudé and Rothmann 2006, Van Wyk et al. 
2003). The concept of security engagement is drawn from work engagement, which has been 
identified as a critical source to motivate and maintain work commitment and performance in 
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various contexts (Bakken and Torp 2012, Crawford et al. 2010, Bezuidenhout and Cilliers 2010). 
Encouraging employees to become involved with security activities is important; nevertheless, the 
level of emotional and cognitive resources that people bring to performing security tasks might be 
the key to performance of the expected security behaviour, even in an unfavourable security 
environment (Bakken and Torp 2012, Crawford et al. 2010, May et al. 2004)). Effective security 
compliance may require not only skills and awareness but also the enjoyment and emotional 
commitment with the organisational security program. Though determinants of work engagement 
have been largely studied (Schaufeli and Salanova 2007, Schaufeli and Bakker 2004), factors that 
influence engagement with security tasks have not yet been fully examined. 
Third, the JD-R model, a work stress model, identifies three broad factors that can influence work 
burnout and engagement: job demands, job resources and personal resources (Schaufeli and 
Bakker 2004). The JD-R explains that employees’ performance and well-being can be affected by 
both job demands and resources via the competing motivational processes of work burnout and 
engagement (Demerouti et al. 2001). Personal resources have been included in the extended JD-R 
model as a moderating factor between demands, resources, burnout and engagement that 
influences job performance, commitment and satisfaction (Bandura 1997, Bakker et al. 2010, 
Toner et al. 2012). To the best knowledge of the researcher no study has used the JD-R model to 
explain compliance burnout, engagement and security compliance. One limitation of the JD-R 
model is that it does not include particular demands and resources (organisational and personal) 
that can be essential to compliance burnout and engagement (Schaufeli and Taris 2014). It is, 
therefore, necessary to explore the ability of the JD-R model to establish a stress-based security 
compliance model taking into account security demands, resources (organisational and personal), 
compliance burnout, engagement and security compliance. 
Fourth, during the PhD study the researcher was located in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Vietnam 
is located in Southeast Asia with a population of nearly 90 million in 2014. Vietnam has 64 cities 
and provinces with the capital of Hanoi in the north and Ho Chi Minh City in the south as the 
largest urban area. The country GDP was recorded at $186 billion with a growth rate estimated 
6% in 2014, one of the highest rates in the world (Source: United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Foreign Direct Investment Online database). In terms of its main industries, 
agriculture (e.g. forestry, fishing, cultivation of crops) contributed to 18% of the GDP, industry 
(e.g. mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water and gas) to 38.5%, and services (e.g. 
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trade, transport, education, and real estate services) to 43.4% respectively. Vietnam has a high 
mobile cellular penetration rate at 147 subscriptions per 100 people, and 48.3% of the population 
access the Internet by 2014 (Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Foreign Direct Investment Online database). The researcher noticed a high rate of Internet 
security incidents in Vietnamese organisations. In a recent survey by ESET, Vietnam has been 
ranked lowest in cyber security awareness amongst six South Pacific countries including 
Malaysia, Singapore, India, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Indonesia (ESET 2015). In 2013 Vietnam 
was ranked number one in the world for facing the highest risk of local infection from removable 
media connected to computers-USB flash drives, camera and phone memory card, and external 
hard drives; number six for facing cyber-threats most often, and number eight for originating 
sources of distributing malware (Funk and Garnaeva 2013). Hence, it is justified for this research 
to collect data from Vietnamese employees as a case environment to investigate security 
compliance issues. 
The identified four research gaps above drove the direction of this research; in particular the 
research focuses on security demands, organisational and personal resources and their relationship 
to compliance burnout, engagement and security compliance in an Asian context. 
The next section presents the research questions and their objectives in order to investigate the 
research gaps. 
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 1.4
The four research gaps described in Section 1.3 have underpinned the direction of this research. 
As a result, the thesis aims to examine how employee security compliance can be affected by the 
characteristics of security demands and of resources (organisational and personal). Overall, the 
outcome of this research will help organisations to design security tasks and develop 
organisational resources that will be effective in motivating employees’ security compliance. The 
research also facilitates development of personal resources to fully utilise organisational resources 
in performing security tasks. 
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 RESEARCH APPROACH 1.5
This research adopted a critical realism approach (Archer et al. 1998) to investigate security 
compliance in organisations. The critical realism approach recognises the complexity of human-
related phenomena and highlights the need to apply multiple research methods to gain a better 
understanding of a complex research problem (Archer et al. 1998). The research followed an 
exploratory sequential design of mixed methods approach (Creswell 2012) and was conducted in 
a two-study sequence. Study One involved a pilot qualitative study of security compliance in 
organisations using semi-structured interviews. The purpose of Study One was to qualitatively 
evaluate the extended JD-R model’s ability to explain security compliance at work. In particular, 
Study One explored characteristics of security demands, and organisational and personal 
resources that could affect compliance burnout and engagement. Study One also helped to 
develop a number of items to assess the identified constructs to be used in Study Two. In total 17 
users in three organisations participated in the interviews conducted in Study One. Findings from 
Study One coupled with an extensive literature review were used to develop a theoretical security 
compliance model, which was then tested quantitatively in Study Two. 
Study Two of this research involved conducting a survey as the method of data collection. 
Employees in organisations from three main cities in Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, and 
Hanoi) completed the survey. A two-step Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) process using 
AMOS was employed to analyse survey data to validate reliability and validity of both the 
measurement and structural model. Overall, the results of the quantitative data analysis confirmed 
both reliability and validity of the measurement and the structural model. The research model was 
examined quantitatively to determine the extent to which the model explains security compliance. 
 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 1.6
The validated theoretical model explains 47 per cent of the variance in security compliance, 54 
per cent in security engagement, and 26 per cent in security compliance burnout. 
The study identified three direct antecedents of security compliance including organisational 
security resources, security engagement and security compliance burnout. First, organisational 
security resources had the strongest direct and positive impact (effect=0.53, p<0.05) on security 
compliance of the three antecedents. Second, security engagement (effect=0.18, p<0.05) partially 
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and positively moderated the impact of organisational security resources on security compliance, 
and fully and positively moderated the impacts between security self-efficacy, security exposure, 
security skill requirements and security compliance. Finally, compliance burnout did not have a 
significant effect (effect=-0.10, p>0.05) on security compliance in the original study model. 
However, the effect of compliance burnout on security compliance became significant (effect=-
0.11, p<0.05) when the direct relationships between security self-efficacy and organisational 
resources with compliance burnout were removed. In other words, although security skills and 
organisational resources may not reduce compliance burnout, they buffered the impact of 
compliance burnout on security compliance. 
This research also explored several factors contributing to security compliance burnout. First, 
three characteristics of security tasks, namely security compliance overload, difficult access to 
security policies, and security skill requirements, contributed to security compliance burnout. 
While security compliance overload (effect=0.31, p<0.05) and difficult access to security policies 
(effect=0.28, p<0.05) were positively related to compliance burnout, security skill requirements 
(effect=-0.17, p<0.05) were negatively related to compliance burnout, which contradicts the 
original expectation. Besides, this research did not find significant relationships between 
organisational security resources and security self-efficacy with compliance burnout as initially 
theorised. Security exposure was positively related to compliance burnout (effect=0.12), which 
also contradicts the study’s original expectation. 
This research found four factors that affected security engagement including, organisational 
security resources effect=0.38, p<0.05), security self-efficacy (effect=0.35, p<0.05), security 
exposure (effect=0.13, p<0.05), and security skill requirements (effect=0.19, p<0.05). 
Organisational security resources are composed of security communication efficacy, skill use and 
development, rewards and sanctions. 
 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 1.7
Key contributions of this PhD research can be grouped into theoretical and practical aspects. In 
terms of the theoretical aspect, the research extends a work stress model to explain how a 
combination of organisational factors, including security demands and organisational resources, 
and personal attributes, such as self-efficacy and security exposure, can influence security 
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compliance. Motivational constructs from work stress literature such as burnout and engagement 
have been adapted in this research to describe the impact of stressful security demands and 
provisions of adequate resources (organisational and personal) on security behaviour. The 
research also developed a sufficiently validated instrument to measure both security compliance 
burnout and engagement constructs. By employing the mixed method approach, the thesis 
identified and quantitatively tested three characteristics of security demands, four of 
organisational security resources, and two of personal resources that are shown to affect 
employees’ security behaviour. Finally, the validated security compliance framework developed 
in this research can be extended to assess the impact of other types of security demands and 
organisational and personal characteristics on security compliance. 
In terms of the practical aspect, the research’s findings provide useful insights to assist 
practitioners to develop effective security programs for organisations. Organisations need to be 
aware of users’ burnout due to complying with security demands. Even though compliance 
burnout may not be fully avoidable, provision of effective security communication, competence-
based training, and evaluation of security behaviour can reduce the negative effect of compliance 
burnout on security behaviour. More importantly, security engagement, which reflects energy and 
enthusiasm in fulfilling security tasks, can encourage employees to focus more on utilising 
resources and to be less affected by stressful security demands. In other words, instead of mainly 
trying to reduce security tasks’ inconvenience, organisations can identify and focus on resources 
that promote the security engagement of employees the most, which then leads to expected 
security behaviour. One example is the customisation of security controls for different groups of 
IT users to satisfy work needs and facilitate their security skill use and development. Another 
example can be that organisations should also establish appropriate security compliance 
evaluation schemes that intrinsically reward employees’ security practice. Security training 
should employ relevant and real security scenarios to promote security engagement. Finally, 
organisations should make security practice sufficiently skill demanding to entice users to develop 
competence when being involved with security activities. 
 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 1.8
The remainder of the thesis is organised into seven chapters. Each chapter is explained as follows. 
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The next chapter, Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of security compliance literature 
and explains the formulation of research questions. 
Chapter 3 describes the philosophical stance, research procedure, and research method of this 
thesis, which followed an exploratory sequential design of mixed methods approach involving 
two separate studies. 
Chapter 4 presents the qualitative study (Study One) of organisational security compliance. The 
Study One aimed to explore several aspects of security demands, organisational security resources 
and personal resources and their impacts on compliance burnout and engagement. The identified 
factors were then used to refine the theoretical model, which was then tested in the following 
quantitative study (Study Two). 
Chapter 5 describes the research design of Study Two that aimed to test the theoretical model 
developed from the literature review and Study One. Study Two involved a correlational research 
design using questionnaire surveys. 
Chapter 6 reports survey participant profiles, data preparation process for multivariate analysis 
and the results of measurement model validity testing. 
Chapter 7 presents the assessment results of the structural model validity together with hypothesis 
testing. Discussions of the research findings are also provided in this chapter.  
Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with highlights of key research findings, a summary of the 
contributions of the research to the current body of knowledge, as well as practical implications 
for security practitioners. Limitations of the study and venues for future research are also 
provided. Final concluding remarks close the chapter and the thesis. 
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 - LITERATURE REVIEW AND CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 INTRODUCTION 2.1
This chapter examines behavioural security compliance and work stress literature in order to 
construct a conceptual model that may explain employees’ security compliance at work. This 
research will ascertain the effects of compliance burnout and security engagement as mediating 
factors of security demands, and organisational and personal resources on compliance. Factors 
that are drawn from the extended Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model (a work stress 
framework) and critical to effective employees’ security behaviour will be assessed. 
Effective security programs rely on users’ security compliance at work, which is pertinent to how 
users safely (or unsafely) access and use IT networks and services in order to abide by security 
policies or procedures. The effectiveness of physical and technical security measures depends on 
whether employees are aware of user requirements in the security policies and whether they 
perform the specified tasks. Identifying factors that can positively influence security behaviour is 
one of the main focuses of recent behavioural security research.  
This chapter starts with an overview of organisational security purposes and the role of user 
compliance in achieving them. Next, contents of a security policy are described to explain the 
‘what’ and ‘why’ of setting out the expectations of user security behaviour. The following section 
then provides a critical review of several behavioural theories, which have been employed to 
assess possible determinants of users’ compliance intention and behaviour. Research gaps 
identified from the review indicate the need to explore characteristics of security demands that 
can cause compliance stress, and the impact of emotional engagement (i.e. energy and 
enthusiasm) in performing security activities on security behaviour. The sections that follow 
present the extended Job Demands-Resources model as the underpinning framework to ascertain 
organisational and personal factors that can affect compliance stress and engagement, which are 
then used to develop the conceptual stress-based compliance model of this research.  
 11 
 
 OVERVIEW OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES AND 2.2
THE ROLE OF SECURITY COMPLIANCE 
This section explains key concepts related to security management, security compliance, and 
security policies, in order to set out the main themes of this research. First, an overview of 
organisational security management and IT user security compliance is presented. Second, the 
content and purpose of security policies are described to understand “what” and “why” of security 
compliance. Finally, what constitutes the performance of security compliance in this research is 
explained  
 Objectives of Security Management and Security Compliance 2.2.1
The main objective of information security is to protect confidentiality, integrity and the 
availability of respective data, information and organisational computer services (Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2001). Protecting confidentiality is about ensuring that information can be accessible 
only by those who are authorised; information integrity measures protect the accuracy and 
completeness of information and processing methods, and information access and availability is 
about guaranteeing that authorised users have access to information and associated information 
resources (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). For example, information confidentiality can be 
protected by authentication with username/password, data integrity with checksum and data 
verification, and availability with data and service backup, and authorisation techniques. In other 
words, information security is the practice of defending the safety of data and information in a 
computer system against unauthorised disclosure, modification, or destruction. Information 
security also protects the computer system itself and resources against unauthorised use, 
modification, or denial of service (von Solms and von Solms 2004).  
Traditionally, information security measures were designed to address security risks in four 
phases: deterrence, prevention, detection and recovery (Warkentin and Willison 2009). The 
deterrence and prevention phases aim to discourage individuals located within or outside the 
organisation from intentionally or accidentally violating security policies or procedures, which 
may lead to compromises of confidentiality, integrity or availability of information and 
computing resources. The detection and recovery phases aim to detect unauthorised security 
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activities and recover damaged information or systems and restore them to their original 
conditions prior to the security violation. 
Organisations often introduce physical, technical, and administrative security measures to guide 
safe IT use and prevent users from intentionally violating security policies and compromising the 
organisational information security (Padayachee 2012). Specifically, physical security measures, 
such as door locks, security badges, fire extinguishers, and access alarms, can be effective during 
the deterrence and prevention phases. Technical measures can include employing 
username/password, data encryption, antivirus software, and access control systems. 
Administrative security measures are more user-oriented techniques that provide guidance and 
requirements for IT users’ security behaviour, and these measures are aimed at encouraging safe 
security practice and deterring malicious computer abuses. Examples of administrative security 
measures include establishing security policies and procedures, which improve security 
awareness, technical training and security compliance supervision (Crossler et al. 2013). 
Of the three types of information security measures (i.e. physical, technical and administrative), 
effectiveness of administrative measures relies greatly on levels of awareness and compliance 
among IT users. Administrative security measures are mainly specified in information security 
policies (Höne and Eloff 2002). In fact, most research on security compliance has focused on 
understanding user compliance with security policies (Crossler et al. 2013, Warkentin and 
Willison 2009, Sommestad et al. 2014). 
With the advancement of security technologies, certain technical security measures can be 
automated and therefore little user involvement is required, thus reducing the potential for human 
errors while ensuring information security objectives. For some security measures or practices 
that cannot be fully automated, however, user compliance is vital to ensure effective security 
management. Security compliance describes the behaviour of users, who, for whatever reason 
may or may not follow an organisation’s security policies when accessing corporate IT networks 
and services (Warkentin and Willison 2009). Security measures are less effective if the employees 
do not use them and choose to act unsafely. For example, automatically scheduled password 
changes together with password complexity checks can minimise reliance on users to regularly 
update and use difficult-to-guess passwords. Hence, users may change passwords repeatedly and 
have to create difficult-to-guess ones. However, some users may resort to writing down 
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passwords on a sticky note and attaching the note to their computer for easy access. These types 
of unsafe practices can defeat even the most sophisticated security systems. 
Users’ failure to follow security procedures is the most common cause of security problems rather 
than deliberate harmful external attack events (Chang and Ho 2006, Crossler et al. 2013). The 
organisation’s security success or failure effectively depends on the compliance actions that 
employees choose to apply (Siponen et al. 2009). Various organisational and personal factors can 
influence how employees respond to security requirements (Furnell and Rajendran 2012). This 
research aims to identify and examine which organisational and personal factors can influence 
employees’ security compliance and to what extent. 
In this research, security compliance comprises both the use of technical measures and the 
exercise of cautious security care. Users can employ security measures, such as antivirus 
software, secure storages, password protector software, and practice safe non-technical security 
care, such as being cautious of suspicious email attachments or checking security-warning 
messages before running an application, to minimise negative impacts of security threats to 
organisations. The combination of using technical measures and security caution can encapsulate 
realistic security behaviour, since employees need not only follow prescribed policies but also act 
responsibly for non-ordinary security cases, which may not be specified in the policies. This way 
of measuring security compliance is consistent with (Rhee et al. 2009). 
To provide a better understanding of security policies and their roles with users’ compliance, the 
following section provides an overview of the content and purposes of organisational security 
policies and their implications for IT user security compliance. 
 Four Main Components of Information Security Policies  2.2.2
Information security policies are formal organisational documents that explain the reasons for the 
security measures and specify the roles of all identified stake-holders in the development and use 
of relevant security tasks (von Solms and von Solms 2004). There is no single way to develop an 
effective information security policy. In fact, it has been a challenge to develop policies in 
organisations where a “copy and paste” practice is quite common (Höne and Eloff 2002). 
Organisations often modify commercially available security policy templates without taking into 
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account their business objectives or culture, thus reducing the effectiveness of the policy on 
implementation (Höne and Eloff 2002). 
Users can resort to security policies as the official organisational security documents for 
instructions and guidance to fulfil their security compliance. Organisations can mandate IS 
policies and provide training to users, however, content clarity and easy access to security policies 
can affect users’ willingness to use the documents for compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
Nonetheless, even clearly defined policies may not guarantee security compliance (von Solms and 
von Solms 2004). Since the security policies can play a significant role in affecting security 
compliance, this research is interested in exploring how effective communication and access of 
security policies can affect users’ compliance.  
Four main components of a security policy have been identified as having considerable impact on 
user security compliance (Höne and Eloff 2002). 
 Objectives of information security policy 
 Information security principles 
 Roles and responsibilities of stake-holders 
 Descriptions of violations and disciplinary actions 
These four components of information security policy answer the ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions that 
support the development and implementation of effective organisational policies (Höne and Eloff 
2002, Knapp et al. 2009). 
 Objectives of Information Security 2.2.2.1
The standard objectives of information security programs cover assurance of confidentiality, 
information integrity, and information resources availability. Information security’s main 
objectives should be linked to the organisation’s business objectives and consider key functional 
operations and the nature of the business (Höne and Eloff 2002). Secure business operations and 
risks to key transactions, information and customer relationships justify the need for effective 
information security and user compliance. 
An individual’s perception of organisational security objectives can be important to his/her 
security behaviour. If employees perceive fairness and justice in how their organisation apply the 
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IT policies, people can be more likely to comply with these policies (Crossler et al. 2013). As a 
result, communication of security requirements should also convey clearly the objectives of the IT 
policies. 
 Information Security Principles 2.2.2.2
Another component of the policies is information security principles, which describe general 
business rules applied to organisational security systems. These rules explain appropriate security 
behaviour that is specific to the organisation, industry and profession. In addition, security 
principles can be guided by common laws (e.g. privacy), professional standards and ethical 
guidelines that are generic to most organisations. For example, an international standard such as 
ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO 27001:2013) describes best practice for an information security 
management system (ISO-27001 2015). An organisation’s security systems can be ISO-27001 
accredited by demonstrating that the systems follow international information security best 
practice. Information security principles provide general guidelines so that individuals can make 
wise security decisions in various contexts. Figure 2-1shows an example of four information 
security principles from an international university in Vietnam. 
1. Overview of Information Security: identify stakeholders of the systems, applicable policy 
2. Security Culture: specify overall responsibilities of stakeholders 
3. Third Party Security: guidelines for external access to corporate information 
4. Reporting Information Security Incidents: guidelines to report security incidents 
Figure 2-1: Sample of Information Security Principles 
In the overview of information security section, key stakeholders of the information system are 
identified, and the Privacy and Information Management Policy is set as the overall guidelines for 
handling corporate information. The section on security culture sets out the overall 
responsibilities of the users and the organisation in promoting appropriate information security 
practices. Third party security stipulates general requirements for third parties in handling the 
university’s information and systems. Finally, reporting information security incidents reminds 
the users to report actual or suspected information security breaches using a defined incident 
process. 
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The employees may have to deal with security cases that have not been clearly defined in the 
policy. In that case, guidelines from the security principles can provide a good basis for 
appropriate interpretation and responsible security actions. Communication of security policies 
needs to explain the applicable principles so that the employees can have a suitable sense of 
general security behaviour in different contexts.  
 Roles and Responsibilities of Organisational Stakeholders 2.2.2.3
Specification of roles and responsibilities for IT system stakeholders is probably the most 
important part of a security policy (Cox 2012, Son 2011, Höne and Eloff 2002). IT system 
stakeholders need to know their roles and responsibilities to help achieve security policy 
objectives and principles. For example, an organisation must be responsible to provide a secure 
working environment and security awareness training for their users. In the meantime, users 
should be aware and capable to perform relevant security tasks when accessing organisational 
networks and services (Pham et al. 2015, Siponen et al. 2014).  
Organisations do not just specify what and how users should fulfil their security roles and 
responsibilities. It is also the organisation’s responsibility to support and guide users’ compliance. 
Provision of an organisation’s supporting services, such as awareness training and facilitating 
conditions, can facilitate user compliance (Ng et al. 2009). However, it is unclear which services 
can be relevant and effective to encourage compliance. Furthermore, determining skills and 
capabilities that users must possess to fulfil security tasks can help organisations formulate 
appropriate training programs. This research will also examine the connection between the 
provision of an organisation’s resources and personal security skills and compliance.  
 Security Violations and Disciplinary Actions 2.2.2.4
The last component of a security policy typically incorporates details of any disciplinary actions 
for non-compliance, which can serve as a deterrent measure for user behaviour. Non-compliance 
can be categorised into intentional (i.e. employees violate security policies that they are aware of) 
or unintentional (i.e. employees violate security policies because they lack knowledge of the 
existence of security policies) (Guo and Yuan 2012). It is advised that sanctions for security 
violations should be directly related to the organisation’s overall disciplinary policy to be 
effective (Höne and Eloff 2002). This means security compliance should be defined and expected 
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as part of an employee’s job responsibilities and it should be in direct accordance with 
organisational policies (Guo 2013). 
The use of sanctions against security non-compliance has been widely studied (Hovav and 
D’Arcy 2012, Hu et al. 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b). Effectiveness of employing disciplinary 
measures against non-compliance has been shown to be inconsistent (Hu et al. 2011, Kankanhalli 
et al. 2003). Though stipulation of disciplinary actions for non-compliance can exist in most 
security polices, detecting non-compliant practice and enforcement of the policies can be a 
challenge. For example, identifying computer abuses can be difficult since insider culprits are 
legitimate users. Due to the extended time interval between an unsafe security practice and 
detection of a security breach, most organisations are not even aware of the breach. It is desirable 
that employees would actively engage with security tasks without the need to be fearful of 
sanctions for making a mistake. Strict formal sanctions and computer usage monitoring as a 
measure to enforce compliance can negatively affect staff trust and morale (Li et al. 2010). 
The previous sections have supplied an explanation of the security compliance construct, contents 
and purposes of security policies, and how communication of the policies may influence users’ 
compliance. The following sections offer a review of current approaches to influence security 
compliance intention, behaviour and discuss venues for further research opportunities. 
 REVIEW OF BEHAVIOURAL SECURITY COMPLIANCE 2.3
THEORIES 
This section discusses several existing theories that have been employed to understand security 
compliance behaviour. Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) as an overarching 
framework, factors drawn from the TPB, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), General 
Deterrence Theory (GDT), and Rational Choice Theory (RCT) are examined in terms of their 
effect on compliance intention and behaviour.  
Security compliance refers to the behaviour of users in accordance with security polices when 
accessing and using the IT network and services. Thus, behavioural theories have been used 
widely in security compliance literature to understand factors that motivate user security 
compliance (Sommestad et al. 2014, Aurigemma and Panko 2012). The TPB is one of the most 
influential frameworks for studying human behaviour, as it explains behavioural antecedents 
 18 
 
(Ajzen 2001). The TPB states that perceived behaviour control, attitude towards the behaviour, 
and subjective norms which predict intention, account for a considerable amount of actual 
behaviour (Ajzen 1991). For example, the TPB predicts that a customer may have an intention to 
buy a car if he/she knows how to drive it, whether he/she has a positive impression of some 
aspects of the car, and favourable feedback received from acquaintances that have purchased the 
same or similar vehicle. A strong purchase intention towards the car is a strong indication that the 
customer will buy it. 
Perceived behavioural control refers to evaluation of factors, whether internal or external, that 
facilitate or impede the performance of the behaviour (Ajzen 2002, Ajzen 1991). User attitudes 
towards behaviour can include positive or negative personal evaluation of performing (or not 
performing) a behaviour. Subjective norms are beliefs about other people’s expectations about the 
behaviour that results in perceived social pressure to perform (or not to perform).  
In other words, the TPB clearly distinguishes three different stages leading to behaviour. In stage 
one various factors can influence the attitude towards a behaviour. In stage two, behavioural 
controls, attitudes, and subjective norms influence an intention towards performing the behaviour, 
and lastly the intention significantly predicts the actual behaviour (Ajzen 2001) (see Figure 2-2). 
  
Figure 2-2: Theory of Planned Behaviour (Adapted from Ajzen (2001))  
In the context of security compliance, the TPB posits that if an employee (1) perceives sufficient 
capacity to complete the security task, (2) enjoys a favourable attitude towards performing it, and 
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(3) observes other people in the organisation are also actively performing the practice, he/she will 
likely comply, which can result in actual security compliance. Extensive studies in behavioural 
security compliance have explored antecedents of compliance attitudes, intention, and behaviour 
(Sommestad et al. 2014, Aurigemma and Panko 2012).  
In accordance with the TPB’s main argument on relationship between intention and behaviour, 
most studies on security compliance measured security intention as the dependent construct and 
argued that intention would lead to actual behaviour (Sommestad et al. 2014, Herath and Rao 
2009a, Herath and Rao 2009b, Vance and Siponen 2012, Pahnila et al. 2007). A main reason that 
most studies stopped short of recording actual security behaviour is that monitoring the behaviour 
in an organisation is difficult (Crossler et al. 2013). For instance, security behaviour can be 
recorded indirectly through electronic means, such as server logs, cameras, or through managerial 
monitoring of user behaviour. However, access to accurate security information sources detailing 
user security actions in organisational contexts can be confronting for research purposes due to 
cost and confidentiality concerns (Warkentina et al. 2012). Access to employees’ security practice 
in their own organisations is also an issue in this research. Appropriate methods to approach the 
studied organisations and their participants are carefully considered and an appropriate 
investigation that assures honest responses would be obtained was implemented. 
The majority of prior studies have used surveys to measure users’ intention to comply with 
information security policies through self-reported answers (Herath and Rao 2009b, Myyry et al. 
2009, Siponen et al. 2009, Vance et al. 2012, Johnston and Warkentin 2010, Bulgurcu et al. 
2010). Warkentina et al. (2012) criticise self-reported security behaviour responses as a research 
method because the connection between user intention (i.e. self-reported responses) and actual 
behaviour in a security context is usually unclear. A few studies employed realistic scenarios 
together with a survey method to disassociate the participants from being directly asked about 
their own intention to comply or not comply with security activities (Hu et al. 2011, Guo and 
Yuan 2012, Vance and Siponen 2012). The scenario-based approach allows participants to answer 
more truly sensitive questions with regard to the organisational security compliance context and 
their intention to comply in the constructed narrative (Warkentina et al. 2012). Due to practicality 
issues, this research plans to employ surveys to record self-reported responses from participants. 
To address limitations of the survey method, appropriate measures were employed to minimise 
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biased responses as much as possible. Details of survey instrument development are provided in 
Chapter 5. 
The following sections present factors from several behavioural theories that may predict security 
intention and behaviour using the TPB as the underpinning framework. 
 Perceived Behavioural Control 2.3.1
Perceived behavioural control refers to the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the security 
compliance requirements, which can depend on whether a person may, or may not, have the 
ability to perform the intended tasks. Perceived behavioural control can impact a person’s beliefs 
about their intentions and actions (Ajzen 2002). The concept of self-efficacy is described using 
Bandura (1977)’s Social Cognitive Theory, and Ajzen (1991)’s Theory of Planned Behaviour as a 
component of perceived behavioural control (Maddux and Volkmann 2010). The construct 
describing one’s self-confidence in their ability to mobilise motivation, cognitive resources, and 
actions needed to successfully complete a specific task within a given context. Self-efficacy 
influences the amount of effort, initiation and maintenance of coping efforts in adverse situations 
(Bandura 1997). 
Security self-efficacy describes an individual’s security knowledge and expertise that enables 
him/her to perform their security tasks, as well as cope with changing security requirements. Self-
efficacy is also included in Protection Motivation Theory, which theorises that knowledgeable 
and skilful employees are more amenable to take protective security tasks (Dang-Pham and 
Pittayachawan 2015, Vance et al. 2012). Self-efficacy has been recognised as a key factor that 
positively influences security compliance (Johnston and Warkentin 2010, Rhee et al. 2009). For 
example, self-efficacy was reported to have a positive impact on protection motivation and related 
compliance with security policies (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b), to 
strengthen security effort (Rhee et al. 2009), and directly influence individual security practice 
(Vance and Siponen 2012, Rhee et al. 2009).  
Another component of perceived behavioural control is locus of control, which is the perception 
of whether a person can control the outcome of their behaviour due to either internal or external 
factors (Ajzen 2002). Self-efficacy is often considered as an internal locus of control, while the 
external control in security compliance refers to organisational factors that may affect an 
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employee’s capacity to perform security tasks (Cox 2012). For example, employees need 
organisational resources, such as time to get acquainted with security policies, or easy access to 
the policies, or training required in order to comply with security policies (Pahnila et al. 2007). 
External locus of control was not consistently found to positively affect compliance intentions. 
Cox (2012) noticed that organisational supports did not contribute to perceived behavioural 
control or compliance intention. Pahnila et al. (2007) reported compliance facilitating conditions 
negatively affected compliance intention and argued that users viewed external security processes 
as the responsibilities of the organisation. Consequently, the more effective the security resources 
the more reliant employees would be on the organisation. In another study, Albrechtsen and 
Hovden (2009) interviewed both security managers and users in a Norwegian bank and an IT 
company with respect to their experiences and views on information security. The study’s 
findings revealed that users left the security responsibility to security managers and the 
technology due to lack of interaction between users and manager and trust in the organisation’s 
security systems. 
This research will explore further which organisational resources can be more effective in 
influencing security compliance. 
 Antecedents of Attitude towards Security Compliance 2.3.2
Several TPB-based studies have found that attitude towards a behaviour can be the strongest 
predictor of behavioural intent (Westaby 2005, Acquisti and Grossklags 2004, Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980). Likewise, the majority of security compliance literature has focused on investigating the 
compliance attitude and its antecedents to predict actual compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, 
Sommestad et al. 2014). Other behavioural theories have also been applied to explain how 
compliance attitudes can be formulated; thus appropriate measures can be used to alter user 
attitudes towards security compliance. Factors from three behavioural theories including PMT, 
GDT and RCT are now reviewed to explain how security compliance attitudes can be affected by 
various factors. 
 Severity and Vulnerability of Security Threats 2.3.2.1
PMT has been widely used to explain protective behaviour due to fear (Rogers 1975, Rogers 
1983). Individuals are motivated to protect themselves from physical, social and psychological 
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threats by invoking coping mechanisms, which are conducted by assessing threat and appraising 
relevant actions (Rogers 1983). PMT states that fear influences cognition, attitudes, intentions and 
protective actions Threat appraisal comprises assessment of perceived severity, vulnerability and 
rewards (benefits of taking a risk). Coping appraisal assessment comprises response efficacy, cost 
and self-efficacy, which determine how well people perceive themselves as being able to respond 
to a threat. Protection motivation (i.e. protective intention) is a mediating variable whose function 
is to evoke, sustain and direct protective behaviour, which facilitates the adoption of adaptive 
behaviours (taking the advised behaviours) if the execution of the advised behaviour leads to a 
reduction of fear (Suton 1982). In a situation where the performance of the advised behaviour 
does not lead to a reduction of fear, maladaptive coping actions, such as denial of the threat or 
avoidance of the fear-evoking message, may be used as a way of avoiding fear. PMT has been 
applied to health-related behaviours, such as reducing alcohol use (Stainback and Rogers 1983), 
enhancing healthy lifestyles (Stanley and Maddux 1986), enhancing diagnostic health behaviours 
(Rippetoe and Rogers 1987), and prevention of disease (Tanner et al. 1991). 
Unsafe security behaviour can be compared to making unhealthy behavioural choices. People 
comply with security measures to reduce the fear of breach consequences (Ifinedo 2011, Johnston 
and Warkentin 2010, Vance et al. 2012, Crossler et al. 2013). PMT-based compliance approaches 
argue that when facing a security threat, an employee conducts threat and coping assessments to 
determine an adaptive (compliance) or maladaptive response (non-compliance) (Vance et al. 
2012).  
The severity of a security threat is measured by the characteristics evidencing its negative impacts 
on the organisation including confidentiality, integrity, and availability of access to information 
and resources. Organisations are now assessing the potential impact of identified security risks to 
market reputation, industry compliance and economic loss (McFadzean et al. 2007). Perceived 
severity of a threat, such as the negative impact of opening an infected email attachment, will 
influence a user to behave more cautiously by limiting or eliminating such practice. 
Users are more likely to respond to security risks that are more certain than those less likely to 
happen (Rogers 1983). Vulnerability or likelihood of security threats represent how likely an 
employee perceives that an unwanted incident will happen, if they do not complete a required 
security task (Vance et al. 2012). However, individuals can have different perceptions of 
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vulnerability of the same security threat. One may perceive a security threat as very likely, while 
another feels quite the opposite (Ng et al. 2009). Consequently, for the same security risk an 
employee can take a preventive measure against the risk while another may ignore it since he/she 
does not think such risk would happen to him/her. 
Response efficacy assesses the perceived effectiveness of taking security measures to minimise 
the risk of a particular security threat. The resources and security measures that the organisations 
provide and implement to facilitate employees’ security compliance should demonstrate their 
effectiveness against the threats. Higher perceived effective security measures would influence an 
employee to take the recommended measures given alignment between their competence and the 
security system’s requirements (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b). Similar 
to the TPB the PMT also speculates that self-efficacy is a determinant of protection motivation. 
Self-efficacy can positively influence protective behaviour such as performing security tasks 
(Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b) 
PMT-based studies found evidence for mixed impacts of threat assessments on compliance 
attitudes and intentions. The security threat severity and the perceived effectiveness of the 
measures (i.e. response efficacy) have a strong influence on the intention of taking the advised 
security behaviour (Ifinedo 2011, Vance et al. 2012, Herath and Rao 2009b). Nevertheless, Cox 
(2012) did not find that risk severity had a significant role in users’ intention. Likewise, the 
impact of vulnerability on compliance intention was not clear. An insignificant impact of 
vulnerability on compliance intentions was observed (Vance et al. 2012, Workman et al. 2008), it 
was, however, identified as positively affecting compliance intention (Ifinedo 2011). 
Fear-based communications help promote security compliance by ensuring users are aware of the 
severity and vulnerability of security risks, and the effectiveness of preventative measures 
provided by the organisation. When facing potential security risks, people may assess the severity 
of the risks and act in a way to avoid the consequences, especially if non-compliance evokes a 
punishment. A clearly described and understood risk that is likely to occur would be more likely 
to have an impact on compliance choices. Given a similar level of a security threat, a less likely 
threat would have less influence on the user’s motivation to act safely and avoid risk. 
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There are some issues related to the effectiveness of using a fear-based compliance approach. 
Poor security communication makes it difficult for users to respond to a real security threat since 
they may underestimate the likelihood of the threat. Often users are motivated to respond to a 
security threat when the risk is evident and personal (Pfleeger and Caputo 2011). Nonetheless, 
factors such as complexity and high numbers of security threats would make users incapable of 
accurately assessing security risks (Schneier 2008, West 2008). Furthermore, little is known about 
the circumstances in which individuals feel fearful and the characteristics of the individuals that 
may serve to accentuate or diminish the emotion of fear in security compliance situations 
(Crossler et al. 2013). Finally, Brennan and Binney (2010) stated that externally motivated fears 
have a short term motivating influence and are not self-sustaining, hence they are not effective to 
motivate security compliance in the long term.  
In summary, the consequences of security threats can have an influence on protective behaviour 
given that reliable assessment is achieved and relevant threats are communicated to users. This 
research includes personal security risk-related experience in examining factors that may affect 
security behaviour. 
 Response Cost for Compliance 2.3.2.2
Attitudes towards security compliance can be drawn from RCT, which puts forward two premises 
for the consideration of an offence (non-compliance): (1) balancing of both costs and benefits of 
the offending, and (2) the decision maker’s perceived or subjective expectation of reward and cost 
(Becker 1968). 
Employees can regard security tasks as supportive tasks (secondary) to their main (primary) tasks, 
thus employees’ security compliance depends on the extent of the efforts or demands on work 
time he/she is required to exercise (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). The more employees are required to 
personally engage in fulfilling security tasks, the less compliant they become (Adams and Sasse 
1999). For example, a user needs to copy a document to his/her portable USB. The company’s 
information security policies require scanning of portable drives for infected viruses prior to 
performing the download. The users’ primary task is to copy the document to the USB, and virus 
scanning on the USB is secondary. Failure of the user to comply with the security policies on 
USB virus scanning may be due to his or her focus on the primary task at hand, and the security 
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task represents an obstacle to the shortest path to the primary goal (D.Weirich and Sasse 2001). 
Consequently, when a security procedure interferes with the primary task, a user may ignore or 
even interfere with the security measures, since the user is more focused on the primary task and 
the associated rewards (Adams and Sasse 1999).  
Correspondingly, the more a user perceives favourable rewards for non-compliance, the higher 
the chance he/she does not comply with security policies. An example of a reward for non-
compliance could be saving time (Woon et al. 2005). When the perceived direct costs to the users 
incurred from the security threat are lower than the indirect cost or effort required by the user to 
circumvent the threat, users can ignore security compliance requirements (Schneier 2008). 
Inconsistent findings on the impacts of compliance costs on intention to comply have been 
reported in prior studies. Herath and Rao (2009b) found response cost and security concerns did 
not significantly contribute to predicting compliance intentions. Ng et al. (2009) notices that a 
perceived barrier or inconvenience for practising safe email had an insignificant impact on the 
users’ safe email practice. Herath and Rao (2009b) observed that security response efficacy and 
self-efficacy had a direct and significant impact on compliance intentions, whereas response cost 
and security concerns did not appreciably contribute to predicting compliance intentions 
Vance et al. (2012), however, detected that compliance cost negatively influenced employees’ 
compliance intention. Vance et al. (2012) explained that employees considered the inconvenience 
of following information security policies a legitimate reason for not complying with those 
policies. Employees may find security compliance time-consuming and inconvenient as it has the 
potential to obstruct their daily routine work, which negatively impacts compliance levels (Vance 
and Siponen 2012, Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006).  
It is clear that there are inconsistent findings on the impact of compliance cost on security 
behaviour. Contextual factors such as organisational support and personal resources may affect 
the impact of personal response cost on compliance intention (Herath and Rao 2009b). One of the 
objectives of this research is to explore further how contextual factors from organisational and 
personal aspects can influence perceived cost of compliance. 
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 Sanctions for Non-Compliance and Rewards for Compliance 2.3.2.3
GDT has been used as a theoretical basis for understanding why employees follow (or do not 
follow) their organisation’s information security policies (Herath and Rao 2009b, Hu et al. 2011, 
Lee et al. 2004). GDT emphasises the use of punishments to deter people from offending, which 
proposes that individuals assess deterrent certainty and severity to determine actions to be taken 
when a violation of the rules occurs (Gibbs 1975). In a security compliance context, organisations 
might employ security mandates and disciplinary actions to manage and motivate compliance 
(Herath and Rao 2009a, Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
As a result, communications of certainty and severity of penalties for rule-breaking behaviour 
have been considered to be effective strategies in preventing employees from violating security 
policies. GDT-based security measures are mainly based on fear of punishment as an antecedent 
to changing an undesirable behaviour. However, the effectiveness of threats of punishment to 
achieve security compliance has been inconsistent. For example, fear of penalties for non-
compliance has been reported to have a significant impact on security behaviour (Herath and Rao 
2009a, Kankanhalli et al. 2003). These studies showed that if employees perceive high certainties 
of being caught for violating security policies, they were more likely to comply; moreover, the 
certainty of being detected outweighs fear of the punishment’s severity. On the contrary, other 
studies found that sanctions did not have a significant impact on actual compliance (Herath and 
Rao 2009b, Hu et al. 2011, Pahnila et al. 2007).  
Associated with sanctions for non-compliance, rewards can also be used to promote compliance. 
The use of rewards as an incentive for behaviour change can be effective in various contexts in 
education, organisational behaviour, and psychology (Luft 1994, Cameron and Pierce 2002, 
Eisenhardt 1985). Rewards can include tangible or intangible compensations that an organisation 
gives to an employee in return for compliance with the security requirements. Compensations 
may include monetary rewards, such as pay rises or bonuses, or nonmonetary rewards, including 
personal mention, formal recognition in oral or written assessment reports, and promotions 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010).  
Although the granting of rewards for security compliance may not yet be common practice (Guo 
and Yuan 2012), a few studies have discussed the possible role of rewards in encouraging 
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desirable security behaviours in the context of information security (Boss et al. 2009, Siponen et 
al. 2014, Pahnila et al. 2007). Boss et al. (2009) argued that rewards may increase how mandatory 
users perceive compliance with security policies, which in turn may enforce security precaution-
taking behaviour. Similarly, Pahnila et al. (2007) and Siponen et al. (2014) hypothesised that 
rewards would increase actual security compliance. Both studies, however, found rewards did not 
contribute to either how obligatory security compliance was perceived to be (Boss et al. 2009) or 
actual compliance (Pahnila et al. 2007). 
There are some reasons that may explain the inconsistent findings of the effectiveness of 
sanctions and lack of support for rewards in motivating security compliance. First, very few 
organisations implement schemes of sanctions and rewards for security compliance, so the actual 
effectiveness cannot be measured (Guo and Yuan 2012, Pahnila et al. 2007). Boss et al. (2009) 
explained that unlike other work tasks, there is little that an individual can do to exceed expected 
security compliance; hence organisations may not employ compliance rewards. Second, an impact 
of a security act may take a long time to materialise from the time of the action (West 2008). For 
example, a compromised account due to a weak password can be used to access the corporate 
network and steal confidential information even months after the password was created. Thus, 
penalising or rewarding a user in this case can be impractical for organisations due to time 
constraints and difficulty in the description of a concrete evidence trail (Guo and Yuan 2012). 
Lastly, employing a sanction and reward-based approach to enforce security compliance may 
negatively affect staff cooperation, discourage risk-taking, and prevent honest reporting of 
security incidents (Guo and Yuan 2012). Even worse, promoting compliance through sanctions 
could promote a culture of lies, deception, and avoidance of responsibility (Ramachandran et al. 
2008). 
Evaluation of users’ security behaviour can include sanctions and both monetary and non-
financial rewards. This research considers examining how these forms of evaluation can be 
relevant to and employees in respect of motivating security behaviour. 
 Subjective Norms 2.3.3
The impact of social influences on an individual’s behaviours and beliefs have been widely 
acknowledged (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Leenders 2002). Social influences are often referred 
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to as subjective norms (Ajzen 1991) and can take the form of introjected motivation (Gagné and 
Deci 2005). For instance, subjective norms refer to the users’ beliefs about the normative 
expectations and social pressure that drive people’s intention to perform security behaviours, as 
posited in the TPB (Ajzen 1991). Similarly, Self-Determination Theory (SDT) specifies the 
spectrum of motivating forces moves from amotivation (i.e. non-regulation) to extrinsic 
(externally applied) and to intrinsic motivation (i.e. self-determination), which shift the 
responsibility for compliance from ‘other’ to ‘self’ (Ryan and Deci 2000b) (see Figure 2-3). SDT 
argues that people can become self-motivating via a series of regulatory processes from non-
regulation through self-regulation to incrementally internalising the requirements of the task until 
they become self-motivated. This research will examine the role of intrinsic motivation’s impact 
on security compliance behaviour. 
 
Figure 2-3: Self-Determination Theory (adapted from Ryan and Deci (2000b)) 
Self-motivation for security compliance is the ideal where people can be trusted to work within 
relevant parameters without surveillance, thereby decreasing costs of security monitoring. In the 
absence of self-motivation, extrinsic factors and other people (social influences and relatedness) 
can motivate people to comply with security requirements. Members of a work environment, such 
as peers, colleagues or supervisors, can exert social influence on an individual to perform security 
tasks (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). If an employee believes that other important members in 
the workplace expect security compliance from him/her, then he/she is more likely to perform 
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appropriate security tasks (Pahnila et al. 2007, Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Johnston and Warkentin 
2010). Subjective norms are sometimes also referred to as social influence (Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010) or normative beliefs (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Pahnila et al. 2007). The positive 
effect of subjective norms on compliance intention has been reported in several studies (Vance et 
al. 2012, Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Herath and Rao 2009b, Johnston and Warkentin 2010).  
The motivating spectrum and its respective regulatory processes proposed in SDT (Ryan and Deci 
2000a) have an important implication for this research. In assessing determinants of security 
compliance, this research needs to include factors that can influence externally regulated 
compliance, such as financial rewards and sanctions, or intrinsically regulated compliance, such 
as self-control and competence development (Ryan and Deci 2000b). 
 Identification of Research Gaps 2.3.4
While existing studies employing numerous behavioural theories provide a solid foundation for 
explaining employees’ security compliance decisions, a complete knowledge of the phenomenon 
remains a challenge. Evidence of the incomplete knowledge can be shown in the percentage of 
explained variance of the compliance variable outcome in existing security compliance models, 
which varies between 25-70 per cent range (Herath and Rao 2009a, Sommestad et al. 2014, 
Johnston and Warkentin 2010, Ifinedo 2011, Cox 2012). A complete understanding of security 
behaviour is problematic because it can be affected by many environmental and personal factors 
Furnell and Rajendran (2012) identified a mix of job characteristics, and organisational and non-
work factors that all play a role in affecting employees’ security compliance. To complicate the 
issue further, individuals’ personality attributes can also act as a filter of the environmental impact 
and affect individual attitudes and behaviour toward security behaviour (Furnell and Rajendran 
2012, Pfleeger and Caputo 2011). 
Security compliance approaches founded on PMT mainly employ fear of security threats and 
effectiveness of security responses to encourage the adoption of security tasks. A security threat 
fear-based approach is unreliable, as risks can be difficult to assess by untrained users who may 
not be fully cognizant of the security risks of clicking on a suspicious link sent in an email or 
Skype chat. Furthermore, individuals tend to have various biases such as optimism that will 
influence security behavioural choices. Fear-based motivation often has only a short-term effect 
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on achievement of the desired behaviour (Brennan and Binney 2010). It is difficult for the users to 
experience fear of security threats on a regular basis when such incidents can be rare. 
GDT recommends the use of sanctions or punishment to achieve a desirable action. The 
employees would be concerned about the severe penalty and certitude of being discovered for 
violating security policies. Whilst disciplinary actions can deter detectable non-compliance it may 
not encourage compliance with security tasks that cannot be monitored (e.g. not reporting security 
incidents, not taking care for unknown security viruses). Fear of formal sanctions due to non-
compliance can lead to an evasive response where employees conceal mistakes and blame others. 
Concealment of security non-compliance may cause security issues not to be detected early. 
Appropriate measures can be taken to stop the threats from compromising the security systems if 
users provide early warning and detection of security breaches. Moreover, discerning security 
non-compliance can be difficult and costly. 
RCT suggests that the cost of compliance and rewards of non-compliance, such as time and 
convenience, can affect security compliance. The cost of security compliance is almost inevitably 
due to the necessary involvement of users with security tasks. Though cost of security compliance 
has been reported to have different influences on compliance (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, 
Workman et al. 2008), there is an insufficient comprehension of which security tasks contribute 
more to compliance cost and whether low perceived cost can improve the behaviour. 
Table 2-1 summarises key factors and challenges of each behavioural theory to influence 
compliance attitude, intention and behaviour 
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Table 2-1: Summary of Behavioural Security Theories 
Theory Description Challenges 
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Cox 2012, 
Ifinedo 2011) 
Key factors: self-efficacy to perform security tasks, attitudes 
toward compliance and security practice of other stakeholders. 
Security compliance can be enhanced by developing self-
efficacy, creating a positive attitude toward security tasks, and 
establishing an organisational safe security culture. 
A main assumption that compliance intention would lead to security 
behaviour. 
May not accurately capture determinants of actual security behaviour. 
Need to employ methods of recording true security behaviour and 
less reliant on self-reported responses. 
Protection Motivation 
Theory (Dang-Pham and 
Pittayachawan 2015, Vance 
et al. 2012, Herath and Rao 
2009b) 
Factors: fear of consequences of security threats, effectiveness 
of response measures 
Security compliance can be encouraged by communicating 
security risk severity and vulnerability, effectiveness of security 
measures, and training to enhance self-efficacy. 
Focusing on nature of security risks. 
Accurate risk assessment is difficult due to its complexity and subject 
to behavioural biases, which affect individuals’ ability to assess a risk 
objectively and accurately. 
Short-term effectiveness in changing security behaviour. 
General Deterrence Theory 
(Hovav and D’Arcy 2012, 
Hu et al. 2011, Herath and 
Rao 2009b) 
Key factors: fear of severity and likelihood of sanctions for non-
compliance. 
Security compliance can be achieved employing strict security 
behaviour monitoring and implementation of disciplinary 
actions. 
Focusing external enforcement measures.  
Costly security monitoring can have negative impact on staff morale 
and cooperation. 
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Rational Choice Theory 
(Vance and Siponen 2012, 
Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Li et 
al. 2010) 
Key factors: perceived extrinsic cost and benefits of performing 
security tasks. 
Security compliance can be motivated by streamlining security 
processes, minimising impacts of security tasks on work 
productivity, and providing resources to facilitate users’ 
compliance. 
Security compliance cost may be unavoidable. Lack of immediate 
benefits of compliance. 
Lack of understanding of characteristics of security tasks and 
compliance cost. 
Low compliance cost still does not guarantee better compliance. 
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A mix of job characteristics, organisational factors, workplace-independent influences and 
personality attributes can influence security compliance (Furnell and Rajendran 2012). Based on 
the review of the behavioural compliance theories above, several research gaps are now 
presented that this thesis aims to investigate.  
Complying with security requirements can require additional effort and time, which can lead to 
physical and psychological exhaustion over extended time periods (Demerouti et al. 2001). 
However, the impact of compliance cost on safe security intention and behaviour has been 
inconsistently reported (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Workman et al. 2008, Furnell and 
Rajendran 2012). Few studies have examined how users develop cognitive and emotional stress 
due to continuing fulfillment of security demands. There is a lack of information system 
literature that explores what aspects of security demands constitute negative or stressful 
compliance that can affect security behaviour (D'Arcy et al. 2014). The authors argued that the 
nature of security tasks can cause stress and increase moral disengagement, which lead to 
security non-compliance. Most security compliance studies have examined factors that influence 
users’ involvement with security tasks. However, the energetic state or intrinsic motivation of 
such involvement, which is the security engagement, has not been investigated, (Naudé and 
Rothmann 2006, Van Wyk et al. 2003). The concept of security engagement is drawn from work 
engagement which has been identified as a critical source to motivate and maintain work 
commitment and performance in various contexts (Bakken and Torp 2012, Crawford et al. 2010, 
Bezuidenhout and Cilliers 2010).  
Emboldening employees to become involved with security activities is important; nevertheless, 
the level of emotional and cognitive resources that people bring to performing security tasks 
might be the key to maintenance of expected security behaviour, even in an unfavourable 
security environment (Bakken and Torp 2012, Crawford et al. 2010, May et al. 2004). Although 
work engagement and its determinants have been largely explored (Schaufeli and Salanova 2007, 
Schaufeli and Bakker 2004), factors that influence engagement with security tasks and activities 
have not yet been fully examined. 
The following section presents the Job Demands-Resources model (Schaufeli and Bakker 2004, 
Demerouti et al. 2001) as a theoretical framework to understand how users can develop cognitive 
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and emotional stress due to security demands, and the ways that energetic engagement with 
security tasks can be established.  
 DEVELOPMENT OF A STRESS-BASED SECURITY COMPLIANCE 2.4
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The Job Demands-Resources model (JD-R) is a work stress model, which explains that 
employees’ performance and well-being can be affected by both job demands and resources via 
the competing motivational processes of work burnout and engagement (Demerouti et al. 2001). 
Personal resources have been included in the extended JD-R model as a moderating factor 
between demands, resources, burnout and engagement that influence job performance, 
commitment and satisfaction (Bandura 1997, Bakker et al. 2010, Toner et al. 2012). Given the 
JD-R model’s significant relevance to security demands, resources, and the motivational 
processes of compliance burnout and engagement discussed in the previous section, the main 
research question of this research is constructed as follows. 
 How do security demands, organisational and personal resources affect security 
compliance? 
This research argues that the level of compliance burnout is a result of the combination of 
stressful security demands and lack of resources (organisational and personal) to cope with those 
demands. Complying with security demands is an energy-draining process that leads to 
exhaustion and cynicism about the security programs (Schaufeli &Bakker, 2004). Burnout 
reduces security focus and attention and can result in negative attitudes toward security tasks, 
hence lowering users’ security performance. On the contrary, security engagement is the extent 
of energy and enthusiasm in performing security tasks, which is an outcome of receiving 
organisational and personal resources in response to security demands. Security engagement is 
hypothesised to positively affect security compliance. 
Based on the developed arguments on the role of burnout and engagement in the compliance 
process, the main research question is further elaborated into two questions that this research 
attempts to examine. 
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 RQ1: To what extent does security compliance burnout mediate the impact of (1) security 
demands, and (2) organisational and (3) personal resources on security compliance? 
 RQ2: To what extent does security engagement mediate the impact of (1) organisational 
and (2) personal resources on security compliance? 
A limitation of the JD-R model is that it does not include relevant predictors of either employee 
burnout or engagement (Crawford et al. 2010). In particular, it does not specify which work 
demands are the determinants of burnout or resources effective in buffering burnout and 
increasing engagement. Though there are observations of various security tasks that can incur 
response cost more than others, there is a paucity of a systematic review of which particular 
aspects of security demands can constitute negative or stressful security experience. Similarly, no 
specific security resources have been identified to reduce security demands’ associated physical 
and psychological costs, promote security engagement and achieve security goals (Demerouti et 
al. 2001). This research endeavours to explore the characteristics of security demands and 
resources (organisational and personal) that can contribute to compliance burnout and 
engagement and determine to what extent it can negatively affect users’ complying with security 
measures.  
The following sections present analysis of key components of the JD-R model in the context of 
security compliance taking into account its organisational and individual personal characteristics. 
 Security Demands and Compliance Burnout 2.4.1
A key component of the JD-R model is job demands which cover physical, social, or 
organisational aspects of the job that require physical and/or psychological effort to fulfil. 
Examples of job demands are work overload, complexity, and job insecurity (Demerouti et al. 
2001). The higher the job demands, the greater the effort including the physical and 
psychological cost which must be spent to achieve the goals, maintain performance and prevent 
psychological exhaustion. As a result, fulfilment of job demands can incur prolonged physical 
and psychological cost, eventually leading to work burnout - a negative psychological state. 
Work burnout is a main determinant of undesirable employee behaviour, such as low work 
productivity and deviance (Gilboa et al. 2008), negative job strain and impaired health 
(Demerouti et al. 2009), and psychological distress (Bruck et al. 2002). Burnout describes a state 
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of mental weariness, which includes two dimensions: exhaustion measuring fatigue and cynicism 
reflecting a distant attitude towards work (Schaufeli and Bakker 2004). Job demands and their 
associated burnout can be extended to security demands and compliance burnout due to their 
fulfilment. 
Security demands are security tasks and procedures that employees must perform as part of their 
responsibilities, such as accessing security policies for instructions and guidance, acquiring skills 
and knowledge to deal with changing security environments, and using security measures. 
Certain aspects of security requirements were demonstrated to affect users negatively. For 
example, the perceived cost of personal security responses has been proven to have different 
impacts on compliance intention and behaviour (Vance and Siponen 2012, Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh 2006). People can view inconvenient, work hindering and time-consuming aspects of 
security tasks as a legitimate reason for not utilising a security measure (Schneier 2008, 
Bulgurcu et al. 2010). For example, an automated virus scan can disrupt an employee’s intended 
work task because his or her computer slows down during the scan. Here the security task poses 
a work impediment to the employee. Work impediment of security tasks was reported to increase 
perceived cost of compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) and negatively impact compliance intention 
(Vance and Siponen 2012, Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006). Complex and time-consuming security 
tasks such as use of security email was noticed to increase employees’ stressful reactions 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010), or fast changing security environment contributed to internal 
security abuse (Posey et al. 2011). 
The impact of stressful security demands on security behaviour can be assessed under the 
phenomenon of technology stress due to human cognitive limitations and inability to adapt to 
rapid advances in technology (Shu et al. 2011). Information overload, and uncertainty and 
complexity of information systems can lead to technology stress in IT users, which may 
negatively influence effective technology use and productivity (Salanova et al. 2013). Under 
technology stress, employees can feel negative affective experiences, such as exhaustion, 
scepticism and inefficacy towards the use of ICT, which then reduces professional commitment 
and effective use of the technology (Salanova et al. 2013). Technology stress is similar to 
compliance burnout in a security context where people can develop negative psychological states 
such as exhaustion and a distant attitude toward the use of security technologies. 
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Adapting from the concepts of work burnout and technology stress, security compliance burnout 
reflects psychological exhaustion and cynicism toward complying with assigned security tasks 
and exercising security precautions. This research assumes that, due to the existence of high 
security demands and lack of resources, the employees experience an energy-draining process 
that results in fatigue and cynical views of security programs (Salanova et al. 2013, Schaufeli 
and Bakker 2004). Such negative psychological affective experiences would reduce cognitive 
attention and focus, as well as commitment in performing security compliance tasks.  
Organisations develop security policies and procedures to require and guide employees to use 
available security resources and perform their responsibilities when dealing with information and 
computer resources. To fulfill these security responsibilities, which can vary in relation to the 
task volume and/or complexity, the users may need to acquire a certain level of computer and/or 
security knowledge and to spend time in applying security measures. Fulfilling expected security 
requirements can affect burnout if employees find performing security tasks to be time 
consuming, unclear, inconvenient and obstructing their daily work. Compliance burnout also 
occurs when security tasks require extra time, computer experience and/or security knowledge 
which the employees may not possess. Finally, performing security tasks can add an extra 
workload on already stressed staff. Performing a high and/or frequent number of security 
measures requires IT users to spend extra time and handle workflow disruption while still being 
required to quickly respond to other work demands that can create anxiety, tension and make 
sustained mental attention difficult, thus reducing their security effort (Salanova et al. 2013). 
To answer the main research question set out in Section 2.4 in this chapter, it is essential to 
explore which security demands can affect users’ compliance burnout. The following research 
question needs to be investigated.  
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout? 
The following hypothesis is proposed to explain the impact of security demands on compliance 
burnout. 
 H1: Security demands are positively related to security compliance burnout 
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 Organisational Security Resources, Security Compliance Burnout and 2.4.2
Engagement 
Job resources are those physical, social, or organisational aspects of the job that help facilitate 
achievement of work goals by reducing job demands’ associated physical and psychological 
costs, and promoting personal growth and development (Demerouti et al. 2001). Examples of job 
resources are performance feedback, job control, and financial rewards (Schaufeli and Taris 
2014). The revised JD-R model incorporated the positive-psychological component namely work 
engagement as a result of receiving adequate job resources (Schaufeli and Bakker 2004). 
Work engagement is considered as a motivational process that is created by job resources and 
mediates the impact of job demands and organisational commitment and performance (Schaufeli 
and Taris 2014). There are several definitions for engagement. Schaufeli and Taris (2014) 
describe it as a persistent positive, fulfilling, work-related state of mind comprised of three 
psychological states: vigour, dedication, and absorption. Vigour represents the high level of 
energy and mental resilience in doing a task. Dedication is connected with enthusiasm, 
commitment, and persistence; and absorption means being focused and capable of effortless 
concentration, and intrinsic enjoyment. Naudé and Rothmann (2006) define engagement as an 
energetic state of performance in which the employee excels at performance at work and is 
confident of his or her effectiveness. Similarly, Van Wyk et al. (2003) explain that engagement is 
similar to involvement, though it also includes energy and effectiveness aspects. Research on 
engagement has consistently demonstrated that it is associated with positive job attitudes 
(Schaufeli et al. 2008) and higher levels of performance at individual and unit levels (Harter et 
al. 2002, Salanova et al. 2005). Engagement in education has been acknowledged as a source of 
achievement and school behaviour across different levels of economic and social conditions 
(Klem and Connell 2004, Handelsman et al. 2005), and resultant academic behavioural and 
social outcomes (Furrer et al. 2006). It is essential that people employ their physical, emotional 
and cognitive resources when they engage at work (May et al. 2004). Engagement can also be 
claimed to be a form of intrinsic motivation that comprises interest, enjoyment, and internal 
satisfaction in the regulatory process (Ryan and Deci 2000a). In summary, work engagement 
includes elements of positive attitude toward the tasks, and energetic and mental resilience in 
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performing them, which can be significant determinants of influencing security compliance 
intention and behaviour (Ajzen 2002, Ryan and Deci 2000a). 
While security compliance can be defined as the task involvement, security engagement 
describes the extent of energy, enthusiasm, and enjoyment in performing security tasks. In other 
words, it is a form of intrinsic motivation or self-motivation in security compliance process 
where people take interest and enthusiasm in performing security tasks. Motivating people to 
perform security tasks can be a challenge where the more the employees are required to 
personally be involved in fulfilling the security tasks, the more resilient or less compliant they 
become (Adams and Sasse 1999). Security compliance burnout and engagement are often the 
results of experiencing an extended security practice under certain security environments. 
Performance of security demands, especially stressful ones, would require sustained focus and 
resilience from the employees. This research argues that people with higher security engagement 
would more be resilient, attentive to the security tasks and have a positive attitude toward 
complying with the policies, which should lead to better security compliance (Ajzen 2002, 
Schaufeli and Bakker 2004). Security engagement to some extent is the direct opposite of 
compliance burnout. Energy and enthusiasm dimensions of security engagement are the 
opposites of exhaustion and cynicism dimensions of compliance burnout (Schaufeli and Bakker 
2004, Demerouti et al. 2001). That means security engagement and burnout will have an 
opposite impact on security compliance, such that security engagement can lead to better 
compliance, while burnout would reduce it. 
Similar to the role of job resources in the JD-R model, security resources could reduce security 
demands’ associated physical and psychological costs, promote security engagement and achieve 
security goals (Demerouti et al. 2001). However, the JD-R model does not include certain 
resources that can mitigate the impact of demands on burnout or motivate engagement in a 
particular work context (Crawford et al. 2010, Schaufeli and Taris 2014). In terms of security 
management, it is the responsibility of the organisations to provide resources to facilitate their 
employees’ completion of their security responsibilities. Depending on the nature of security 
demands, users may need different resources to comply properly. 
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As discussed in the main components of information security policies (Section 2.2) organisations 
should provide a secure work environment for their employees and assist them to perform their 
IT responsibilities. Organisations’ security supports often come in the forms of security 
awareness training, documentation on business applications and IT system (Ng et al. 2009), 
technical support (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011) and financial rewards (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, 
Siponen et al. 2014, Boss et al. 2009). User training and system documentation can increase 
security-related awareness and provide adequate skills to cope with the complexity of the 
security tasks. Technical support also helps address users’ IT and security-related problems and 
queries. A responsive and effective help desk can reduce work interruption, offset the effects of 
decreased productivity, and increase employees’ satisfaction (Salanova et al. 2013). Financial 
rewards can be used to extrinsically motivate staff to perform security compliance as people 
weigh the benefits of doing the tasks (Vance and Siponen 2012). The effectiveness of rewards to 
increase compliance, however, is not yet clearly demonstrated in prior studies (Boss et al. 2009, 
Pahnila et al. 2007). 
As mentioned previously, the impact of security resources on compliance can also be examined 
from PMT. Security response efficacy is a factor to motivate employees to take protective 
measures against security threats (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b). The 
resources and security measures that the organisations provide and implement to facilitate 
employees’ security compliance do not only reduce an individual’s IT effort but also 
demonstrate effectiveness of the security measures. Most security systems nowadays implement 
technical measures, such as automated antivirus systems, email spam prevention, network 
firewalls and automated user data backups. Automated technical measures can minimise 
involving users in security tasks and demonstrate the effectiveness of security measures. Users 
would be more likely to perform security activities when they understand the purposes of the 
security program, perceive security measures to be relevant and effective against risks, and are 
capable of fulfilling such tasks (Vance and Siponen 2012, Vance et al. 2012). 
The effectiveness of security resources to assist users’ compliance, however, can result in their 
reliance on the organisation for protecting information assets. For example, facilitating 
conditions, such as time to learn, easy access to security policies and support to comply, was 
shown to negatively influence attitudes towards compliance, contrary to the authors’ original 
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theory (Pahnila et al. 2007). An explanation can be that users consider security responsibilities 
should be dealt with by the organisation (Cox 2012). As a result, the more effective the security 
resources the more reliant on the organisation employees would be. Albrechtsen and Hovden 
(2009) explained that employees would leave complex security tasks to organisations and 
underestimated their roles in security protection. 
Most studies on security compliance have not systematically examined which resources can be 
effective in reducing burnout and increasing engagement. For example, Parker et al. (2010) 
demonstrated higher self-determined employees experience greater engagement in the form of 
dedication to work if they are given higher job control, such as the ability to use skills or control 
the work practice. Identification of resources that may enhance security engagement can have an 
important practical implication. Organisations need to focus on providing the resources that 
could be effective in promoting employees’ security compliance, not their reliance on the 
organisation for security protections. 
The following research question is put forward to identify characteristics of security resources 
and their influence on compliance burnout and engagement. 
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and security 
engagement? 
To describe the impact of security resources on burnout and engagement, two hypotheses are 
developed as below.  
 H2: Organisational security resources are negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
 H3: Organisational security resources are positively related to security engagement 
 Personal Resources, Security Compliance Burnout and Engagement 2.4.3
The original JD-R model mainly addresses the influence of work-related factors, namely, 
demands and resources on people’s stress and job commitment without incorporating their 
personal resources (Xanthopoulou et al. 2007, Schaufeli and Taris 2014). Personal resources are 
mental and emotional self-competences that can affect how an individual appraises the work 
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environment, copes and recovers from the stress process (Hobfoll et al. 2003). Self-efficacy 
theory derived from SCT can be regarded as one major personal resource (Bandura 1977). 
According to SCT (Bandura 1977) and the TPB (Ajzen 1991), self-efficacy influences one's 
ability to mobilise motivation, cognitive resources, and emotional reactions, such as stress and 
anxiety, in response to a task. Xanthopoulou et al. (2007) observed that personal resources, such 
as self-efficacy, esteem, and optimism, mediated the impact of work demands and resources on 
employees’ job performance. The authors argued that high-level self-efficacious employees 
would adapt better to a changing and challenging work environment, focus more on work 
resources than demands, hence experiencing higher level of engagement. The employees’ 
resources can moderate the tension between work demands, resources and perceived burnout that 
influence individual job performance, commitment and satisfaction (Bakker et al. 2010, Toner et 
al. 2012). In regard to security behaviour, personal resources can be effective in coping with 
security demands and alleviating the negative impact of compliance burnout on compliance 
behaviour. They can also help users to take advantages of the resources and develop engagement 
with security activities. 
As previously mentioned, security self-efficacy relates to a belief in an individual’s capabilities 
to successfully perform their security tasks, as well as to cope with changing requirements. IT 
self-efficacy has been shown to affect anxiety related to ICT (Henderson et al. 1995), motivate 
continued computer use (Deng et al. 2004), and to help safeguard against burnout (Salanova 
2000). An imbalance between a person’s capabilities and the security demands can also create 
stress or burnout when there is an anticipation of negative consequences due to inadequate 
responses (Chen et al. Winter 2012-2013), or the requirements exceed one’s capabilities and 
personal resources (Posey et al. 2011). Therefore, employees with high security self-efficacy 
would be willing to overcome the complexities of the security tasks and cope with them more 
positively (i.e. engagement), decreasing the level of perceived compliance burnout (Shu et al. 
2011). 
Negative experience of security incidents could also influence one’s confidence in one’s self-
efficacy. Exposure to security incidents, such as a virus infection, losing information, and online 
fraud causes a negative emotional state such as stress or anxiety, which could lower individuals’ 
belief in their security self-efficacy (Rhee et al. 2009). Moreover, security exposure was shown 
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to increase perceived benefits of compliance, perceived cost of non-compliance, and safety of 
resources to name a few, which then influenced overall assessments of consequences, security 
attitude, and eventually the intention to comply (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
In summary, mental and emotional self-competences of personal resources can help individuals 
to buffer the impact of security demands on burnout and enable positive emotional responses 
towards security requirements, hence increasing security engagement. Self-efficacy and negative 
security experience can affect the security compliance process. This research aims to explore and 
evaluate further personal resources that one can employ in controlling the effect of compliance 
burnout and engagement. Hence, another research question is constructed in regard to types of 
personal resources that one may deploy in appraising and coping with burnout and engagement 
in the compliance process. 
 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
Given the potential influence of personal resources on appraising burnout and exerting 
engagement in security behaviour, two hypotheses are put forward. 
 H4: Personal resources are negatively related to security compliance burnout 
 H5: Personal resources are positively related to security engagement 
Finally, compliance burnout and engagement can oppositely affect users’ complying with 
security policies and caution taking. Hence, the following hypotheses are constructed in 
pertaining to the effects of burnout and engagement on security compliance. 
 H6: Security compliance burnout is negatively related to security compliance 
 H7: Security engagement is positively related to security compliance. 
The conceptual research model of this research is depicted in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4: Conceptual Stress-Based Security Compliance Model 
The model in Figure 2-4 posits that security demands positively affect users’ perceived 
compliance burnout (hypothesis H1). While provision of organisational resources can reduce 
compliance burnout incurred by fulfilling security demands (H2), and develops security 
engagement (H3). Similarly, emotional and cognitive competences of users help alleviate 
burnout (H4) and boost engagement with security tasks (H5). Finally, compliance burnout, 
which causes psychological exhaustion and negative attitudes towards compliance, lowers the 
intention to comply (H6). In contrast, the energetic and enthusiastic level of participating in 
security programs increases security commitment and performance (H7). 
The research method employed in this research aims to examine the conceptual model proposed 
in Figure 2-4. Security demands and organisational and personal resources in the model are 
broad constructs that are built on other factors (Schaufeli and Taris 2014). Hence, this research 
needs to identify what factors should be included for each broad construct of the model, before it 
can be tested for the extent of the mediating effects of compliance burnout and engagement. 
 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 2.5
Employees’ unsafe security behaviour has been considered the weakest link in overall security 
programs. Security compliance with safe practice and guidelines is essential to minimise security 
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risks caused by the users. Security demands and organisational and personal factors can 
influence employees’ security behaviour. Particularly, security tasks can be time-consuming and 
complex, provision of organisational resources may facilitate compliance and, at the same time 
result in employees’ over reliance on the organisation for security protections, and users’ IT 
competences which can all determine security behaviour. By extending the Job Demands-
Resources (JD-R) model, this research argues that characteristics of the security tasks and 
personal attributes can affect users’ security compliance. Hence, the main research question of 
this PhD thesis is as follows: 
 How do security demands, organisational and personal resources affect security 
compliance? 
Based on the work stress literature, compliance burnout and engagement are identified as 
potential key determinants of security compliance. The two motivational processes of burnout 
and engagement help explain the mechanism that security demands, organisational and personal 
resources impact on users’ security compliance. Two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) are 
developed to examine two main arguments of this research adapted from the JD-R model. First, 
security compliance burnout should mediate the impact of security demands on employees 
complying with security policies. Security burnout can be buffered by receiving organisational 
and personal resources (RQ1). Second, security engagement is fostered by receiving 
organisational resources and can be further enhanced by individuals’ own resources. Eventually, 
higher engagement with security activities should positively contribute to security compliance 
(RQ2). 
 RQ1: To what extent does security compliance burnout mediate the impact of (1) security 
demands, and (2) organisational and (3) personal resources on security compliance? 
 RQ2: To what extent does security engagement mediate the impact of (1) organisational 
and (2) personal resources on security compliance? 
To address the lack of information system literature on identification of what aspects of security 
demands contribute to compliance burnout, the following research question is put forward. 
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout? 
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Similar to the issue of characteristics of security demands and their impact on burnout, little 
research has explored what types of resources (organisational and personal) can be effective in 
increasing engagement and reducing individual security compliance burnout. Two more 
questions (RQ4 and RQ5) are proposed to investigate this gap. 
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and security 
engagement? 
 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
Seven hypotheses are subsequently developed for the five questions of this research and 
summarised in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question Hypotheses 
RQ1, RQ3 H1: Security demands are positively related to security compliance burnout 
RQ1, RQ2, RQ4 H2: Organisational security resources are negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
H3: Organisational security resources are positively related to security engagement 
RQ1, RQ2, RQ5 H4: Personal security resources are negatively related to security compliance burnout 
H5: Personal security resources are positively related to security engagement 
RQ1 H6: Security compliance burnout is negatively related to security compliance 
RQ2 H7: Security engagement is positively related to security compliance. 
 
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 2.6
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the significance of achieving user security compliance 
to minimise security risks based on a review of literature. Findings from the review were used to 
develop a conceptual model to be tested by this research. The chapter reviewed several 
approaches to encourage security compliance and highlighted the need to gain a better 
understanding of the impact of both organisational and personal factors on security compliance. 
The chapter also introduced the extended Job Demands-Resources model as a theoretical 
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framework to explain how security demands, together with organisational and personal resources 
could affect security compliance through the dual motivational processes of burnout and 
engagement. Security compliance burnout and engagement were hypothesised as mediating 
factors of security demands, and organisational and personal resources on compliance. The 
following chapter describes the research design including the approach and procedure employed 
to further examine the research questions developed in this chapter. 
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 - RESEARCH DESIGN CHAPTER 3
 INTRODUCTION 3.1
This chapter provides a detailed overview of the philosophical foundation and the research 
method adopted for the purpose of examining the research problems identified in Chapter 2. 
First, the philosophical paradigm towards the phenomena of security compliance is explained in 
Section 3.2. Then, the research method following the chosen paradigm is described in Section 
3.3. Ethics approval for the study is outlined in Section 3.4. 
This research employed a two-study sequential exploratory mixed method research design. Study 
One was a qualitative study that aimed to explore characteristics of security demands, and 
organisational and personal resources that could influence users’ security compliance burnout, 
and engagement. Study Two employed a quantitative approach using surveys to test the 
hypotheses developed based on the literature review and the findings of Study One. Details of 
the data collection procedures and methods of data analysis for Study One are described in 
Section 3.5. The results of Study One are presented in Chapter 4. The research method and 
results of Study Two are presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. 
 RESEARCH APPROACH 3.2
Any approach to knowledge development relies upon certain foundational assumptions and 
presuppositions – about the nature of reality, about possible forms of knowledge about that 
reality, about the types of methods which can be used to generate that knowledge, and how to 
interpret the findings (Brennan et al. 2011). These assumptions, including ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological, are inherent in a research approach and influence the 
research strategy and the methods which are part of that strategy (Brennan et al. 2014, Saunders 
et al. 2012). Different foundational assumptions lead to different forms of and approaches to 
answer a research problem, including what are considered to be acceptable and appropriate types 
of methodology.  
The three assumptions attempt to answer the following questions (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 108).  
 49 
 
1. The ontological question: what is the researcher’s view of “reality” or being and 
therefore what is there that can be known? 
2. The epistemological question: what is the researcher’s view of acceptable 
knowledge? 
3. The methodological question: what data collection techniques that are most often 
used about whatever can be known? 
The answers for the basic fundamental questions actually determines a research paradigm which 
specifies the types of methods that are considered appropriate, and the meanings and 
interpretations of the results generated by the use of the chosen methods (Brennan et al. 2011). 
The three main classes of paradigm examined in this research are: (1) positivism; (2) 
interpretivism; and (3) critical realism (Saunders et al. 2012, 126-140). Major features of each 
paradigm are summarised in Table 3-1. Each research paradigm is examined in the following 
sections to justify a suitable approach to answer the research problems formulated in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3-1: Main Features of Three Research Paradigms 
 
 Positivism Interpretivism Critical Realism 
Ontology External, objective ‘real’ 
reality but apprehendable 
Socially constructed, 
subjective, may change, 
multiple 
Objective ‘real’ reality but 
only imperfectly and 
probabilistically 
apprehendable through social 
conditioning 
Epistemology Objectivist; only observable 
phenomena can provide 
credible data, facts. Focus on 
causality, simplification’ 
Subjective meanings and 
social phenomena. Focus upon 
the details of situation, a 
reality behind these details, 
subjective meanings 
Objectivist; observable 
phenomena can provide 
credible data, facts. Focus on 
explaining within a context or 
contexts 
Methodology Experimental / manipulative; 
verification of hypotheses; 
chiefly quantitative methods 
Small samples, in-depth 
investigations, qualitative 
Modified experimental / 
manipulative; falsification of 
hypotheses; quantitative or 
qualitative or mixed methods 
Source: (Brennan et al. 2011, Saunders et al. 2012, 140) 
 Positivism 3.2.1
Positivism is developed in the mid of 19
th
 century by a French sociologist and philosopher 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) which defines that there is only a single objective reality to any 
research phenomenon, and does not take into account the researcher’s belief (Hudson and 
Ozanne 1988). In other words, only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge, which comes 
from positive affirmation through strict scientific methods, especially experimental and 
manipulative methods (Cohen 1992). Hence, positivist researchers have to maintain a clear 
distinction between science and personal experience, reason and feeling, fact and value judgment 
(Carson et al. 2001). Accordingly, the positivists have to be independent from their researches. In 
the other words, they have to keep a minimal interaction with their research participants. Certain 
presuppositions for positivism must be made to be a valid choice, for instance: there must be an 
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objective reality, which people can know; and it can be explained or described through symbols. 
Due to its natural science approach, positivism often focuses on:  
- Prediction and control: focusing on the cause and effect relationship in predicting and 
controlling the natural phenomena.  
- Empirical verification: people can trust the observations or measurement to get the 
accurate data. 
- Value-free: the term “Positive” indicates a value-free or objective approach; which 
eliminates the subjective bias. It is similar to the natural science and opposite to the 
normative, which relies on how things should or ought to be.  
Because the main purpose of positivism is the verification theory, which indicates that 
propositions are meaningful only if they can be tested which can pose several significant 
limitations to theory development, especially in social science (Brown 1977). Firstly, while 
speculation and creation of a priori hypothesis are necessary for conducting systematic theory 
testing, this approach heavily depends strict inductive statistic method; hence it can be 
inappropriate to apply (Leong 1985). Secondly, the approach is created based on pure 
observations, which is impossible in social research when dealing with human objects (Anderson 
1983). Finally, since the research statement is created by objective interpretation of assumptions 
only, and without any biases or scientists’ knowledge to involve; therefore the researchers 
always have to follow the mathematical and natural sciences in the research method.  
The positivism affects significantly to the information systems (IS) research by leading to a focus 
more on the need for reliable methods to against the fallibility of the human mind (Klein and K. 
1984). Furthermore, thanks to positivism, the IS research now pays more attention on where and 
how the technology can be applied (Trauth and Jessup 2000). However, the method also creates 
some negative effects, such as the simplification and abstraction which are needed for good 
experimental designs, usually reduces interesting features of research findings. Moreover, a pure 
empirical method would fail to create deep insights into IS phenomena (Kaplan and D. 1988). 
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 Interpretivism 3.2.2
The interpretive philosophy assumes that the reality is multiple and relative (Hudson and Ozanne 
1988). It is difficult to interpret a research phenomenon in term of fixed realities as in positivism 
because they depend on many systems for various meanings (Neuman 2009). In the other words, 
interpretivism philosophy denies rigid structural frameworks as in positivism and follows 
personal and flexible structures (Carson et al. 2001). The aim is to capture the meaning of human 
behaviour instead of generalising and predicting the causes and effects (Hudson and Ozanne 
1988). 
Interpretivism establishes several views, which are opposite to the principles of positivism. 
Firstly, it pays more attention on the creativity of science. Secondly, it considers factors, 
including social interactions, researcher’s influence, idiosyncrasies and subjective 
interpretations, to be relevant to the research process and developing scientific knowledge (Peter 
and J.C. Fall 1983). Thus, interpretivist researchers are permitted to gain new knowledge through 
the research process and let it develop and contribute to the study with the help of informants 
(Hudson and Ozanne 1988).  Interpretivism considers science is not objective but rather an 
ongoing social process. Full scientific knowledge can only be created by observing and 
stimulating dynamic theory development. 
Interpretivist philosophy is suitable for IS research as it mirrors the link between the human 
element and the technological aspect of IS research. It eliminates strict value-free research 
problems due to a pure empirical paradigm and has led to development in IS research programs, 
which behavioural research can be taken into account (Cooper 1988). 
 Critical Realism 3.2.3
Critical realism views the reality and the value-laden observation of reality as operating in two 
different dimensions, intransitive (i.e. natural) and transitive (i.e. social and historical) (Bhaskar 
1998, Archer et al. 1998). Intransitive reality is relatively unchanging and does not depend on 
human activity, whereas transitive reality is changing and depends on human factors (Bhaskar 
1998). In other words, critical realism acknowledges the existence of an objective reality, but 
holds that it can only be imperfectly captured and understood (Mingers et al. 2013). Value-laden 
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research observations mean that both the research process and the generalisation of the research 
findings should be assessed carefully since they can influence validity of research findings. Due 
to the researchers’ role in the research process, potential interference with the studied objects 
should be recognised and addressed. Critical realism acknowledges the inevitable value-laden 
aspect of a research approach (Mingers 2004), especially in social context such as dealing with 
IT users’ security compliance. 
Critical realism assumes that reality is composed of different levels including biological, 
psychological, social, and cultural level (Bhaskar 1998). None of these levels, nor the causes of 
what occurs on these levels, can be reduced to another level (Wikgren 2005, Brennan et al. 
2014). This view implies that social phenomena such as security compliance behaviour can be a 
result of factors originating from processes or mechanisms from more than one level, whether 
personal, cognitive, organisational or socio-cultural. Moreover, the factors at one level may not 
be directly inferred to influence at another level (Brennan et al, 2014). That means antecedents 
and outcome for security compliance should be assessed at the same level of the study subject, 
whether individual or organisational. This study examines security compliance at the individual 
level. 
With regard to the research method, critical realism does not commit to a single form of research 
either qualitative or quantitative, as the focus is on the structures and mechanisms that shape 
observable events to answer “why” things are as they are. Critical realism recognises the 
existence of a variety of objects of knowledge (e.g. physical, social, and conceptual) and that 
each requires different research methods to access them (Mingers et al. 2013). Moreover, critical 
realism emphasises the interaction among these objects and a variety of research methods can 
help gain more knowledge in particular situations. In information systems research, the critical 
realism approach recognises the complexity of human-related phenomenon and highlights the 
need to apply multiple research methods to gain better understanding of a complex research 
problem (Mingers et al. 2013, Wikgren 2005). 
 The Researcher’s Chosen Paradigm 3.2.4
Critical realism has been widely used in IS research as it offers a robust framework for 
employing a variety of methods to study the meaning and significance of IS in businesses 
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(Mingers et al. 2013). Security compliance in this research pertains to how IT users perform both 
technical measures and precautions to protect from security risks when working with information 
resources. Security compliance in organisations is often considered as a part of the information 
systems discipline which has been described as an applied discipline, whose concepts and 
relationships are derived from various fields including the behavioural sciences, economics and 
computer and management sciences (Bharadwaj 1996). Factors that influence IT users’ security 
compliance can be technical in nature (i.e. intransitive dimension, human-independent), and 
contextual (i.e. transitive dimension, human-dependent). Thus, research approach to study 
security compliance fits with critical realism’s view of reality and observation of reality. 
Furthermore, this research aimed to gain insights of how the contextual factors including security 
resources and demands can develop users’ emotional stages such as burnout and engagement. 
Few theories have been developed in this aspect of security compliance, hence exploratory work 
is needed for which positivist approach may not be suitable. Furthermore, the research also 
planned to use the insights learnt to develop and test a theoretical security compliance model for 
which interpretivism approach would not satisfy. Hence, the researcher adopted the critical 
realism to investigate the research problems in understanding factors that influence users’ 
security compliance in organisations. 
In terms of research methods, this research employed a mixed methods approach involving 
sequential exploratory research design (qualitative followed by quantitative). A mixed methods 
approach can build on the strengths and reduce weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Creswell 2012). It also improves the validity of the conclusions generated by the 
research (Singleton and Straits 2005). A mixed methods approach can provide a more complete 
and complex picture of social phenomenon (Creswell 2012) and was used in this research to 
enable better understanding of security compliance phenomenon. 
 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 3.3
The main research question of this research was: 
 How do security demands, organisational and personal resources affect security 
compliance? 
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In a security context, sustained fulfilment of certain security requirements could lead to 
compliance burnout, such as cynicism towards to security tasks, and engagement with security 
tasks could be a result of receiving effective organisational and personal resources. Underpinned 
by the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model where burnout and engagement are identified to be 
two opposite motivational processes resulting from a work environment, the main research 
question was further deconstructed into two sub-research questions: 
This research followed an exploratory sequential design of mixed methods approach (Creswell 
2012) (see Table 3-2 for a summary of each study). The research was conducted in a two-study 
sequence. Study One involved a pilot study evaluating users’ security compliance in 
organisations by using semi-structured interviews. The purpose of Study One was to evaluate 
qualitatively the extended JD-R model’s ability to explain security compliance at work. 
Furthermore, since the security demands and organisational and personal resources are broad 
constructs and are built on other factors, the following questions were also explored in Study 
One. 
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout? 
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and 
engagement? 
 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
An exploratory sequential design is suitable for a study that needs to explore a phenomenon, 
identify themes, design instruments, and subsequently test it (Creswell 2012). This fits well with 
this research’s purpose: exploring the ability of the extended JD-R model to explain security 
compliance for which prior studies have not fully developed relevant themes and instruments in 
the domain of security compliance. 
Findings from Study One, reported in Chapter 4, were used to refine the theoretical security 
compliance model developed from the literature review (see Figure 2-4). Study Two aimed to 
quantitatively test the refined model to determine the extent to which the model explains security 
compliance. Particularly, the following two questions were examined in Study Two.  
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 RQ1: To what extent does security compliance burnout mediate the impact of (1) security 
demands and (2) organisational and (3) personal resources on security compliance? 
 RQ2: To what extent does security engagement mediate the impact of (1) organisational 
and (2) personal resources on security compliance? 
Table 3-2: Research Procedure of the Mixed-Method Research Design 
Study Phase Objective Research 
Questions 
Methods 
Study One: 
Pilot study  
(Qualitative 
study) 
To qualitatively explore and develop 
an in-depth understanding of the 
impacts of security demands and 
organisational and personal 
resources on compliance burnout, 
engagement and compliance. 
RQ3 
RQ4 
RQ5 
Data collection: semi-structured depth interviews 
Sampling: purposive sampling 
Data analysis: thematic analysis 
Study Two: 
Quantitative 
study 
To quantitatively test the theoretical 
model developed based on insights 
from literature review and Study 
One’s findings. 
RQ1 
RQ2 
Data collection: web-based and paper-based 
survey 
Sampling: purposive sampling 
Data analysis: structural equation modelling 
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 STUDY ONE: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF ORGANISATIONAL 3.5
SECURITY COMPLIANCE 
The purpose of Study One was to qualitatively evaluate the extended JD-R model’s ability to 
explain security compliance at work. In particular, it aimed to explore the characteristics of 
security demands, and different types of organisational and personal security resources that can 
affect security burnout and engagement. The expected outcomes of the qualitative study are the 
identification of security demands, and organisational and personal resources relevant to the 
security compliance practice of the participants.  
Initial findings in the literature review showed that security demands and resources can have 
impacts on security compliance through the dual processes of burnout and engagement. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, the extended JD-R model may explain how security demands could 
result in burnout and provision of organisational security resources could be effective in reducing 
burnout and promoting engagement and therefore increasing security compliance. However, it is 
unclear the characteristics of security demands and organisational and personal resources can 
influence burnout and engagement. Therefore, the formative research was undertaken to 
determine whether particular security requirements, organisational and personal resources in 
different organisational contexts were commonly recognised among participants as main 
determinants for security behaviour. 
 Qualitative Data Collection Approach 3.5.1
For the purpose of gathering data to evaluate issues identified in the literature review and to 
further inform the design of a questionnaire survey in Study Two, a series of in-depth interviews 
were undertaken. The theme of the topic and sequence of most questions were developed in 
advance. Factors derived from the extended JD-R model helped form the guiding framework for 
the interview questions. The discussion guide for the interviews and interview invitations are 
contained in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. The findings of these interviews are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
Focus group and individual interviews were the two primary interview methods in qualitative 
research which were quite similar and equally effective (Crabtree et al. 1993). Choice of either 
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interview method depends on a wide range of factors, such as group interaction, sensitivity of the 
subject, depth of individual responses, cost and training and more. In a study that needs to 
answer a large number of questions, which are either complex or open-ended, and the order and 
logic of questioning may not be suitable for all participants or contexts, will most benefit from 
in-depth or semi-structured interview (Easerby-Smith et al. 2008). 
Individual semi-structured interviews were selected for this study due to two main reasons 
 It was quite difficult to invite a large group of employees to be available at the same time 
for the interview;  
 Security practice is quite private and some participants were not comfortable to share 
their experience with others, especially with their colleagues.  
The flexible structure of semi-structured interviews facilitated the opportunity to identify and 
explore significant situational factors influencing the participants’ security compliance. A 
participant’s answers could have different meanings. The opportunity to investigate alternative 
meanings of key study concepts adds significance and depth to analysis of data collected. Thus, 
the findings from one interview can be used in the following interviews to enhance or explore 
further their meaning and implications for security compliance context. In addition, through 
interviews new dimensions relating to security compliance emerged that could be significant in 
addressing the research questions and objectives, or helping formulate new research questions in 
the following study. The interview questions in Study One were designed as open-ended and 
insight seeking to explore stressful security demands and supporting resources, which influenced 
the participants’ security burnout, engagement and compliance. As organisations had different 
security policies and different levels of security requirements, multiple views from participants 
were sought to help understand security compliance issues and formulate key constructs to be 
used in the Study Two’s quantitative examination of security compliance.  
 Sample Size and Interview Data Collection Process 3.5.2
There is no specific guideline for required sample sizes in a qualitative study. A number of issues 
can determine sample size in qualitative research, though the guiding principle should be 
 59 
 
saturation during the data collection (Mason 2010). Saturation refers to a stage when the 
collection of new data no longer reveals any new insight into the issue under investigation.  
Factors that affect saturation can include the aims of the study (Charmaz 2006), expertise of the 
interviewers (Jette et al. 2003), and number of methods used in a study (Lee et al. 2002). The 
aims of the study ultimately determine the research design and therefore the sample size. A small 
study with modest claims can reach saturation quicker than a study that aims to generalises the 
findings to a wider population (Charmaz 2006). Hence, the number of interviews required in the 
exploratory phase of this study depends on when the collected data clearly answer the research 
questions. The findings of the interview do not need to be generalisable beyond the interview 
samples. Topic expertise of the interviewer helps achieve saturation faster as the interaction 
between the experienced interviewer and the participants can elicit richer data than inexperienced 
or novice interviewer (Mason 2010). In this case sample size becomes less relevant as quality of 
data can be obtained from a smaller sample size. In this study, the researcher, who has more than 
ten years of IT experience and actively researching information security topics, conducted all the 
interviews and data coding. Therefore the number of participants needed can be fewer. Finally, 
Lee et al. (2002) suggest that studies that use more than one method require fewer participants. 
This research employed a mixed method approach in which a quantitative study using surveys 
was conducted to test the security compliance model following the exploratory phase in Study 
One. 
Given the typically small sample size of qualitative studies, informative cases are essential in 
answering research questions and meeting research objectives (Saunders et al. 2012, 380-382). It 
was vital to find participants who could share diverse experience and insights towards security 
compliance in various work contexts. First, it was important to choose organisations that had 
different levels of IT usage and security requirements because organisational factors could affect 
users’ views towards security responsibilities. Previous studies showed users behaved differently 
under different security requirements, quality of security policies, and management styles 
(Dourish et al. 2004, Kraemer et al. 2009). Second, participants with different job positions in the 
same organisation were also selected as users’ security experience could be affected by users’ IT 
expertise and job-specific security requirements in previous qualitative studies (Ramachandran et 
al. 2008, Kraemer et al. 2009). 
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As trust is an issue when discussing security issues in many organisations (Crossler et al. 2013, 
Albrechtsen 2007), three organisations selected for the interviews were chosen because the 
researcher had known managers and staff at these organisations on past occasions, and one that 
the researcher was working at. These managers helped recruit participants for the interview. All 
participants were also ensured of the confidentiality of all interview contents by the researcher. A 
similar approach to acquire participating organisations and interview participants for 
investigating security-related experience was also used in Albrechtsen (2007).  
The researcher telephoned the acquainted managers and staff to explain the purposes of the study 
and sought their permission to conduct interviews with representative IT users. The managers 
were asked to invite their employees to attend a 60-minute interview with the researcher and the 
participants nominated time availability for the interview at their premises. Full details of 
participating organisations and interviewed participants are described in Chapter 4. The 
candidate organisations were screened to ensure they clearly specified IT users’ security 
responsibilities. Specification of security responsibilities could be formal such as written security 
policies, terms in labour contract or informal such as verbal instructions from IT department or 
supervisors. Examples of security specifications could be conditions for accessing Internet for 
work and non-work purposes, using portable devices at work, or attending security training. IT 
users from a range of departments participated in the interviews. No determined conditions were 
required for the participants as long as they were using IT system in their job and willing to 
spend up to 60 minutes for the interviews at the organisation’s premises. 
The interviews were conducted in both English and Vietnamese subject to the level of English 
competency of the interviewees. All interviews were audio recorded for further analysis. 
Vietnamese interviews were translated to English by the researcher who is bilingual in both 
Vietnamese and English.  
 Qualitative Data Analysis Process 3.5.3
 Storing and Transcribing Data 3.5.3.1
All interviews were audio recorded and saved in a secure storage server for further analysis. 
Interview audio recordings were first transcribed by the researcher for further text analysis using 
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Nvivo 10. Each transcribed interview was saved in a separate file with an identifying label. 
Participants’ transcribed answers were grouped by interview questions to facilitate the data 
categorisation into themes described in Section 3.5.3.2. 
As the interviews were conducted in both Vietnamese and English, Vietnamese interviews were 
then translated to English by the bilingual researcher. To ensure the accuracy of the translation, a 
qualified Vietnamese-English interpreter then verified all translations.  
 Categorising Data 3.5.3.2
Categorising data is the process of converting original qualitative data into analytical categories 
(Yin 2009). Each category should become part of a coherent set that needs to follow an 
analytical framework for further analysis. The identified categories must have an internal and 
external aspect. The internal aspect describes individual meaning in relation to the data, and an 
external aspect provides an illustration of the individual practices (Saunders et al, 2012).  
Interview data was categorised according to three sources: (1) terms emerging from the data, (2) 
the actual terms used by the participants, or (3) terms used in existing theory and literature 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998). Terms were then used to develop categories in each pre-selected 
theme that included security demands, organisational resources, and personal resources. These 
themes provided guidance for the data categorisation process. To enhance reliability of the 
categorising results, cross-verification of data coding was done with another IT expert who was a 
University professor in Information Systems. The expert has extensive teaching and research 
experience in information system analysis and knowledge management”. 
 Pattern Matching Analysis Approach 3.5.3.3
The transcribed interview data was analysed using a pattern matching and deductive analysis 
procedure proposed by Yin (2009). Before the interviews, research questions and broad themes 
including nature of security requirements and resources from organisations and persons had been 
identified from the literature. The transcribed texts of all interviews were scanned by the 
researcher to identify key words and important quotes that could identify, explain, or elaborate 
the categories that broadly matched the pre-selected themes (i.e. security demands, 
organisational and personal resources, compliance burnout and engagement). Categories that had 
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not been identified in advance were still recorded for further analysis and inclusion in the final 
theoretical model. 
Using the literature review as guidance, a conceptual model was established prior to the 
qualitative data collection (see Figure 2-4). Pattern matching was undertaken, which involved 
matching patterns emerging from interview data with the identified themes from literature, and 
testing the validity of the pre-defined conceptual model. In particular, the analysis of the 
interview data focused on capturing how the participants described and explained various 
organisational security demands and resources (organisational and personal) in connection with 
security experience. 
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 3.6
This chapter described the critical realism approach selected for addressing the research 
problems discussed in Chapter 2. A two-study sequential mixed method design was employed to 
develop and test the theoretical model of this research. Study One, which was a qualitative study, 
aimed to explore categories of security demands and organisational and personal resources that 
could influence IT users’ security compliance. Study Two employed a quantitative approach 
using surveys to test the hypotheses developed, based on literature review and the findings of 
Study One. This chapter also described the data collection and analysis procedures of Study One. 
The following chapter reports the findings of Study One which helped refine further the original 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. 
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 – STUDY ONE: A QUALITATIVE STUDY CHAPTER 4
OF ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY COMPLIANCE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 4.1
This chapter presents the findings of the qualitative pilot study, which involved a series of semi-
structured interviews. The qualitative study employed a multi-case study approach to explore 
different characteristics of security demands and organisational and personal security resources 
that could affect security practice at work. 
Section 4.2 describes the profiles of the interview participants. Findings of the interviews are 
presented in Section 4.3. The revised hypotheses as a result of the interviews’ findings, which 
were tested in Study Two, are detailed in Section 4.4. 
 PARTICIPANT PROFILE AND INTERVIEW PROCESS 4.2
Interviews were undertaken with 17 people in three organisations during a four-month period. 
Ten bank clerks and a manager from a local bank branch, four lecturers and three general staff 
from a local international university and two professional staff from an oil distribution company 
in Vietnam took part in 45-minute long interviews (see Table 4-1 for organisations and 
participant profiles). 
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Table 4-1: Organisations and Participant Profiles 
Organisations No of 
Employees 
Participants IT security systems Interview Details  
A local 
commercial bank 
branch  
30 6 counter tellers 
(Participant 1-6) 
2 accountants 
(Participant 7-8) 
1 branch manager 
(Participant 9) 
Firewalls, desktop security 
controls, limited Internet 
access, proprietary banking 
system, IT helpdesk  
3 separate 
interviews 
Total 2 hours of 
interview 
At bank site 
A local 
international 
university  
400 4 academic staff 
(including IT and 
Commerce lecturers) in 
Centre of Commerce and 
Management (Participant 
10-13) 
2 professional staff from 
Student Service 
department (Participant 
14-15) 
Proxy servers, desktop 
security controls, spam 
filtering, open Internet access, 
IT helpdesk 
5 separate 
interviews 
Total  4.5 hours of 
interview 
At University site 
An international 
oil distribution  
80 2 marketing executives 
from the Marketing 
department (Participant 
16-17) 
Desktop security controls, 
open Internet access, IT 
helpdesk 
2 separate 
interviews 
Total 1.5 hours of 
interview 
At University site 
The three organisations in the study were deliberately chosen to represent organisations with 
high, medium and standard information security requirements to acquire more diverse security 
experience from participants and that the researcher has established a good relationship with 
managers of each organisation. It was expected that the diverse security environments 
exemplified by the bank, university and oil company would provide dissimilar security contexts 
for the study. A prior established relationship with the participating organisations enabled the 
researcher to conduct highly sensitive and confidential issues such as information security. 
The bank especially in a highly technologically supported environment has high security needs 
to protect client data and financial information. Bank staff are more strictly required to comply 
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with security policies. For the University the focus of the security system is to protect IP, 
copyright, student information and privacy. Universities usually have less restricted information 
security controls and use of information technology due to the staff’s need to access a wide range 
of online information and applications. Universities often provide professional technical support 
to users. Finally, the oil distribution company, which was considered as a SME (Small and 
Medium Enterprises), had less technical support resources than those of both the bank and the 
university. The IT systems of the bank were most complex, followed by the university and the oil 
distribution firm. 
The three organisations were first screened to ensure they explicitly specify security 
responsibilities for IT users. Specification of security responsibilities could be formal, such as 
written security policies, labour contract terms and conditions, or informal practices, such as 
verbal instructions from IT departments or supervisors. In terms of security compliance, these 
organisations should have allowed a certain level of security flexibility to the users. For example, 
they could access the Internet for work and non-work purposes and use portable devices on 
company computers, to install software (these conditions were asked during the interview to rate 
the level of security restrictions in each participant’s organisation). Security flexibilities were 
important for users’ security compliance to be a valid issue. Some organisations enforced very 
strict technical security restrictions so that users’ roles became minimal. In that case motivating 
security compliance could be less relevant for the users. 
The acquainted managers of the three organisations were invited to send interview requests to 
their staff. Given the time limit and availability of the participants, nine staff from a local bank 
branch, six University staff and two marketing professionals from the oil distribution firm were 
successfully recruited for the interviews. To ensure the participants were able to provide 
informed opinions about security compliance they only needed to work within an organisation 
that had IT security infrastructure, policies and end-user requirements. There were no specific 
requirements for number of participants, job roles and security expertise of the participants from 
each organisation for the exploratory qualitative interviews. However, the range of roles chosen 
needed to be broad enough to provide the exploratory details required to underpin the JD-R 
model to be investigated in the following quantitative phase of the research. Furthermore, a 
diversity of participant roles and security expertise across organisations was important to ensure 
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that different end-user security perspectives were provided. Of the 17 participants, their roles 
ranged from bank clerks, accountants, commerce and IT lecturers, student service officers and 
marketing executives which were considered adequate to represent diverse users’ roles and IT 
expertise in a typical organisation. 
Each participant within an organisation chosen was asked to tell a story about their security 
compliance experience including commenting on effectiveness of available organisational and 
personal resources in encouraging compliance and detailing any negative experience of 
performing security tasks. The selected themes explored in the interviews helped develop a more 
thorough understanding of how and why security demands, organisational and personal resources 
could be influencing users’ security compliance burnout and engagement. 
Applying the saturation guideline for determining sample size discussed in Section 3.5.2, 
analysis of data collection from 17 participants from three organisations found sufficient quality 
and useful findings to all three research questions explored during the interviews. 
 CASE ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 4.3
The following sections describe case analysis findings with regard to the following three 
questions: 
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout? 
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and 
engagement? 
 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
Three broad themes, which were explored during the interviews, included characteristics of 
security demands, organisational and personal resources and their connection with security 
compliance burnout and engagement. In-depth discussions together with relevant quotes for each 
theme are provided to further refine the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 (see Table 2-2) 
which would be quantitatively tested in Study Two. 
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 Characteristics of Security Demands and Compliance Burnout 4.3.1
The participants were asked whether they experienced security compliance burnout at work and 
which security tasks affected their perceived compliance burnout. Security compliance burnout 
refers to the psychological exhaustion and cynicism toward complying with assigned security 
tasks and exercising security precautions. Participants at the oil distribution company and the 
university expressed a high level of mental fatigue whilst doing regular security tasks, such as 
changing passwords, periodical security auditing, and requesting IT permissions. Employees 
typically maintained multiple IT accounts (up to 4 accounts) and symptoms of burnout were 
evident. The experience of security compliance burnout from bank participants was less obvious. 
Bank staff acknowledged the importance and necessity of maintaining security vigilance. For 
them, security requirements were clear and integrated into work processes making compliance 
simple. Further, some bank staff emphasised that they did not have any problems following 
security measures as they considered it an ethical responsibility towards the organisation. 
A bank staff member reflected on the compliance burnout experience. 
“Personally, I don’t think there is a burnout. The word that you used is quite 
strong, because this is also a job’s responsibility. In certain jobs which require 
information security, that is not considered burnout as it does not influence me 
that much. Security measures that I have to comply are quite simple and rarely 
happen so it doesn’t matter much.” (Participant 1, Bank teller) 
The bank manager shared a similar view. 
“For normal users, they are not active. They would just follow the regulation 
or instructions without any effort to achieve.” (Participant 9, Bank manager) 
However, cynical attitudes towards security compliance demonstrated in their views that security 
protection should be the sole responsibility of the IT department were evident among most 
participants. The participants were willing to perform common routine tasks, such as scanning 
viruses or seeking IT department assistance and permissions for computer services. However, 
when being asked to perform less common security tasks, such as checking spoof emails or 
reading security warnings when opening an attachment, participants showed no concern for such 
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security risks due to insufficient knowledge to understand the risk associated with such complex 
tasks.  
Most participants emphasised that they needed to focus on their main job tasks rather than 
spending time on improving their security knowledge and skills. Furthermore, technical 
restriction controls imposed on users’ computers could further the distant attitude towards being 
more responsible for security compliance. Highly restricted computer permissions made the 
participants less caring about safe security practice.  
I cannot finish my work and sometimes have to use computer at home for 
searching information. That could cause the delay and bad result of work. As a 
user, I feel angry and discontented” (Participant 17, Oil marketing executive)  
In total, three categories of security demands emerged from the data that strongly affected the 
participants' compliance burnout: (1) security compliance overload, (2) access to security 
policies and (3) security skill requirements. Each of these security demands is described in the 
following sections. 
 Security Compliance Overload 4.3.1.1
One of the most common issues of security demands was security compliance overload 
negatively affecting the participants’ main work and consequently reducing productivity. It was 
common among the interviewed organisations to have multiple computer accounts for different 
systems with frequent password resets, regular system check-ups, and procedures to gain security 
access which added to the emotional exhaustion among the users.  
Security compliance overload was expressed in terms of time needed to perform security tasks 
and work obstructions affecting productivity. Frequencies of password changes and strict 
password reuses were noted causing some stress to the users. For example, an IT lecturer 
explained that he had stopped changing one of the account passwords, as required and resorted to 
downloading offline copies of documents rather than accessing them online.  
“This is something I hate the most. Because in the past I just have one 
password for everything, and now I have number of passwords for different 
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things. And the frequencies of having them changed are very high. And I 
cannot repeat the passwords for 15 times.” (Participant 10, University IT 
lecturer) 
The marketing executive (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) revealed she kept ignoring 
password change reminders until the last minute and was very concerned about the time-
consuming work of security audit on her laptop. Participants from the university and the bank 
also complained that frequent password changes were unnecessary as there was no clear security 
risk. 
“Changing password is really annoying. It’s a burden with changing too many 
passwords, and too frequently.” (Participant 12, University lecturer) 
Sometimes I find security tasks really cause compliance burden because it 
takes time for periodical tasks (changing passwords, going to IT for virus 
checking). Also for repetitiveness, I have to change password like once every 3 
months. It is annoying because we are already very busy with our job. So 
maybe changing password does not take time, but it keeps popping up in our 
screen, keep reminding and that is annoying. (Participant 3, Bank teller)  
Some security tasks conducted by the IT department took away work time from the employees 
and affected their work productivity. For example, scheduled IT equipment auditing and 
processing software installation requests delayed the participants’ work process. Perceived 
security overload often became worse when the participants were not convinced of the 
effectiveness of the security procedures. A lecturer annoyed at the number of IT requests for 
minor software fixes commented that: 
“I feel annoyed when I have to ask IT to come and authorise me to fix and 
install common software. I think it needs to have room for the users to do it by 
themselves. There is certain software you can install by yourself.” (Participant 
13, University lecturer) 
Other participants raised the issues of time-consuming security tasks that affected work 
productivity. 
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“Checking laptop hardware and security audit could take half a day. It is 
annoying and it is really a burden for us. (Participant 16, Oil marketing 
executive) 
The security task is time consuming. Some require just a couple of minutes of 
time while others virtually take away my time. Forgetting to change the 
password after the expiration date, teller is unable to log in the computer 
hence acquiring the assistance from IT to unlock the account. Due to the traffic 
of the bank, too crowded and sometimes multitasks, I could not change 
password immediately. (Participant 3, Bank teller) 
Faced with increasing security demands, the participants seemed to develop workarounds. 
Skipping the tasks and/or failing to report IT security issues were options used to reduce the cost 
of compliance unless the tasks were made compulsory by the organisation. A lecturer 
(Participant 13, University lecturer) raised the issue that due to strict IT security settings on staff 
computers, he was not able to use the software needed for his lecture. He did not request IT 
assistance to install it either due to the urgency of the matter and went on with the lecture by 
omitting the teaching activities that required the software. The oil marketing executive 
(Participant 16) reported that she did not report initial problems on her laptop to the IT 
department as she was concerned at the considerable time it took to audit. 
The hypothesis H1 originally developed in Chapter 2 is further decomposed to include the 
impact of security compliance overload as a characteristic of security demands on compliance 
burnout. 
 H1a: Security compliance overload is positively related to security compliance 
burnout 
 Access to Security Policies 4.3.1.1
In three organisations the main sources of specifying information security requirements were the 
written IT usage policies, which contained detailed instructions for proper IT practice when 
dealing with confidential information, secure systems, company reputation, and/or legal 
requirements. IT policies of the bank and oil distribution companies were nine and ten pages 
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long and available in pdf format. The university’s IT policy was available entirely online in html 
format that contained links to several other sources. 
Table 4-2: Description of IT Policies of the Interviewed Organisations 
Organisation Topics covered in the Policy Policy Format and Length 
Local Bank  Information classification 
Sensitivity guidelines 
Data retention and disposal 
Incident management 
Confidentiality policy 
Written policy, available 
online, 9 pages 
Local International 
University 
Overview of information security 
Privacy and Information Management policy 
Security culture 
Third party security 
Secure system development 
Reporting information security incidents 
Access management 
Sourcing new systems 
Corporate mobile devices 
Online policy, various links 
to relevant policies and 
guidelines 
Oil Distribution 
Company 
Overview of security requirements 
Virus check practice 
Software installations 
Backup and data 
Internet and Email usage 
General security and passwords 
IT procedures and processes 
Written policy, available 
online, 10 pages 
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Most participants were aware of the availability of the IT security policies but acknowledged that 
they just ignored them or did not know where the policies were stored or that the policies were 
not disseminated effectively by management. Employees admitted that written policies were of 
little use in the provision of the necessary knowledge to generate security compliance 
motivation. Almost all participants considered their organisation’s IT security policies lengthy, 
as well as difficult to read due to the use of unfamiliar terms. 
“In the current organisation I have not read much IT security policy because 
first it’s too long, second it does not remind me of something. Currently I don’t 
know whether we have a policy or it exists or not. I sometimes confused.” 
(Participant 10, University IT lecturer) 
“Sometimes IT sent emails to us, but I never read them. Because they just look 
so long and I’m just lazy to read.” (Participant 4, Bank teller)  
“It depends on the length of the document. If it is too complicated and it is too 
long, then I would not read. Sometimes because it is time-consuming to peruse 
the security instructions, so I just click OK on the risk warning popup without 
knowing what it meant. (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) 
 The participants associated their compliance knowledge with on-the-job knowledge, team 
sharing practice, instructions from direct supervisors, and their general awareness of IT security 
purposes. Another academic staff member highlighted the need to make IT policies more usable 
and accessible. 
“We cannot remember all the policies and we just want to know those kinds of 
things that we deal every day or at least monthly. Those kinds of things should 
be easy to remember, in a friendly reminder mode, and for complicated policy, 
at least we know it exists and we can look for it. The frequencies that we work 
with those complicated policies may be not much, but at least we know they 
exist, and we can know who we can ask for them.” (Participant 10, University 
IT lecturer) 
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As the participants found existing IT security policies of little help in guiding security practice, 
other sources of communications from the IT department were considered essential for 
maintaining security awareness. Recommended security practice should be communicated in 
simple words together with graphic posters and a reduction of the need for users to access 
complex written security documents as their main source of instructions. 
Given the significance of clear and simple access to security policies and instructions to ease the 
burden of finding useful information for effective security compliance, the following hypothesis 
is proposed to extend hypothesis H1 regarding security demands and burnout developed in 
Chapter 2. 
 H1b: Access to security policies is positively related to security compliance burnout 
 Security Skill Requirements 4.3.1.2
In terms of skill requirements for IT security compliance tasks, most participants considered 
security compliance as relatively simple and straightforward. IT security compliance meant 
following routine technical control procedures for activities, such as changing passwords, 
locking up computers, virus protection, or not sharing computer accounts. The interviewed 
organisations had increasingly implemented technical security controls, which made most of 
their IT security tasks easier and simpler for individual compliance. The marketing executive 
explained the difficulty of following IT security requirements as: 
“The IT security measures are quite easy to follow, as long as I just follow 
instructions, not touching on the IT parts or as long as we don’t make mistake 
on the IT things.” (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) 
However, when being presented with three IT security scenarios, few participants expressed any 
interest to consult further IT security advice or had knowledge of potential organisational 
security risks for the three scenarios. Most participants did not know how to check a URL in an 
email for potential spoofing attacks by checking fake websites asking for personal information. 
IT security risk assessment for some staff was often too complex and/or time consuming. One 
staff member in the bank explained her view on security risk assessment: 
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“I can click on the warning message to cancel or run the application. But 
thinking about what IT security risks might happen if I run it would be too 
much to handle.” (Participant 3, Bank teller) 
Similarly, the university student administrative staff member shared her view on skills required 
to evaluate security risks. 
“It does not matter to me much as I don’t have enough expertise and 
knowledge to assess the effectiveness of security tasks and the risks.” 
(Participant 14, University administrative staff)  
Most participants argued that the IT security knowledge required for security compliance by 
users should be general and easy to comprehend and apply. Advanced knowledge required for 
security risk assessment, such as reading complex instructions or regular skill updates, should be 
for IT professionals and would not be in the interest of the participants. 
The following hypothesis is made concerning the effect of another characteristic of security 
demands, which is security skill requirements, on compliance burnout. 
 H1c: Security skill requirements are positively related to security compliance burnout 
 Organisational Security Resources, Security Compliance Burnout and 4.3.2
Security Engagement 
The participants were asked to explain which organisational resources helped reduce compliance 
burnout and increase security engagement. In the main, most participants expressed little interest 
in engaging with security activities at work.  
One marketing executive explained her view on security practice. 
“I am not interested or find challenging for any of security tasks. I just find 
them obligations that I have to follow. It is just like a norm in the company. I 
just do it without any willingness or interest.” (Participant 16, Oil marketing 
executive) 
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Interestingly, the same participant expressed interest in completing security training.  
“I don’t think we will be willing to spend time with security tasks. But we will 
be willing to spend time for some training or some visual learning from the 
security. It will be more interesting and we will be willing to.” (Participant 16, 
Oil marketing executive) 
The IT lecturer explained what an employee should do in terms of adequate security compliance: 
“Security becomes something like when I want to do something, the first thing I think that 
I should check if we can do it or not. It will make like a culture that we ask the first 
question and we know where to check. And either my colleagues or I go to system to 
check and we know who should ask.” and that 
“They need to know what the environment they are working on, how much 
security to provide, what level of security they need to have and how they are 
going to protect themselves.” (Participant 10, University IT lecturer) 
For those participants who showed interest in participating in security initiatives, three security 
resources were commonly agreed to influence security engagement: 1) security communication 
efficacy; 2) organisational compliance evaluation (rewards and sanctions); and 3) security use 
and skill development. The impact of each of these resources is explained in the following 
sections. 
 Security Communication Efficacy 4.3.2.1
Most participants agreed that the IT department should be mainly responsible for managing IT 
security and should communicate clearly to users so that they know what and how to comply 
with security requirements. Two main forms of security response efficacy emerged from the 
data: (1) timely and helpful IT support and (2) effective communication. Timely and helpful IT 
support was required to reduce the impact of IT security systems on employees’ work by 
ensuring compliance time and effort were minimal. The participants expected minimum effort 
and involvement with security tasks. Users expected timely and helpful responses from the IT 
department and simple explanations on complex security issues. With clear and informative 
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communication the participants expressed willingness to engage in IT security practices. A 
lecturer explained how effective communication could ease compliance burnout. 
“Our IT staff’s competencies are very important. They should be friendly, 
listening, and willing to help and giving advice beyond what people ask. 
Sometimes I have limited knowledge in IT or IT security, when I ask them I’m 
not sure it’s right or not, so I think it’s the way I need. But they should know 
more than me they can advise more than that.” (Participant 11, University 
lecturer) 
Similarly, the marketing executive emphasised the importance of effective IT communication to 
her security compliance practice: 
“I will take IT advice if the IT shows competency, capable of managing the IT 
security risks, and they give us some knowledge if we follow them. They have 
to demonstrate that they can do something with the risks for my computer first. 
From that I will take their advice into account. It should come from a qualified 
IT department, first of all.” (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) 
Effective communication was clearly needed to reduce compliance burden as one of the 
marketing executives emphasised the role of clear communication and her security practice: 
“The IT department is very helpful. I can seek for help from them any time I 
want. We hardly feel any compliance burnout except time. It’s about attitude 
towards security tasks: security tasks are not my main tasks, it should take a 
small time of 8 hours in the office, or somehow we ignore it.” (Participant 17, 
Oil marketing executive) 
However, effectual IT support and the lack of user security involvement can have a negative 
impact on compliance, such as over-reliance on IT staff for any security issues. If users have 
access to effective IT support, they may entirely rely on the IT department to handle all of the IT 
related issues including security. Users’ reliance on the effectiveness of the IT department can 
further their distant attitude from security compliance, whereby they consider activities the 
responsibility of others. Lack of self-efficacy and self-control in administering security settings 
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for employee’s work were also quoted as reasons for underestimating the requirements of the 
personal compliance role and resultant delegation of tasks to the IT department. It was quite 
obvious that simply providing effective IT support may reduce compliance burnout but not 
increase security engagement. To a certain extent effective communication was essential to 
motivate users’ support of security programs and eventual compliance. Most participants 
expressed their support for the IT security program if they received clear communication about 
the significance of IT security risks, and the role of the users in the organisational prevention of 
security breaches and minimisation of risk exposure. Without that information, the participants 
would at best passively comply or solely rely on the IT department to take care of organisational 
security. 
Among organisational security efficacy, effective security communication plays a key role in 
promoting security engagement and reducing burnout. The following hypotheses are made in 
regards to the relationships between security communication efficacy of security resources and 
compliance burnout and engagement. These hypotheses extend the original hypotheses H2 and 
H3 already developed in Chapter 2. 
 H2a: Security communication efficacy is negatively related to security compliance burnout 
 H3a: Security communication efficacy is positively related to security engagement 
 Security Skill Use and Development 4.3.2.2
Sixteen out of 17 participants opted strongly for security programs that balanced their work and 
provision of some flexibility in IT settings. Six out of nine participants from the bank and all 
other participants were not satisfied with highly restricted IT security environments that removed 
most of their need to use and develop computer competence for their work. Strict computer 
control with little flexibility was perceived as a hindrance for job performance, reducing work 
productivity. A bank staff mentioned:  
“I don’t have much control over IT security as the company enforces strict IT 
security measures. I cannot access anything except work-related systems 
dictated by the IT department. Sometimes I feel frustrated as I can’t access 
resources that are needed in my job.” (Participant 5, Bank teller) 
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Similarly, the oil marketing executive complained that the inability to use IT skills 
caused exasperation and discontent in performing her job.  
“IT policy limits our access to website related to services, shopping, 
hotel…etc. Nowadays, it is not much different from stealing your working 
tools. I cannot finish my work and sometimes have to use computer at home for 
searching information. That could cause the delay and bad result of work. As a 
user, I feel angry and discontented” (Participant 17, Oil marketing executive)  
A university lecturer desired customised security controls for different groups of users. 
“I think it’s good because the role of the users is different. People are teaching 
different courses and exposed to different kinds of teaching needs so I think we 
need to customise what the users need in term of security and protection.” 
(Participant 13, University lecturer)  
The participants desired opportunities to utilise their skills and expertise in order to improve 
security compliance. In the absence of some compliance autonomy, the employees would either 
comply passively or simply delegate security responsibility to the IT department, if possible. It is 
clear that the users were more active and responsible for security tasks if they were given more 
skills training and development initiatives sanctioned by the organisation. There was not much 
need for individual effort to improve IT knowledge and skills if they were not given 
opportunities to apply them in practice. The marketing executive underlined the need to use her 
computer skills to comply with security requirements: 
“Matching computer skills will make me willing to comply. Security task could 
be personalised based on different requirements from different positions in the 
company.” (Participant 17, Oil marketing executive) 
Another bank staff underscored that lack of IT autonomy that may even lead to intentional 
compromise of the IT security system:  
“Regardless how restricted the IT security system is, someone still can get 
around it to access the resources they need. IT security measures should 
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provide some flexibility to the staff in performing their job.” (Participant 5, 
Bank teller) 
Interestingly, only a certain level of opportunities to use security skills was desired as long as 
job’s needs were satisfactorily supported by the technology. Giving IT users too much 
compliance autonomy was often considered as overload and unnecessary, especially when the 
users had to deal with complex or unfamiliar security tasks. As a participant from the oil 
distribution organisation stressed, she had no desire to have more responsibilities for taking care 
of a computer or IT security. All that she asked for was access  the Internet and to run software 
that she needed. 
“I prefer to follow regulations from the IT. First, there are certain risks if I do 
not follow regulations from IT. I don’t have the ability to manage all IT risks. 
So regulation is good to help us to manage the risks from outside. We will 
follow as long as we still have free right to access the Internet, or to do what 
can help to do our job. (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) 
The following hypotheses are made pertaining to the effect of security skill use and 
development, another form of security resources, on compliance burnout and engagement. 
Hypotheses H2b and H3b cover the second form of security resources and extend the hypotheses 
H2 and H3 proposed in Chapter 2. 
 H2b: Security skill use and development is negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
 H3b: Security skill use and development is positively related to security engagement 
 Personal Compliance Evaluation  4.3.2.3
Formal evaluation of individual IT security compliance was identified as an effective way to 
motivate on-going compliance, although no interviewed organisations implemented clear 
rewards or sanctions for individual compliance. Participants from the bank suggested a call for 
formal recognition, such as financial reward and/or performance bonuses for individual IT 
security effort. In addition, it was suggested that compliance evaluation should also include 
penalties for non-compliance, such as losing a bonus, pay cut, or even disciplinary actions. A 
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bank staff member’s suggestion for how to encourage IT security compliance effort in short term 
and long term was: 
“But in short term, there should be a clear “award – punishment”, gradually, 
it will become self-consciousness. In the long term, we will aim for the 
improvement in each individual’s consciousness as if we require that from the 
beginning, that would be very difficult.” (Participant 7, Bank accountant) 
Similarly, the marketing executive mentioned some forms of formal evaluation of IT security 
compliance effort: 
“We need some award for staff to promote compliance. There is deviation 
report (something dangerous that may happen if we do something wrong), 
award (6 month or a year) for a staff who follows or does well with the IT 
security compliance.” (Participant 16, Oil marketing executive) 
On the other hand, some participants did not recommend formal recognition for IT security 
compliance. These participants argued that IT security compliance was more an ethical duty and 
responsibility. According to these participants, IT security compliance was part of someone’s job 
and should not be evaluated separately. 
Financial reward was not the only form of recognition which was emphasised. Other forms of 
formal evaluation were also recommended. An academic staff member suggested that IT security 
could be promoted as a mini competition among staff, who would document their own best IT 
security practice and compete against each other for recognition of their effort. IT security 
competencies could be formally certified so that staff would know what level of awareness and 
skills were required for their job or indeed promotion. 
Some participants explained that formal evaluation of security compliance at work demonstrated 
how seriously organisations took information security and as they understood that it was 
essential to the organisation’s wellbeing. The employees would only make security compliance a 
personal responsibility if the organisation recognised individuals’ security effort and that 
gradations in levels of achievement including non-achievement be acknowledged. Systems and 
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business processes geared towards identification of security best practice, compliance and non-
compliance were pivotal to establishment of quality performance benchmarks.  
The following hypotheses are made regarding the impact of the third form of security resources 
(i.e. personal compliance evaluation) on compliance burnout and engagement. These hypotheses 
extend hypothesis H2 and H3 proposed in Chapter 2. 
 H2c: Organisational rewards are negatively related to security compliance burnout. 
 H2d: Organisational sanctions are negatively related to security compliance burnout. 
 H3c: Organisational rewards are positively related to security engagement. 
 H3d: Organisational sanctions are positively related to security engagement. 
 Personal Resources, Security Compliance Burnout and Engagement 4.3.3
Security self-efficacy and past security exposure were the two main personal resources that 
emerged from the data as having an important impact on security compliance effort. It was 
obvious that participants with more IT knowledge and skills demonstrated higher moral support 
for security programs in organisations. Some participants expressed a willingness to engage with 
security tasks despite their inconvenience and time-consuming nature. As one IT lecturer 
explained the proper security behaviour that employees should accept to maintain security and 
minimise risk. 
“They need to know what the environment they are working on, how much 
security to provide, what level of security they need to have and how they are 
going to protect themselves.” and that… 
“Security becomes something like when I want to do something, the first thing 
I think that I should check if we can do it or not. It will make like a culture that 
we ask the first question and we know where to check.” (Participant 10, 
University IT lecturer) 
Participants with less security skills would find it difficult to use existing security resources or 
demonstrate personal commitment towards security requirements. Some participants expressed a 
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reluctance to engage in any additional security tasks that required certain knowledge or extra 
cautious steps to protect information resources.  
“It does not matter to me much as I do not have enough expertise and 
knowledge to assess the effectiveness of security tasks and the risks.” 
(Participant 11, University lecturer) 
“Here we don’t have IT background; most of us will just follow what the 
process or regulation request. For example, we log in a program, we need an 
ID and password to do, most of us do not think about what may happen in 
terms of Internet security if we click the link. That is a little too much.” 
(Participant 4, Bank teller) 
In addition to security skills and knowledge, genuine experience of past security incidents 
strongly influenced participants’ taking extra care towards security risks through the adoption of 
safe security measures. Past security exposure, either through training or real incidents, provided 
staff with real experience of what a security risk could do to their digital assets and made them 
more personally cautious and willing to take extra effort and time to engage in security activities. 
“If people can be educated to know what is virus, how it affects to your 
computer, something like that, and then next time, when people see about the 
virus, that word, then they will definitely be curious to know more about how it 
happens.” and 
“I think that if we experience some problems before like losing the hard disk or 
losing the information, and corrupted. I would be more cautious next time.” 
(Participant 14, University administrative staff) 
“We need mock up exercise through that we can find security compliance is 
very important and purposeful. Then we will follow actively and with 
supportive attitude.” (Participant 15, University administrative staff) 
Participants without experience of having suffered from security consequences would be 
unwilling to tolerate compliance costs, as they did not understand why their behaviour could 
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compromise security. It is “seeing is believing” that some participants mentioned during the 
interview to highlight how past security exposure could strongly affect their overall effort in 
engaging further with security tasks to prevent security risks. 
The impact of personal security resources on compliance burnout and engagement was 
hypothesised in hypotheses H4 and H5 developed in Chapter 2. Security self-efficacy and 
security exposure are identified as two forms of personal resources in Study One. Hence, the 
following hypotheses are proposed to extend both H4 and H5. 
 H4a: Security self-efficacy is negatively related to security compliance burnout 
 H4b: Security exposure is negatively related to security compliance burnout 
 H5a: Security self-efficacy is positively related to security engagement 
 H5b: Security exposure is positively related to security engagement 
 UPDATED HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL MODEL 4.4
Study One has qualitatively examined IT users’ security compliance using the extended Job 
Demands-Resources (JD-R) model. Key constructs of the extended JD-R model were explored in 
the context of IT users’ security compliance in organisations. In particular, Study One explored 
which characteristics of organisational security demands affected compliance burnout, and which 
types of organisational and personal resources could mitigate the impact of burnout on 
compliance and increased engagement with security tasks. Study One identified three 
characteristics of security demands, four types of organisational resources, and two personal 
resources that affected security compliance burnout and engagement, which eventually 
influenced security compliance. 
This research extends the current research on information security compliance by demonstrating 
that current IT security systems’ implementations and operations can cause users’ psychological 
burnout thus making them less supportive of performing security measures. To increase 
employees’ security compliance, organisations need to consider security initiatives that reduce 
burnout and encourage security engagement through effective development of both security 
demands and provision of resources. Effective communication of security requirements, 
minimising time and effort of the users, identifying and providing necessary IT knowledge, and 
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establishing appropriate security compliance evaluation schemes are examples of such 
initiatives. 
Table 4-3 below summarises hypotheses developed based on the literature review in Chapter 2 
and Study One’s qualitative findings presented above. 
Table 4-3: Table of Research Questions, Original Hypotheses and Updated Hypotheses 
Research 
Question 
Original Hypotheses Updated Hypotheses (After Study One) 
RQ1, RQ3 
 
H1: Security demands are positively 
related to security compliance burnout 
H1a: Security compliance overload is positively related to 
security compliance burnout 
H1b: Access to security policies is positively related to 
security compliance burnout 
H1c: Security skill requirements are positively related to 
security compliance burnout 
RQ1, RQ4 H2: Organisational security resources 
are negatively related to security 
compliance burnout 
 
H2a: Security communication efficacy is negatively related 
to security compliance burnout 
H2b: Security skill use and development are negatively 
related to security compliance burnout 
H2c: Rewards are negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
H2d: Sanctions are negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
RQ2, RQ4 H3: Organisational security resources 
are positively related to security 
engagement 
H3a: Security communication efficacy is positively related 
to security engagement 
H3b: Security skill use and development are positively 
related to security engagement 
H3c: Rewards are positively related to security engagement 
H3d: Sanctions are positively related to security engagement 
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RQ1, RQ5 H4: Personal resources are negatively 
related to security compliance burnout 
H4a: Security self-efficacy is negatively related to security 
compliance burnout 
H4b: Security exposure is negatively related to security 
compliance burnout 
RQ2, RQ5 H5: Personal resources are positively 
related to security engagement 
H5a: Security self-efficacy is positively related to security 
engagement 
H5b: Security exposure is positively related to security 
engagement 
RQ1 H6: Security compliance burnout is negatively related to security compliance 
RQ2 H7: Security engagement is positively related to security compliance 
Based on the updated hypotheses shown in Table 4-3, a revised version of the original 
conceptual model developed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2-4) is depicted in Figure 4-1 below. The 
revised model extends the initial broad constructs of security demands and organisational and 
personal resources to include more detailed components that made up these constructs. More 
specifically, security demands contain security compliance overload, access to security policies 
and security skill requirements. Organisational resources compose of security communication 
efficacy, security skill use and development, and compliance evaluation. Finally, personal 
security resources include security self-efficacy and security exposure. Overall, the identified 
three elements of security demands are hypothesised to negatively affect compliance burnout 
(H1a, H1b, and H1c), which can be mitigated by three types of organisational resources (H2a, 
H2b, H2c and H2d) and two forms of personal resources (H4a and H4b). On the other hand, the 
reported elements of organisational (H3a, H3b, H3c and H3d) and personal resources (H5a and 
H5b) are hypothesised to positively influence security engagement. Eventually, security 
compliance burnout is hypothesised to reduce security compliance (H6) while security 
engagement increases it (H7). 
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Figure 4-1: Revised Theoretical Model of Stress-Based Security Compliance 
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 4.5
The chapter reported the outcome of Study One of the research which qualitatively evaluated the 
proposed security compliance model with seventeen users in three organisations in Ho Chi Minh 
City, Vietnam. Security demand overload, difficulty accessing security policies and high security 
knowledge requirements were shown to increase users’ security burnout. Organisational security 
resources including effective security communication, opportunities to use and develop security 
skills, and individual security evaluations motivated the participants to become more involved 
with security tasks. Finally, personal resources including security self-efficacy and past security 
exposure enhanced security engagement through exploring new security techniques and giving 
moral support for organisational security effort.  
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The findings of Study One helped revise the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and refined the 
original theoretical model. The following chapter (Chapter 5) describes the research method 
selected for Study Two, which was designed to test the theoretical model developed in this 
chapter and enhance the explanatory power of the security compliance model in wider 
organisational contexts. 
  
 88 
 
 – RESEARCH DESIGN OF STUDY TWO: A CHAPTER 5
QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF ORGANISATIONAL 
SECURITY COMPLIANCE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 5.1
Study One qualitatively explored the ability of the extended Job Demands-Resources model 
(Demerouti et al. 2001) to explain security compliance in organisations. A security compliance 
model was developed which proposed that security demands, including security compliance 
overload, access to security policies and security knowledge requirements, would result in a 
cynical attitude (i.e. compliance burnout) towards security compliance. The model also proposed 
that provision of security resources, comprising security communication efficacy, security skill 
use and development, rewards and sanctions, and personal resources of IT users, namely, 
security self-efficacy and security exposure would positively affect user’s levels of energy and 
dedication in performing security tasks (i.e. security engagement). The resultant security 
compliance burnout would potentially decrease security compliance whilst processes that 
enabled security engagement would increase it. 
The following sections describe the research design for the quantitative study (Study Two) that 
aimed to confirm the developed security compliance model in Figure 4-1 and providing a 
broader statement about which factors can impact security compliance. Section 5.2 details the 
justification of the survey approach chosen for the study. Survey instrument development is 
discussed in Section 5.3. Sampling issues and the administration of the survey are covered in 
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 respectively. Section 5.6 presents preparation steps for data analysis 
to test measurement model validity (Section 5.7) and structural model validity (Section 5.8). 
Finally, Section 5.9 summarises the chapter. 
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 RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY 5.2
Experimental and correlational designs are two common quantitative data collection and analysis 
research methods (Creswell, 2012). Each of these designs is now evaluated to determine a 
suitable research design option for the study. 
Experiment research assigns levels of treatment to experimental units and measures the outcome 
from those who experienced the treatments and those who did not (Kirk 2013, 23). Experiment 
can be used to establish possible cause and effect between independent (treatments) and 
dependent (outcome) variables under certain treatments. Main activities in conducting 
experimental design involve (Kirk 2013, Creswell 2012): 
 developing and determining treatment levels (independent variables), outcome 
measurements to be recorded (dependent variables) 
 randomising individuals to various experimental groups 
 controlling extraneous conditions that may influence the relationship between treatments 
and outcome 
 and specifying the statistical analysis to be performed 
Because experiments can be controlled in terms of participant characteristics, high level of 
random participant selection, treatment levels, and direct outcome observations, they are 
considered the best of the quantitative designs to establish probable cause and effect (Creswell 
2012, 295). In this study, suitable employees can be assigned randomly to two groups who then 
experience different levels of security resources and demands in a controlled environment. 
Employees in each group would be then asked to complete a survey after the treatment. The 
experimental research design is desirable to enable examination of security compliance 
behaviour under certain security demands, resources and actual security compliance recorded at 
different times for the same participants. 
Experimental research, however, also has disadvantages that proved unsuitable for this 
quantitative study. Independent variables of this study include various organisational resources, 
security demands, and various personal resources, which can be difficult to develop and 
manipulate in a controlled testing environment. Furthermore, due to strict controlled 
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environment of each treatment, the findings in experimental research may prove less applicable 
to real-life organisational context, making it less useful and generalisable to the population. 
Finally, research employing experiments can be time consuming and expensive to conduct as the 
researcher needs to develop realistic testing environment, controlling for human errors during 
each treatment, and requiring a large number of employees to attend separate treatment sessions. 
Given the limited resources and time that the researcher could obtain for this project, 
experimental designs would be impractical to be applied for Study Two. 
Another research design for quantitative study is correlational research which involves the 
measurement of two or more factors to determine and explain the relationships among them. 
Correlational statistical tests are used to describe and measure the degree of relationship (or 
association) between two or more variables (Creswell 2012). An example of a research problem 
that can use correlational designs where one wants to determine whether higher student 
motivation and student achievement have any relationship and whether student motivation can 
predict student achievement. Depending on the nature of a research problem, correlational 
research can either be explanatory or prediction design (Creswell 2012, 340-341). The main 
difference between explanation and prediction designs is that prediction designs extend variable 
relationships in explanatory designs by distinguishing predictor (independent) and criterion 
(dependent) variables. A set of predictor variables are used to forecast about one or several 
outcomes in prediction research. As Study Two aims to test a set of hypotheses which involve a 
number of predictions, hence correlational prediction designs clearly suit the purpose of Study 
Two. 
Survey designs are often used in correlational research to capture opinions, beliefs and attitudes 
of individuals {Creswell, 2012 #144}. In particular, questionnaire survey method provides a 
quick and efficient way to obtain information from a large sample and the ability to generalise 
research findings based on the collected sample (Saunders et al. 2012). Two main types of 
surveys are cross-sectional and longitudinal. In a cross-sectional survey design, responses for 
both independent and dependent variables are collected at one point in time. This design can 
measure respondents’ current attitudes and it requires only a short time and cost for 
administering the survey and collecting the information. A longitudinal survey design involves 
collecting data about trends with the same or different respondents over time. Longitudinal 
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survey designs can examine whether employees change their security behaviour before and after 
certain changes in the organisational security context occur over time. Though longitudinal 
surveys would be suitable for this study to capture employees’ security compliance changes and 
provide better evidence of contributing factors to compliance, it requires much more time and 
resources than cross-sectional survey approach. 
Due to time and resource constraints, a cross-sectional survey was used in Study Two to measure 
a snapshot of users’ self-report security compliance in the context of their own perceived security 
environment. Although using self-report survey to study security compliance is consistent with 
previous studies, measuring individuals’ actual behaviour is still one challenge for behavioural 
security research (Crossler et al. 2013). Responses collected from self-report survey are often 
subject to common method bias in which participants may not truly answer the questions due to a 
wide range of factors such as survey question ambiguity, desire to provide socially accepted 
responses, or to please the researcher (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Such biased responses can distort 
the actual measurement of the study constructs, which lead to inaccurate study conclusions. 
More complete discussion of common method biases and how they were addressed in this 
research are provided in Section 5.3.3.3 in this chapter. 
The cross-sectional survey design involves following five steps: 
1. Survey instrument design (Section 5.3) 
2. Determining sampling frame and size (Section 5.4) 
3. Survey administration (Section 5.5) 
4. Data preparation and analysis to establish the validity and reliability of the measurement 
(Section 5.6 and 5.7) 
5. Assessing structural model validity (Section 5.8) 
Each of the steps is now described in the following sections. 
 SURVEY INSTRUMENT DESIGN 5.3
The purpose of survey instrument design was to operationalise the constructs identified for the 
research model (based on the literature and Study One) so that they could be measured and 
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quantified. The developed constructs were examined for reliability, validity and the inter-
relationships between them. The Study Two instrument followed a measure development process 
recommended by Churchill (1979) which involved the following steps: 
 Specify the domain of constructs (Section 5.3.1) 
 Generate a sample of items that capture the constructs (Section 5.3.2) 
 Pilot test to purify the measures (Section 5.3.3.5) 
 Assess the measure reliability and validity (Section 5.7snd 5.8) 
 Specification of Domain of Study Constructs 5.3.1
Specifying the domain of constructs involves determining what is included in the definition of a 
construct and the dimensions that represent the elements of the constructs (Churchill 1979, Lewis 
et al. 2005). Table 5-1 provides definitions of the constructs and sources of measurement items 
that structure the research model proposed after Study One. 
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Table 5-1: Specification of the Domain of the Constructs and Measurement Items 
Domain Construct Definition/Description Sources 
Measurement 
items source 
Items 
Security 
Demands 
Security 
compliance 
overload 
Security compliance overload is defined as having too many 
security tasks to do in the time available, which may reduce 
work productivity. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010); 
Herath and Rao (2009b); 
Vance et al. (2012) 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010) 
3 
Access to security 
policies 
Availability and easy access to the documented security 
policies and procedures. 
 Adapted from 
Boss et al. 
(2009) 
4 
Security skill 
requirements 
The pressure to spend time and effort in learning and 
understanding IT knowledge in order to comply with the 
organisation's security requirements. 
Shih et al. (2011) Adapted from 
Shih et al. 
(2011) 
3 
Organisational 
Security 
Resources  
Security 
communication 
efficacy 
Level of satisfaction with the clarity and usefulness of the 
organisational security communication. 
(Pahnila et al. 2007) Adapted from 
(Pahnila et al. 
2007) 
4 
Security skill use 
and development 
Opportunities to use and develop one's skills in performing 
security tasks as required by the organisation. 
Workman et al. (2008); 
Bakken and Torp (2012); 
(Wall et al. 1996) 
Adapted from 
Wall et al. 
(1996) 
4 
Organisational 
rewards 
Tangible or intangible compensation that an organisation 
gives to an employee in return for compliance with security 
requirements. 
Boss and Kirsch (2007); 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
Boss and Kirsch 
(2007) 
4 
Organisational 
sanctions 
Disciplinary actions towards non-compliance. Sanctions can 
be described in terms of financial/non-financial penalties. 
 Boss and Kirsch 
(2007) 
3 
Personal 
Resources 
Security self-
efficacy 
An employee’s judgment of personal skills, knowledge, or 
competency about fulfilling the requirements of the security 
demands. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010); 
Vance et al. (2012); 
Workman et al. (2008); 
Rhee et al. (2009) 
Adapted from 
Rhee et al. 
(2009) 
6 
Security exposure The extent to which users have had direct knowledge or 
experience of security incidents in their own lives (e.g. things 
happening to them or to friends/family, as well as things that 
they may have internalised from media coverage). 
Rhee et al. (2009) Adapted from 
Rhee et al. 
(2009) 
4 
 Security 
compliance 
burnout 
Reflecting psychological exhaustion and cynicism towards 
assigned security tasks. It shows a lack of interest and 
underestimation of security issues and measures. 
 Adapted from 
Schaufeli et al. 
(1996); Boss et 
al. (2009) 
5 
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 Security 
engagement 
The extent of energetic dedication in performing and 
involving with security tasks. 
 Adapted from 
Handelsman et 
al. (2005) 
6 
 Security 
compliance  
Security compliance is an act of exercising safe security 
practice at work. 
Vance et al. (2012); 
Ifinedo (2011); Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010); 
Developed for 
this study 
9 
    Total items 56 
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Security demands describe characteristics of security measures that organisations want and 
expect users to perform. Study One found that security compliance overload, difficult access to 
security policies and security skill requirements could all have a strong impact on user security 
compliance burnout. 
Organisational security resources are what the organisations provide to users to ensure the 
effectiveness of the overall security program and assist users’ security compliance. The four 
forms of organisational security resources identified in the qualitative study were (1) 
organisational security communication efficacy, (2) security skill use and development, (3) 
rewards and (4) sanctions. 
Personal resources comprise security self-efficacy and security exposure that motivate the users 
to protect organisational information. Research has shown that task-specific self-efficacy should 
be considered to improve predictability in security performance (Rhee et al. 2009), thus security 
self-efficacy describes specific security skills and knowledge of the users. Security exposure 
used in Study Two specifically refers to the direct experience of security issues and incidents in 
one’s life, work or both. 
The direct outcomes of fulfilling security demands and receiving organisational security 
resources were security compliance burnout and engagement respectively. The “burnout” 
construct was borrowed from the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model (Demerouti et al. 
2001). Burnout consists of two dimensions: exhaustion from work and cynicism towards work. 
Both dimensions have been adapted to reflect the burnout effect from fulfilling security 
demands. The original exhaustion construct captures both physical and psychological fatigue 
from work demands (Demerouti et al. 2001). Dealing with security demands, such as reading 
security policies and exercising safe security practices, does not require much physical effort 
except for cognitive effort and time. For Study Two, compliance burnout is the psychological 
fatigue from and cynicism towards supporting and performing security tasks. 
The construct “security engagement” in this research has been adapted from work engagement, 
which refers to a positive, fulfilling, security task-related state of mind that reflects the level of 
energy and emotional dedication in performing security tasks (Schaufeli and Bakker 2004, 
Demerouti et al. 2001).Finally, security compliance involves users’ usage of protective 
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technologies, such as networked firewalls, and anti-virus software (to name a few), and exercise 
of additional non-technical measures, such as keeping secure passwords, being cautious with 
suspicious email attachments, or reporting non-compliant behaviour. Performing non-technical 
measures does not require the employment of any specific technologies except his/her active 
common security knowledge to eliminate possible negative consequences, such as loss of 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of information. 
 Generating Items to Measure Research Variables 5.3.2
Existing scales were used in the current study provided they satisfied three conditions: (1) they 
have measured the same concepts as the study, (2) have been empirically tested and validated, 
and (3) were designed for a similar group of participants (Schrauf and Navarro 2005). Scales 
adapted from previous validated suitable instruments must be revalidated for their content, 
construct validity, and reliability. This study examined existing literature in the domain of 
security management, security policies, and security compliance to find relevant scales. This 
procedure was conducted together with an expert in measurement development. The initial pool 
of measures had 56 items in total (see sample questionnaires at Appendix 4 for English and 
Appendix 5 for Vietnamese version). 
The following section describes how the scales were allocated to each construct specified in the 
proposed research model. 
 Security Demands 
Security demands consist of three constructs: security compliance overload, difficulty accessing   
security policies, and security skill requirements. The construct “security compliance overload” 
is the quantitative workload of security tasks including frequencies of the tasks and task 
completion time that users have to comply with in a period of time. Security compliance 
overload was measured with a three-item scale adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010). The 
construct “access to security policies” described the availability and easy access to the 
documented security policies and procedures. Security policy access was assessed with a four-
item scale adapted from Boss et al. (2009). The “security skill requirements” construct describes 
the extent that users have to spend time and effort in learning and understanding security 
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knowledge to comply with security requirements. It was measured with a three-item scale 
adapted from Shih et al. (2011) which measures knowledge demand for IT staff in doing their 
jobs. Table 5-2 below displays the pooled items for three constructs of security demands. 
Table 5-2: Generated Items for Security Demands 
Variable Item Source 
Security Compliance 
Overload 
The IT security system holds me back from doing my actual work. 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010) 
The IT security system slows down my response time to my 
colleagues, customers, and managers. 
Overall, the time spent on complying with the requirements of the 
IT security system hinders my productivity at work. 
Security Policy 
Access 
I need to spend a lot of time to be familiar with the organisation’s 
IT security policies and guidelines. 
Boss et al. (2009) 
I am required to know a lot of existing written policies and 
guidelines to secure my computer system. 
It is difficult to find the information I need from the existing IT 
security policies and guidelines to secure my computer system. 
It is time consuming to know what IT security precautions I should 
take at work. 
Security Skill 
Requirements 
I need to acquire new skills to comply with the requirements of the 
IT security system. 
Shih et al. (2011) 
I need to rely on others’ help to effectively comply with the 
requirements of the IT security system. 
I need additional training to acquire sufficient knowledge to 
comply with the requirements of the IT security system. 
All security demands’ items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from (1) 
strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
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 Organisational Security Resources 
Organisational security resources consist of three constructs: security communication efficacy, 
security skill use and development, organisational reward and sanction. Organisational security 
communication efficacy was assessed with a four-item scale adapted from Herath and Rao 
(2009b). Security skill use and development was assessed with four items adapted from Bakken 
and Torp (2012). Reward and sanction are two aspects of security compliance evaluation which 
were measured by seven items adapted from Boss and Kirsch (2007). All items of organisational 
security resources were scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale. Items to measure three constructs 
of organisational security resources are shown in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3: Generated Items for Organisational Security Resources 
Variable Item Source 
Organisational 
Security 
Communication 
Efficacy 
IT security policies and guidelines are made available to 
employees online. 
Herath and Rao 
(2009b) 
IT security policies and guidelines are written in a manner that is 
clear and understandable. 
Users receive adequate security training before getting a network 
account. 
A variety of business communications (notices, posters, 
newsletters, etc.) are used to promote security awareness 
Security Skill Use 
and Development 
The security program at work allows me to use my security 
knowledge and skills. 
Bakken and Torp 
(2012) 
Security training contributes to my personal development. 
I have the opportunity to be resourceful in fulfilling IT security 
requirements 
I learn new things from the IT security program. 
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Reward and 
Sanction 
My performance reviews at work depend on whether or not I 
comply with the requirements of the IT security system. 
Boss and Kirsch 
(2007) 
I will receive a personal mention in work reports if I comply with 
the requirements of the IT security system. 
I will be rewarded if I comply with the requirements of the IT 
security system. 
I will be recognised for my expertise in IT security. 
If I breach the IT security system, I can be penalised. 
I can be fired if I breach the IT security system. 
If I do not practice safe IT security, I will receive a warning or bad 
work report. 
I can be demoted or receive pay cut if I breach the IT security 
system. 
 Personal Resources 
The personal resources construct has two sub-constructs: security self-efficacy and security 
exposure. Security self-efficacy was measured with a six-item scale adapted from Rhee et al. 
(2009) and security exposure was measured with a four-item scale developed for this study. 
Rhee et al. (2009) security self-efficacy scale was changed slightly to suit the security 
environment in Vietnam. For example, unpopular online software, such as file-sharing Kazzaz 
used in the original scales, was replaced with popular software for users in Vietnam including 
Skype and Yahoo Messenger. Scales for security exposure were developed based on the 
interviews in Study One. Three participants reflected past experience with damaging security 
incidents, such as file-infected viruses, losing information due to hardware failure, or witnessing 
someone else having a security incident. The cited security incidents had a strong impact on the 
participants’ level of security practice. The four-item scale was designed to capture users’ direct 
knowledge or experience of security incidents in their own lives (e.g. things happening to them 
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or to friends/family, as well as things that they may have internalised from media coverage). 
Table 5-4 shows generated items for security self-efficacy and security exposure constructs. All 
personal resources items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from (1) strongly 
disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
Table 5-4: Generated Items for Personal Security Resources 
Variable Item Source 
Security Self-
Efficacy 
I know how to set the security levels of the Web browsers when I 
am using the Internet.  
Rhee et al. (2009) 
I know how to use different programs to protect my computer from 
IT security risks (e.g firewalls, pop-up blockers, clearing cache 
files).  
I rate my IT security knowledge level as advanced.  
I can comfortably read and use the user’s guides for IT security. 
I am confident that I can update my computer’s security software 
when it is needed. 
I know how to check online spoofing attacks (e.g. a fake website 
impersonates another website to collect your account information). 
Security Exposure 
I have had a virus on my computer in the last 12 months. 
Self-developed for 
this study  
I have received a fraudulent online request for my personal 
information or money in the last 12 months. 
I have had to restore my computer files after an IT security issue in 
the last 12 months. 
I have a colleague at my work who has had issues with IT security 
(e.g. virus infected computer, lost account information...) in the last 
12 months. 
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 Security Compliance Burnout 
Though work burnout and engagement are often negatively correlated psychological states, they 
are not exact opposites of each other. Further, it is possible that one can feel exhausted but still 
highly energetic in doing a task. Schaufeli and Bakker (2004) suggested that burnout and 
engagement should be measured independently using different instruments. This research is 
taking a similar approach to assess security compliance burnout and engagement using different 
sets of survey items. 
Security compliance burnout refers to compliance exhaustion and cynicism towards security 
tasks. Security compliance burnout was assessed with a five-item scale adapted from Schaufeli 
et al. (1996) and Boss et al. (2009). All security compliance burnout items were scored on a 7-
point Likert-type scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
 Security Engagement 
The security engagement construct is the extent of energy and emotional dedication in 
performing security tasks. The construct was measured with a six-item scale adapted from 
Handelsman et al. (2005). All security engagement items were scored on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
 Security Compliance 
The measure of the security compliance construct included a nine-item scale, which was 
developed for this study. In the first part of this research (Study One) it was found that the term 
“security compliance” referred to many security tasks that employees need to perform and 
security policies were not the only source of specifying security requirements, hence asking 
whether users comply with security policies could be unclear. This study aimed to measure 
security compliance using specific security tasks that users performed as part of their practices. 
Because common technical controls now restrict many security activities that the users can 
perform at work, such as software installation or virus scanning, asking questions about users’ 
intentions to complete such controlled tasks would be irrelevant. Thus, the security compliance 
measure developed included those security tasks where users could have options to complete. An 
example item is “I do not click on links in Yahoo chat, Skype chat, or email without checking the 
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source of the link”. All security compliance items were scored on a seven-point Likert-type 
scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
Measurement items for the constructs of security compliance burnout, security engagement and 
security compliance are illustrated in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-5: Generated Items for Security Compliance Burnout, Security Engagement and 
Security Compliance 
Variable Item Source 
Security 
Compliance 
Burnout 
I do not think IT security is a big issue. 
Schaufeli et al. (1996) and 
Boss et al. (2009) 
It does not matter if I get involved in resolving IT security 
issues or not. 
I am not interested in helping the company with IT security 
issues. 
I think too much fuss is made about IT security. 
I feel tired when I have to face a day of dealing with IT 
security issues at work. 
Security 
Engagement 
I talk to my colleagues about IT security issues at work. 
Handelsman et al. (2005 
I am enthusiastic about complying with IT security measures 
at work. 
When I find an IT security risk, I am excited to work with the 
IT department to look for others in case there has been a 
breach. 
I find identifying and controlling IT security risks challenging 
and rewarding. 
I am proud of my safe security practices at work.  
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I really enjoy learning about IT security. 
Security 
Compliance 
I often follow IT requests to check viruses. 
Self-developed for this 
study 
I often install software updates if I am asked by IT staff. 
I do not install software on company computers without 
consulting IT staff. 
I take extreme precaution when installing freeware from 
Internet. 
I do not store confidential information on a non-protected 
storage device (e.g. portable hard disk, USB). 
I do not click on links in Yahoo chat, Skype chat, or email 
without checking the source of the link. 
I often consult with IT staff about security warnings when I 
am not sure of the risks. 
I use strong passwords for all work-related accounts. 
I log out of the system when finished working. 
 Questionnaire Design 5.3.3
Self-administered questionnaires were used in this study. The questionnaires were distributed to 
the participants in both an electronic form using the online RMIT Qualtrics survey and a paper-
based form using delivery and collection method. It is essential that the questionnaire be 
designed properly to improve the response rate and the validity of the responses. 
The following sections describe the structure of the questionnaire, consideration in addressing 
response biases, and questionnaire translation. 
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 Sequencing of Questionnaire Questions 5.3.3.1
The researcher adapted a sequencing technique recommended in Saunders et al. (2012) in 
organising the order and flow of questions. Questions that were more straightforward and clearly 
relevant to the purpose of the questionnaire were placed at the beginning. For example, questions 
on attributes and behaviours are more straightforward to answer than those asking for opinions 
so the former questions were presented at the start. Less straightforward questions including 
personal and demographic information were placed towards the end of the questionnaire to 
reduce participants’ boredom. Questions were also grouped into sections that were logical for the 
participants. 
 Explaining Purpose of the Questionnaire 5.3.3.2
The purpose of the survey was clearly explained including an assurance of confidentiality for 
participating companies. Participants were not identified whether they completed the survey or 
not as there was no identity information collected. Surveys with a clearly defined purpose often 
result in higher response rates (Dillman 2009). The questionnaires were delivered in both 
electronic and paper-based forms and accompanied by a covering letter explaining the purpose 
of the questionnaire and the research. The format of both the covering letter and the 
questionnaire ensured that the materials looked simple and interesting to the participants. 
 Bias Responses and Resolution 5.3.3.3
Common method bias refers to the measurement variance that is caused by the measurement 
method rather than the actual measures of the study constructs. The term method signifies 
different abstract forms of measurement, such as item content, scale type, general response 
context, or timing of the response (Fiske 2011). Method biases have been one of the main 
sources of measurement error which can undermine the validity of both constructs and 
relationships among them (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Measurement error caused by method bias can 
be systematic which alters the observed relationships between the theoretical constructs 
independently of the theoretical model (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Misleading conclusions could be 
derived from systematic measurement error.  
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Three main sources for common method bias are a common rater, a common measurement 
context, and a common item context effect (Podsakoff et al. 2003). A common rater effect 
occurs where both predictor and dependent variables are obtained from the same respondents. A 
common measurement context effect is where both predictor and dependent variables were 
measured at the same time. Finally, a common item context effect happens where all 
measurement items are used in the same instrument, and/or the characteristics of measurement 
items themselves. This study employed a cross-sectional survey that measured self-reported 
responses on both predictor and dependent variables by the same respondents, at the same time, 
and in the same questionnaire, due to the time and resources available for the study. Thus the 
research was unavoidably subject to the common rater, measurement context, and item context 
biases.  
For this study where predictor and dependent variables cannot be measured separately by 
different raters and/or different contexts, the common method variance was controlled by 
applying procedural remedies related to questionnaire design and a statistical remedy (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003). Procedural remedies were applied when designing the questionnaire. First, response 
anonymity was guaranteed to all companies and users participating in the survey. The purpose of 
the survey was also explained in the consent statement before the participants were allowed to 
complete the survey. Second, several questionnaire design techniques were used to reduce item 
characteristic bias effects, such as the desire to answer with socially accepted responses, or to 
please the researcher, or ambiguous items leading to random answers or personal interpretation 
of the meaning of the questions to name a few. It was clearly stated at the start of the 
questionnaire that there were no right or wrong answers, but the participants should answer as 
honestly as possible. Though some of the questionnaire items were borrowed from previous 
studies, all items were checked with both experts and sample participants in a pilot study for 
content clarity and lack of ambiguous items. 
 Questionnaire Translation into Vietnamese 5.3.3.4
As the majority of the population sample for the study was not fluent in English, a Vietnamese 
version of the questionnaire was made available to the survey participants (see Appendix 5). As 
suggested by Usunier (1998) issues, such as lexical meaning, idioms, experiential meaning, and 
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grammar and syntax, were considered in the translation. Given that the researcher speaks fluent 
Vietnamese and English, a parallel translation technique was used where both the researcher and 
another translator independently translated the English version to Vietnamese. These two 
translated versions were then compared to create the final version. 
 Pilot Study Testing 5.3.3.5
Pilot study testing was performed on the questionnaire before conducting the main survey to 
refine the questionnaire and improve the clarity of the questions so that the participants could 
answer the questions (Saunders et al. 2012). The pilot test also allowed initial assessment of the 
questions’ content validity and formative reliability assessment of the data to be collected. 
First, the questionnaire was administered to five local IT experts who had experience in a 
general information security domain to evaluate its representativeness and the suitability of the 
questions for the organisational IT context. All consulted IT experts confirmed the clarity and 
suitability of the questionnaire questions. Second, a group of 30 university staff, university 
alumni, and a local bank staff were invited to participate in a pilot survey. This pilot group was 
selected because they were similar to the main sample population of the study. To assess the 
reliability and suitability of the questions in the survey, all participants in the pilot test were 
asked to provide feedback on the following items: 
 How long it took to complete the questionnaire; 
 The clarity of the instruction; 
 Which, if any, questions were unclear or ambiguous 
 Whether there were any major topic omissions; 
 Any other comments 
Feedback areas were inserted for each question in the pilot questionnaire version. General 
questions, such as time to complete, suggestion for major topic omissions, and any other 
comments, were placed at the end of the questionnaire.  
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 SAMPLING FRAME AND SAMPLE SIZE 5.4
Study Two aimed to measure the impact of security demands, and organisational and personal 
security resources on employees’ compliance with security policies and the exercise of safe 
security practice. The target population of the study are people working in organisations in 
Vietnam that use networked computer applications, such as email or access networked Internet 
in their daily job. The organisations, which were suitable to participate in the survey, had some 
forms of information security policies or security guidance to guide proper use of information 
technology. It is expected that organisation size should provide an indication of the level of 
security demands and resources. An organisation with a larger number of users should have 
more security demands and provide more appropriate security resources. 
Sample size not only affects various aspects of a statistical test but also needs to be justified 
against the expense of time and resources (Fox et al., 2007). For example, a Chi-squared 
statistical test, one of the most common model fit tests, is sensitive to sample size. For too small 
a sample size, a Chi-squared lacks the power as it may not discriminate between good and poor 
fitting models (Kenny and McCoach 2003). On the other hand, for a model with a large sample 
size, 400 or more, the Chi-squared is almost always statistically significant and results in 
rejecting the model (Bentler and Bonnet 1980).  
In Study Two, the expected statistical analysis technique was structural equation modelling 
(SEM), which assessed the validity of both measurement model (confirmatory factor analysis) 
and structural model (hypothesis testing). Studies which test hypotheses need sufficient power to 
minimise the likelihood of Type I and Type II errors (Sekaran 2000). A Type I error occurs 
when a null hypothesis is rejected when it is actually true. A Type II error occurs when a null 
hypothesis is not rejected when effect actually exists in the population. Increasing the sample 
size can increase both statistical significance and power. That means increasing sample size will 
reduce the likelihood of both Type I and Type II errors.  
The proposed research model had 12 constructs and no construct had less than three items 
(measured variables). There were 56 items measuring the constructs in the study model (see 
Table 5-1). According to Hair et al. (2010) sample size for SEM can be affected by five factors: 
multivariate distribution of data, estimation technique, model complexity, missing data, and 
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communalities of the model (i.e. average error variance of indicators). Distribution of data that 
deviates greatly from normality would need a higher sample size, or at least 15 respondents for 
each parameter estimated in the model. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is the most 
common SEM estimate procedure for normal distribution data thanks to its efficiency and non-
biasness (Hair et al. 2010). MLE works reliably with a sample size of 200. MLE can be sensitive 
with a large sample of more than 400 and can make goodness of fit become poor fit. Model 
complexity implies that the required sample size would vary heavily with the number of 
measures and factors in the model, but it is expected to require around 200 subjects for a 
standard model (Tanaka 1987), or at least five respondents for every measured variable (Hair et 
al. 2010). Missing data effectively reduces the number of a usable sample size. A higher sample 
size may be required to offset any problem caused by missing data. Finally, communalities refer 
to the average amount of variation among measured variables as specified in the measurement 
model. For models with multiple constructs having low communalities of less than 0.5, higher 
sample sizes may be required for convergence and model stability (Enders and Bandalos 2001). 
Study Two expected a minimum five respondents per item, thus a sample size of at least 280 was 
needed for a proper SEM analysis (Hair et al. 2010). 
 ADMINISTRATION OF THE SURVEY  5.5
In the researcher’s experience of working more than six years in the local IT/IS industry, sending 
unsolicited emails inviting employees in companies in Vietnam to participate in the online 
survey would be very ineffective and the pilot study confirmed that this was indeed the case. 
Most local people ignore email requests to complete surveys unless they know the researcher. 
Furthermore, as the topic of the survey was about information security issues, and security 
compliance of users that could be confidential to the companies, most companies were reluctant 
to allow their staff to participate without a prior relationship with the researcher. 
First, participants for the questionnaire survey were recruited through the researcher’s friends, 
family members, colleagues, University alumni network, and the researcher’s personal Facebook 
page. The online survey link was sent to potential participants’ emails (see Appendix 3). Second, 
an invitation to complete the survey was posted on the Vietnam CIO Facebook page of which 
the researcher was a member. The Vietnam CIO Facebook page was the largest social network 
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of local IT professionals and executives. Prospective contacts on the Vietnam CIO page were 
also asked to forward the survey to their employees. For all electronic invitations, a reminder 
was sent three days after the first emails to increase the response rate. Third, printed copies of 
the survey were also distributed to potential participants to improve response rate by 
accommodating those who did not want to respond to unsolicited emails. To establish the 
relationship with participants via their companies, a network of alumni associates and acquainted 
business professionals (now referred as the survey distributors) were recruited to disseminate the 
printed surveys to their colleagues and contacts. There were two distributors in Hanoi, two in Da 
Nang, and five in Ho Chi Minh City. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, survey 
distributors were asked to recruit participants in various industries in three biggest cities in 
Vietnam including Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and Da Nang. 
 DATA ANALYSIS PREPARATION 5.6
Collected data needs to be organised, examined and explored before commencing multivariate 
instrument validation and hypothesis testing due two reasons. First, data needs to be organised 
into the right format as both online and paper-based surveys were collected. Data organisation 
also helps control data entry errors and avoids unclear data labelling which can lead to confusion 
and difficulty with the statistical analysis in the next phase. Second, data needs to be examined 
and explored to ensure missing data is properly handled and multivariate assumptions are 
satisfied before a multivariate analysis is conducted (Hair et al. 2010).  
 Data Entry Procedures 5.6.1
The data collection was conducted using both electronic and paper-based methods. Electronic 
questionnaires were created and hosted on RMIT Qualtrics - an RMIT online survey software. 
Online questionnaires were recorded as “finished” only after the participants clicked “Submit” 
button. As part of the consent agreement of the participation, only “finished” online surveys 
were used for further data analysis. 
Data from both online and paper-based questionnaires were combined then exported from RMIT 
Qualtrics to SPSS format to be used with SPSS 22.0 statistical software package. The data 
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formats and variable names were adjusted and coded according to consistent naming 
conventions for better clarity in the following analysis 
 Missing Data and Remedies 5.6.2
Missing data occurs where valid values on one or more variables are not available for the 
analysis (Hair et al. 2010). Missing data also occurs when the participants fail to complete all 
questionnaire items or make data entry errors. Similar to other quantitative studies, this research 
also encountered missing data which was scattered randomly or appears in distinct patterns. 
When distinct missing patterns occur to a sufficient extent, the missing data should be explored 
and a remedy taken to offset the impact. 
The current research employed a four-step missing data process proposed by Hair et al (2010) 
for identifying missing data patterns and implementing remedies. Steps 1 and 2 are to determine 
the type of missing data and the extent of missing data respectively. Step 3 is to verify the 
randomness of missing data. The final step is to select an imputation method to replace missing 
data. The detailed procedures of each step are described below. 
The first step in examining missing data is to determine whether it is ignorable or non-ignorable. 
Ignorable missing data is expected and part of the research design (e.g. skipped questions that 
are not applicable) and does not require a specific remedy. The questionnaire for this research 
was designed without explicit missing sections, thus any missing data should be treated as non-
ignorable. As it could not be predicted, non-ignorable missing data are generally classified into 
two classes: known missing data and unknown missing data processes based on their source 
(Hair et al. 2010). The main difference between known and unknown missing data is whether the 
source of the missing data can be easily identified or not, data missing due to entry errors can be 
classified as known missing data, whereas missing due to participants’ failure to answer certain 
questions is treated as unknown missing data. Extreme care was taken when entering paper-
based questionnaires into RMIT Qualtrics, thus any missing data in Study Two was a result of 
unknown missing data process. 
The second step of missing data analysis involved examining its extent to determine whether it 
was due to specific cases or variables, and the missing extent could be justified with any specific 
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remedies without affecting the results of the study (Hair et al. 2010). The following criteria were 
applied to delete cases and variables in Study Two as recommended in (Hair et al. 2010). 
1. Cases with more than 10 per cent of missing data except the missing data occurring in a 
specific non-random pattern (e.g., missing mainly in a specific set of questions, from a 
specific group of participants). 
2. Variables with more than 15 per cent of missing data although higher levels of missing 
data up to 20-30 per cent can often be remedied. 
3. Cases with missing data for dependent variable(s) to avoid artificial increase in 
relationships with independent variables. 
The third step in the missing data process involves examination of randomness of non-ignorable 
missing data across the cases and the variables. There are two levels of randomness in missing 
data: missing data at random (MAR) and missing completely at random (MCAR) (Hair et al. 
2010). MAR occurs when data is missing randomly within subgroups but manifests significant 
differences between the subgroups of missing data. MCAR are not caused by any underlying 
process and missing data do not lead to bias in the study results. Of the two randomness levels, 
only MCAR allows for the use of any remedy and does not affect the generalisability to the 
population (Hair et al. 2010). Assessing the randomness of missing data processes can include 
one or both diagnostic tests: comparing a variable Y between observations with missing data of 
Y and those with valid values of Y and conducting an overall test of randomness (Hair et al. 
2010). 
In the last step, a treatment procedure for missing data is employed. The missing data can either 
be deleted or ignored using complete case approach (LISTWISE in SPSS) or all-available 
approach (PAIRWISE in SPSS), or by using replacement values (Hair et al. 2010). Complete 
case and all-available case approach can reduce the sample size as only cases with valid data are 
used. A replacement value approach ensures all observations are available for the analysis by 
replacing missing values with estimated values based on information available in the sample. 
Missing values can be calculated using three main methods, namely mean substitution, 
regression imputation, and model-based (Hair et al. 2010). Mean substitution is the most widely 
used due to its simplicity though it is not without some disadvantages, such as reducing variance 
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estimates, distorted distribution of values, or depressing the observed correlation (Hair et al. 
2010). Expectation Maximisation (EM) - a model-based imputation method (Little and Rubin 
1987) offers best representation of original distribution of values with least bias (Hair et al. 
2010). EM estimates missing values by forming the shape of the partially missing data 
distribution and calculating the likelihood of missing values under that distribution (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007). EM also takes into account variables that are potentially related to the missing 
of imputed variables and the imputed variables (Schafer 1997). The current research (Study 
Two) employed EM in SPSS 22.0 as the imputation method to replace missing values and 
produced a new data sheet that was used in further analysis. 
 Testing of Normality 5.6.3
Normality or normal distribution refers to the shape of the data distribution for an individual 
metric variable, which is the most fundamental assumption for univariate and multivariate 
analysis (Hair et al. 2010). The shape of a distribution can be described by two measures: 
kurtosis and skewness. Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data is peaked or flat relative to a 
normal distribution. High kurtosis distribution tends to have a distinct peak near the mean, 
decline rather rapidly, and have heavy tails. Data sets with low kurtosis tend to have a flat top 
near the mean rather than a sharp peak. While kurtosis depicts the height of the distribution, 
skewness refers to the balance of the distribution. A distribution, or data set, is symmetric if it 
looks the same to the left and right of the centre point. An unbalanced distribution can shift to 
the left (positive skewness) or to the right (negative skewness) from the centre point (Hair et al. 
2010).  
In addition to visually testing the shape of a distribution for normality, several statistical tests are 
available to test the extent of kurtosis and skewness. The two most common tests for normality 
are the Shapiro-Wilks for small sample size of less than 50 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov for 
medium sample sizes of less than 300 (Hair et al, 2010). For a larger sample size (i.e. n>300), 
cut-off absolute value of greater than 2 for both kurtosis and skewness can be used as a reference 
of substantial departure from normality (West et al. 1997, Curran 1996). 
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 Test for Outliers 5.6.4
Outliers are observations that are distinctly different from other observations (Hair et al. 2010). 
Without proper identification, outliers can change the results of analysis and result in poor model 
fit (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Occurrence of outliers can be due to data entry errors or 
special cases of the sample population. Depending on the purpose of each study, outliers can be 
beneficial or problematic. Outliers can be beneficial if a study aims to explore all aspects of a 
population. On the contrary, if a study aims to examine general trends of the population outliers 
may not represent the population and can seriously distort the analysis results. Outliers can be 
verified at two main levels: univariate and multivariate. This study investigated both univariate 
and multivariate outliers. 
Univariate outliers can be checked using SPSS histograms. If a univariate outlier is detected, 
further multivariate outlier detection should also be performed to determine if that outlier should 
be removed. Multivariate outliers can be detected using Mahalonbis distance, which divides 
Mahalonbis distance (M2) by degrees of freedom (df or number of items) for each case 
separately (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). There is no strict recommendation for a M2/df 
threshold to detect a multivariate outlier. (Hair et al. 2010) propose a threshold of between 2.5 to 
4.0 depending on sample size, with a larger sample allowing a larger value. An M2/df threshold 
of 4 was used to detect multivariate outliers for the sample size of this study (above 400). 
 Test for Common Method Bias 5.6.5
Common method bias refers to the measurement variance that is caused by the measurement 
method rather than actual measures of the study constructs. Though special consideration was 
given during the design of the questionnaire to minimise potential common method bias, it is 
necessary to test for existence of any common method bias in this study. 
Harman’s single-factor test was used to assess the level of common method bias in Study Two. 
The test uses exploratory factor analysis to examine an unrotated factor solution to determine 
factors which account for a significant variance in the variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
Common method bias may exist if (1) a single factor emerges from the factor analysis, or (2) one 
 114 
 
general factor accounts for more than 50 per cent of the covariance among the variables (Greene 
and Organ 1973, Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
 ASSESSING MEASUREMENT MODEL VALIDITY 5.7
Model testing of Study Two followed a two-step SEM model building approach (Hair et al. 
2010, Anderson and Gerbing 1988). The first step involved assessing validity of the proposed 
measurement model. Validity of measurement model depends on construct reliability, validity 
and goodness of fit for the measurement model. If the measurement model is satisfactorily 
obtained, the second step is to assess the validity of the structural model. The two-step SEM 
process ensures that only when all constructs are clearly understood and captured (i.e. validity of 
measurement model), the relationships among the constructs can be evaluated (structural model). 
This section provides procedures for assessing the measurement model validity. Section 5.8 
discusses the assessment of structural model validity. 
 Test for Construct Reliability 5.7.1
Construct reliability assesses the degree of consistency or repeatability between multiple 
measurements of a variable. Tests for reliability can include test-retest measuring responses from 
the same participants at two points in time, inter-rater agreement comparing results among 
participants/reviewers, and internal consistency measuring the extent to which the items in a 
scale intercorrelate. 
This study employs internal consistency testing which is the most common assessment of 
reliability (Hair et al. 2010). Internal consistency can be measured using two statistical 
indicators: item-total correlation and reliability coefficient such as Cronbach's alpha. Item-total 
correlation indicates if a single item correlates well with other items representing the same 
construct. An item’s item-to-total correlation value of less than 0.5 indicates low correlation with 
the scale overall, and is a candidate for deletion (Hair et al. 2010). High values (>0.95) though 
may indicate multicollinearity or such items have not been answered objectively (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007). 
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Cronbach’s alpha is the most commonly applied estimate that measures how closely 
intercorrelated a set of items are as a group. Cronbach’s alpha lower limit is generally set at 0.70 
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). Items with Cronbach’s alpha lower than 0.70 should be deleted 
from the scale. For scales to be reliable using Cronbach's alpha the constructs need to be 
unidimensional and have less than 12 items in the scale as reliability value increases when 
number of items increases (Hair et al. 2010). 
 Test for Construct Validity  5.7.2
Construct validity refers to the extent a set of measured variables actually reflects the theoretical 
latent construct for which they are designed to measure. Evidence of construct validity ensures 
that item measures from the sample actually represent the true score that exists in the population 
of the study. Construct validity is constructed by five main components: content validity, 
factorial validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and nomological validity. Each of 
these components is explained below. 
 Content Validity 5.7.2.1
Content validity, also called face validity, is the assessment of the correspondence between 
measured items for each construct and its conceptual definition. Content validity of study 
constructs has been subjectively assessed by experts in the field, or pretested with people similar 
to the studied population. For pre- and pilot testing, the questionnaire items were thoroughly 
tested with five IS experts and 30 users for valid content of the studied constructs and filtering 
out any irrelevant items. 
 Validating Factorial Validity through Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 5.7.2.2
Factorial validity considers the unidimensionality of a construct, which ensures that a set of 
measures represent only one single construct. Unidimensionality is a fundamental condition for 
good psychometric measures (Hair et al. 2010, Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Factorial validity 
can be measured by two main methods: multi-trait multi-method matrix (MTMM) or factor 
analysis (Campbell and Fiske 1959). MTMM is suitable for studies employing more than one 
research method, whereas factor analysis is commonly used for a single method study. Though 
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this study employed a mixed method approach, factor analysis through EFA is still utilised to 
further validate the unidimensionality of the constructs. 
The main purpose of EFA is to explore the underlying structure among observed variables. EFA 
identifies sets of variables that are highly interrelated and grouped into factors. Depending on the 
purpose of a study, EFA can be used as a data reduction technique or to search for structure 
among a set of variables without a predefined model (Hair et al. 2010). EFA would be necessary 
if there were not sufficiently strong theories about the constructs’ underlying responses to your 
measures (DeCoster 1998). In Study Two, in addition to existing measures from previous 
studies, new variables have been developed to measure several factors, such as difficult access to 
security policies, security skill requirements, security engagement and security compliance 
burnout to name a few. Thus, it is necessary to explore how the newly developed variables fit 
with those factors. 
Study Two also used factor analysis to reduce non-significant data to be used in subsequent 
analysis (i.e. data reduction). Data reduction identifies representative variables from the original 
variables and also uses factor loadings to identify significant variables that are more 
representative for each factor. Hence, data reduction could reduce the number of original 
variables into smaller numbers of factors to achieve a more parsimonious model. 
To prepare for factor analysis, two main issues are to be considered: (1) which types of variables 
and number of variables are to be included in the factor analysis; and (2) sample size in terms of 
subjects in the study and the number of variables in the analysis. 
Types of variables need to be considered so that correlation value can be calculated among all 
variables. In this study, all variables except demographic information are using metric scales (i.e. 
Likert-type scales) so there should not be a problem for the correlation calculation. Conceptual 
and statistical assumptions need to be clarified before factor analysis can be meaningfully 
conducted. Conceptual assumptions are critical for any statistical results to be meaningful. 
Underlying structure in the set of selected variables should be clearly identified and justified 
prior to factor analysis. Proposed factors in the study and sets of variables have been developed 
based on the outcome of previous studies and borrowed from their results. Thus, there should be 
a certain data structure among the selected variables. Homogeneity of the underlying factor 
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structure should also be assured before factor analysis to avoid mixing factors from known 
differing sub-groups of the selected variables. The population sample in this study has no known 
differences among different sub-groups; consequently there is no need to separate samples into 
differing groups.  
EFA requires sample adequacy to produce reliable EFA results. At least a case-to-variable ratio 
of 5:1 is needed to conduct an EFA (Hair et al. 2010). The measurement model of Study Two 
contained 56 variables with a sample size of more than 400 (see Section 6.2), resulting a 
variable-to-sample size ratio of greater than 5:1, hence satisfying the sample adequacy criterion. 
Overall measures of intercorrelation can be examined by three main methods: analysis of 
correlation, Barlett’s test, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) (Hair et al. 2010). First, the 
correlation values of greater than 0.30 or partial correlation of less than 0.7 are indicators of 
sufficient intercorrelation. Partial correlation is the unexplained correlation when effects of other 
variables are considered. Partial correlation should be small when an actual data structure exists 
in the set of variables. Second, the Bartlett test of sphericity examines the entire correlation 
matrix for significant correlations among at least some of the variables. Statistical assumption 
for factors analysis is that variables are sufficiently intercorrelated to produce representative 
factors. If all the correlations are low or equal, it means there is no underlying structure to group 
variables. Degree of variable intercorrelation can be assessed from both overall and individual 
variable perspectives (Hair et al. 2010). Third, KMO or overall measure of sampling adequacy 
(MSA) of at least 0.5 or above is required before proceeding with the factor analysis. KMO 
value can increase as (1) sample size increases, (2) the average correlations increase, (3) the 
number of variables increase, or (4) the number of factors decreases. 
When the overall KMO value falls below the 0.50, MSA can be extended to individual variables 
to exclude variables that do not fall within the acceptable range. The variable with the lowest 
KMO should be deleted and factor analysis can then be recalculated. By continuing to delete 
variables with lowest KMO value under 0.50 until all remaining variables have acceptable KMO 
value, the overall KMO can then be evaluated to assess its suitability for factor analysis. 
In summary, in accordance with the literature and with common research practice, the following 
factor extraction rules are to be implemented: 
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• Principal component extraction 
• Varimax rotation 
• Threshold for factor extraction of Eigen value >1 
• Items with cross-loadings (loadings on two or more factors) of > 0.4 to be dropped 
• Items with a factor loading of less than 0.4 on any factor can be dropped 
 Assessing Convergent and Divergent Validity through Confirmatory Factor 5.7.2.3
Analysis (CFA) 
The purpose of the CFA (i.e. assessing measurement model validity) is to examine the validity 
of individual measures through the model’s convergent, divergent validity of the constructs and 
the overall fit. The following sections describe the objectives for each component. 
5.7.2.3.1. Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity examines whether measured items of the same construct are correlated, 
which can be assessed through factor loading, average variance extracted (AVE), and reliability 
(Hair et al. 2010). Standardised factor loadings of measured items for the same construct should 
be preferably above 0.70 or at least 0.50 so that at least 50 per cent of the variation (squared 
standardised factor loading) in an item is explained by the latent construct. AVE is the average 
squared factor loading of all items among a set of constructs. An AVE of 0.5 or higher 
represents adequate convergence for a construct. Finally, reliability measure such as Cronbach’s 
alpha is also an indicator of convergent validity. Higher construct validity indicates higher 
internal consistency among items that consistently reflect the same latent construct. 
5.7.2.3.2. Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity scrutinises for differences of correlation among distinct but similar factors. 
High discriminant validity verifies that a construct is unique and the measured items capture a 
factor that other measures do not. Correlation between different factors should be low, 
demonstrating that the items are measuring different factors. Discriminant validity can be 
assessed by comparing AVE estimates for any two constructs with the square of the correlation 
estimate between these two constructs. It means that a latent construct should explain its item 
measures (AVE) better than it explains another construct (square of correlation estimate between 
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two constructs). Discriminant validity is evidenced when AVE estimates for two constructs are 
greater than the square of the correlation between the constructs (Hair et al. 2010).  
5.7.2.3.3. Goodness of Fit (GOF) 
Goodness of fit (GOF) in the measurement model indicates the ability of a model to reproduce 
the data (i.e., the similarity of the observed and estimated covariance matrices among measured 
items). GOF tries to find which model reflecting the underlying theory best represents the data. 
Model fit is one of the most important steps in structural equation modelling (Yuan 2005). 
A good-fitting model is one that is reasonably consistent with the data and so does not require 
respecification. Also a good-fitting measurement model is required before interpreting the causal 
paths of the structural mode (Barrett 2007, Hooper et al. 2008). 
The goodness of fit measures can be grouped into three general groups: absolute fit, incremental 
fit, and parsimony fit indices. Each group of GOF is briefly explained in the following 
paragraphs followed by the specification of the selected fit measures applied for the study. 
 Absolute Fit Indices: Chi-square, RMSEA, RMSR, SRMR 
Absolute fit measures seek to measure how well a specified model fits the sample data 
(McDonald and Ho 2002). Absolute fit testing does not rely on a baseline model for comparison 
with sample data. Each model is evaluated independently of any other models. 
An absolute measure of fit presumes that the best fitting model has a fit of zero. The measure of 
fit then determines how far the model is from perfect fit. These measures of fit are really a 
“badness” measure of fit, in that the bigger the difference from 0, the worse the model. Chi-
square (X
2
), Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) are three common absolute fit measures. 
The Chi-Square value assesses the differences between the estimated covariance and observed 
covariance matrices (Hu and Bentler 1999). The lower Chi-Square value represents the better fit. 
Good model fit using Chi-Square should produce an insignificant result at a 0.05 threshold 
(Barrett 2007). The use of Chi-Square for fit testing has certain limitations. First, a Chi-Square 
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test assumes multivariate normality. Tests on non-normal data, especially distributions with 
Kurtosis, may result in model rejections (Type 1 error-reject model) even if the model is 
correctly specified (McIntosh 2006). This issue has been addressed prior to the measurement 
model fit assessment stage. Second, Chi-Square is sensitive to sample size and number of 
observed variables. The Chi-Square fit test works reasonably well with sample sizes between 75 
to 200 (Kenny and McCoach 2003). On the other hand, in models with a large sample size (400 
or more), the Chi-Square is almost always statistically significant, thus rejecting the model 
(Bentler and Bonnet 1980). Chi-Square value is likely to be greater as the number of observed 
variables in the model increase, thus making the model fit poorer. Due to the limits of Chi-
Square, it is seldom used as a sole indicator of a measurement model fit. 
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) assesses how well the model would fit 
the population covariance matrix with the optimal number of parameter estimates (Byrne, 1998). 
RMSEA improves model parsimony by choosing a model with a lesser number of estimated 
parameters. Lower RMSEA value indicates a better fit. The cut-off fit value for RMSEA is set at 
0.06 (Hu and Bentler 1999) or the more stringent upper limit of 0.07 (Steiger 2007) has been 
more generally accepted (Hooper et al. 2008). One key advantage of RMSEA is that a 
confidence interval can be specified when calculating a range of RMSEA value. It is possible to 
report RMSEA value with a confidence level representing the precision in the estimate of the 
RMSEA. 
Root Means Square Residual (RMSR) and Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) 
are “the square root of the differences between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and 
the hypothesised covariance model” (Hooper et al. 2008, 54). RMSR value is expressed in terms 
of the scale ranges of measures, thus making it difficult to compare and interpret RMSR results 
if different scales are used (Hair et al. 2010). By using SRMR it is more meaningful to interpret 
the results in that case whose value ranges from zero to 1.0 with good model fit values of less 
than 0.08 (Hu and Bentler 1999). SRMR value for a model fit would be lower as the number of 
parameters increase or models with large sample sizes. 
 Incremental Fit Indices 
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Incremental fit measures compare the Chi-Square value of the studied model against a baseline 
model (null model). The null or worst possible model (also called the independence model) 
allows all the variables in the model to have variation but no correlation (McDonald and Ho 
2002). A value of zero (0) indicates there is no difference between the null model and the 
proposed model; value of one (1) indicates the best fit the proposed model can be. 
Normed-fit Index (NFI) is a ratio of the difference between Chi-Square value of the null model 
and the proposed model divided by the Chi-Square value of the null model. NFI value ranges 
from 0 (no fit) to 1 (perfect fit). Cut-off value for NFI should be greater than 0.95 (Hu and 
Bentler 1999).  
A major issue with NFI is its sensitivity to sample size and that it does not change if more 
parameters are added to the model. Model fit using NFI for samples less than 200 can be 
underestimated (Bentler 1990). Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) is the revised NFI, which takes 
into account the model complexity and favours simpler models (i.e. degree of freedom value). 
NNFI value can go above 1.0 and it should be set at one. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest NNFI 
cut-off value of greater than 0.95. 
Another incremental fit index is Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which improves the NFI by 
assessing the sample size (Hu and Bentler 1999) and works well with a small sample size 
(Hooper et al. 2008). CFI values range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better fit. 
Cut-off value for CFI of greater than 0.95 is indicative of good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). CFI is 
one of the most used fit indexes as it is least affected by sample size (Fan et al. 1999).  
 Parsimony Fit Indices  
Parsimony fit indices assess the best-fit model among a set of competing models considering 
model complexities. A simpler model (i.e. fewer estimated parameters) can return an improved 
parsimony fit value. There are two major parsimony fit indices developed by (Mulaik et al. 
1989): Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) and Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI). PGFI 
is a revised version of Goodness Fit Index (GFI), formed by incorporating degrees of freedom. 
As GFI is now rarely used for model fit measure (Sharma et al. 2005, Hair et al. 2010), PGFI is 
not popularly used in reporting model fit. 
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PNFI is a revised NFI adjusting for degrees of freedom and widely used parsimony fit index. 
Higher PNFI value indicates relatively better fit. Though (Mulaik et al. 1989) suggested 
parsimony fit indices within 0.5, there is no generally recommended cut-off value for these 
indices. PNFI is strongly advised to be used with other goodness-of-fit measures (Hooper et al. 
2008). 
 Selected Model Fit Indices for This Research 
It is not necessary and useful to report all fit indices available and neither is it appropriate to 
choose only those fit indices that indicate best fit (Hair et al. 2010, Hooper et al. 2008). Though 
there is no consensus on what fit indices should be reported in a study, it is advised to include 
the Chi-Square value, normed chi-square and p-value (Hair et al. 2010, Kline 2005), an absolute 
fit RMSEA together with its associated confidence interval (PCLOSE), and one incremental fit 
index CFI (Kline 2005, Hair et al. 2010, Hooper et al. 2008). These indices are best representing 
model fit as they are most insensitive to sample size, model misspecification and model 
complexity (Hooper et al. 2008). Table 5-6 below summarises fit indicators and their acceptance 
level to be used for this study. 
Table 5-6: Goodness of Fit Measures 
Fit Indices Abbreviation 
Traditional 
(Love et al. 
2006) 
Adjusted Levels of Model Fit 
Complexity of model (m: no. 
of variables) 
 N/A m<12 12<m<30 m>30 
Chi-Square x
2
 p>0.05 p>0.05 
p<0.05 
accepted 
Not 
relevant 
Normed Chi-Square x
2
 / df 
1.0-2.0 
Even <5 (Byrne 
2010) 
   
Root Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation 
 
RMSEA 
PCLOSE 
RMSEA <0.10 
RMSEA < 0.08 
PCLOSE > 0.05 
Comparative Fit Index CFI >0.90 >0.97 >0.95 >0.92 
Source: (Hair et al. 2010, Kline 2005) 
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 ASSESSING VALIDITY OF STRUCTURAL MODEL 5.8
The purpose of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (i.e. assessing the measurement model) 
is to examine the validity of individual measures through the model’s overall fit and other 
evidence of construct validity. CFA does not fully assess the nature and direction of 
relationships among constructs in a model, except correlations among measured variables and 
latent constructs. A structural model specifies the direction and magnitude of the relationships 
between constructs. These relationships are represented by the hypotheses developed in Section 
4.4 in Chapter 4. 
The proposed security compliance model was tested on both measurement model fit (covered in 
Chapter 6) and the significance and direction of the hypothesised relationship paths (covered in 
0). Obtaining a good model fit from the CFA analysis is a necessary first step, then if the 
hypothesised relationship paths are significant and in the hypothesised direction, then it indicates 
that the model is supported. Lastly, variance explained for each of the three dependent variables, 
which are compliance burnout, security engagement and security compliance, of the research 
model is assessed. 
 Model Specification 5.8.1
Based on the proposed security compliance model, relevant relationships are specified in the 
AMOS software. The model specification also includes evaluated parameters and degrees of 
freedom of the structural model. It is noted that only the recursive model is specified in the 
study. That is, the paths between constructs all flow from the predictor (antecedent) constructs 
(e.g. security demands and organisational security resources) to the dependent construct 
(security compliance burnout, security engagement and security compliance). Recursive 
relationships are suitable with cross-sectional data (Hair et al. 2010), which was the data 
collection method of Study Two. 
 Assessing Overall Structural Model Fit 5.8.2
The structural model fit is assessed similarly to the CFA model. All fit indices used in the CFA 
would be used for assessing structural model fit as well.  
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 Comparing the CFA Fit and Structural Model Fit 5.8.3
A good fit CFA model (i.e. measurement model) provides a best-fit baseline model to assess the 
structural model fit. It is noted that a recursive structural model cannot a have lower Chi-Square 
value than that obtained in the CFA due to the more restricted paths specified in the structural 
model (i.e. more degrees of freedom in the structural model). Thus, the overall recursive 
structural model cannot fit better than the overall CFA (Hair et al. 2010). The purpose of the 
structural model is to specify a simpler and more precise model than CFA in which relationships 
exist in all constructs. If the structural model fit is much worse than the CFA model fit, it fails to 
provide a simpler good-fit model than the CFA one. In this case, it can be concluded that the 
structural model lacks validity. On the contrary, if there is no significant difference between the 
structural model and its CFA model, it indicates an adequate structural fit.  
 Examining Hypothesised Dependence Relationships 5.8.4
The hypothesised dependence relationships in the proposed structural model represented 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. Each of these hypotheses was evaluated by examining 
individual parameter estimate for each corresponding path for statistical significance and the 
predicted direction. Negative parameter estimate (less than zero) indicates a negative 
relationship, whereas positive one (greater than zero) indicates a positive relationship. 
 Examining Variance Explained For Dependent Variables 5.8.5
The squared multiple correlation (SMC) for each dependent variable was calculated that 
indicated the percentage of the variance of a dependent variable, which could be explained by 
the structural model (Hair et al. 2010). Variance explained of a construct can be classified as 
substantial, mediocre and weak with SMC greater than 0.67, 0.33 and 0.19 respectively (Chin 
1998). 
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 5.9
This chapter discussed the research method to test the theoretical model developed from 
literature review and findings of the qualitative study in Study One. A questionnaire survey was 
employed to collect data necessary to test the theoretical model. Instrument development was 
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described in Section 5.3. Data analysis preparation was detailed in Section 5.6. Study Two 
employed Structural Equation Modelling using AMOS to analyse the survey data through two-
step model building approach. Both measurement and structural model are to be examined 
before hypotheses of the research are tested (see Section 5.7and 5.8). The next chapter presents 
the first phase of the SEM data analysis – assessing the validity of the measurement model. 
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 - ASSESSING MEASUREMENT MODEL CHAPTER 6
VALIDITY 
 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 6.1
This chapter presents results pertaining to the measurement model in step one of the two-step 
SEM model building approach. The chapter consists of four main sections. First, Section 6.2 
describes survey response rate and profiles of the participants. Section 6.3 covers the data 
preparation process including assessing assumptions of multivariate analysis for SEM. Then 
Section 6.4 focuses on examining validity of the measurement model including validating 
content, factorial and construct validity. Both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were employed to test the validity of the measurement 
results. 
 SURVEY RESPONSE RATE AND PARTICIPANT PROFILE 6.2
Due to the confidentiality agreement with the survey distributors those roles were explained in 
Section 5.5, it was not clear how many emails that each of them forwarded to their contacts. 
There were 79 online surveys recorded as started, but only 35 were actually completed (the 
completion rate is 44.3 per cent) (see Table 6-1). For the paper-based questionnaire, 400 copies 
were sent to employees in Ho Chi Minh City, 200 in Da Nang, and 300 in Ha Noi. The returned 
responses included 154 from Ho Chi Minh City, 117 from Da Nang, and 137 from Ha Noi. 
Overall, there were 408 returned questionnaires at a response rate of 45.33 per cent. 
Table 6-1: Survey Response Rate 
Types of Surveys 
Response Location 
Total Percentage Unknown 
location 
Ho Chi Minh 
City 
Da Nang 
City 
Ha Noi 
Online survey started 79    79 100% 
Online completed 35    35 44.3% 
Paper-based questionnaires 
distributed 
 400 200 300 900 100% 
Paper-based questionnaires 
returned 
 154 117 137 408 45.33% 
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The survey targeted IT users in organisations in Vietnam who were using computer systems and 
needed to perform cyber security tasks at work. In addition to the main study questions, 
participants were also asked to provide information about their age, gender, education level, job 
position, their last access to IT policies, company industry and company size.  
The sample consisted of 443 participants, including 232 women (52.4 per cent) and 194 men 
(43.8 per cent), and 17 not indicating gender (3.8 per cent) (See Table 6-2). Most of the 
participants were between 18 and 34 year old (74.7 per cent), an age group which represent the 
young labour force in Vietnam. The next largest group was aged between 35 and 44 (19.9 per 
cent). Age group above 44 accounted for less than 5 per cent. 
Table 6-2: Age and Gender Distribution 
Characteristic Value Frequency % 
Valid % (excluding 
missing value) 
Valid cumulative % 
(excluding missing value 
Age 
18-25 159 35.9 36.9 36.9 
26-34 163 36.8 37.8 74.7 
35-44 88 19.9 20.4 95.1 
45-54 15 3.4 3.5 98.6 
55-64 4 0.9 0.9 99.5 
Above 65 2 0.5 0.5 100.0 
Missing 12 2.7   
Gender 
Male 194 43.8 45.5 45.5 
Female 232 52.4 54.5 100.0 
Missing 17 3.8   
 
Table 6-3 shows education and job position of the participants. More than 82 per cent of the 
participants had undergraduate (63.1 per cent) and postgraduate degrees (17.9 per cent), 12.7 per 
cent had a diploma, and 6.4 per cent had completed high school. The figures show a relatively 
high education level of the workers in the participated companies. The majority of the 
participants were holding non-managerial positions (71.3 per cent). 
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Table 6-3: Education Levels and Job Positions 
Characteristic Value Frequency % 
Valid % (excluding 
missing value) 
Valid cumulative % 
(excluding missing value 
Education Level 
High school 27 6.1 6.4 6.4 
Diploma 54 12.2 12.7 19.1 
Undergraduate 268 60.5 63.1 82.1 
Post graduate 76 17.2 17.9 100.0 
Missing 18 4.1   
Job Position 
Manager 94 21.2 22.4 22.4 
Employee 316 71.3 75.4 97.9 
Others 9 2.0 2.1 100.0 
As the availability of IT usage policy and access to the policy are important to security 
compliance, the participants were asked to disclose their last access to IT policy. Table 6-4 
shows 64.2 per cent of the participants had IT policy access within 12 months, 18.4 per cent 
never read an IT security policy and 17.4 per cent disclosed that there was no IT security policy 
in their current company. 
Table 6-4: Frequencies of Access to IT Policies 
Characteristic Value Frequency % 
Valid % (excluding 
missing value) 
Valid cumulative % 
(excluding missing value 
Access to IT 
Policies 
Last month 106 23.9 25.3 25.3 
Last 6 months 99 22.3 23.6 48.9 
Last 12 months 64 14.4 15.3 64.2 
Never 77 17.4 18.4 82.6 
No IT security 
policy 
73 16.5 17.4 100.0 
Missing 24 5.4   
In terms of the industries of the participants and the type of company, Table 6-5 shows the top 
three industries were finance and insurance, trading and commerce, and IT-software 
development at 31.6 per cent, 20.5 per cent, and 13.4 per cent respectively. Other industries were 
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education (8.7 per cent), transport (8.1 per cent), building and manufacturing (6.5 per cent), 
medical services (3.4 per cent) and others (6.5 per cent). Most of the participants (59.2 per cent) 
worked in companies having between 11 and 200 employees. 14.6 per cent of participants 
worked in companies of 200-500 employees, 16 per cent in large companies of above 500 
employees, and almost 10 per cent in less than 10-employee companies. 3.8 per cent of the 
participants did not indicate their industry. 
Table 6-5: Industry and Company Size 
Characteristic Value Frequency % 
Valid % (excluding 
missing value) 
Valid cumulative % 
(excluding missing value 
Industry 
IT, software 57 12.9 13.4 13.4 
Financial, insurance 134 30.2 31.6 45.0 
Education 37 8.4 8.7 53.8 
Trading, commercial 87 19.6 20.5 74.3 
Building and 
manufacturing 
29 6.5 6.8 81.1 
Transport 36 8.1 8.5 89.6 
Medical services 15 3.4 3.5 93.2 
Others 29 6.5 6.8 100.0 
Missing 19 4.3   
Company Size 
1-10 44 9.9 10.3 10.3 
11-200 252 56.9 59.2 69.5 
201-500 62 14.0 14.6 84.0 
501-1000 35 7.9 8.2 92.3 
Above 1000 33 7.4 7.7 100.0 
Missing 17 3.8   
 DATA PREPARATION PROCESS 6.3
The data preparation went through several steps as summarised in Table 6-6. First, the collected 
data from both online and paper-based surveys were checked and coded into a standardised 
format. Second, missing value patterns were analysed to identify high missing value cases and 
perform imputation on the remaining missing data cases. Third, item outliers were checked, 
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followed by normality testing for multivariate analysis. Finally, test of common method bias was 
conducted to ensure the data was free from biases. 
Table 6-6: Data Examination and Preparation Process 
Data preparation 
step 
Selection criteria or methods 
Examination 
Results 
Action Number of cases 
Data collection    443 (35 completed 
online, 408 printed 
surveys) 
Data entry procedures 
(Section 6.3.1) 
Only submitted online 
questionnaires 
Visually inspected completed 
printed questionnaires for random 
answers and multiple responses 
by a single participant 
31 unusable paper-
based questionnaires 
Removed 
31 cases 
412 
Missing value 
analysis (Section 
6.3.2) 
Cases with more than 10 per cent 
missing value of the questionnaire 
items 
5 cases missing more 
than 10 per cent  
Removed 
5 cases 407 
Tests for outliers 
(Section 6.3.3) 
Used univariate (histogram) and 
multivariate (Mahalanobis 
distance) methods to identify. 
11 cases failed 
univariate tests, no 
case failed 
multivariate tests 
 
407 
Tests for normality 
(Section 6.3.4) 
Statistical value for skewedness 
and kurtosis (within -2 and +2) 
  407 
Common method bias 
test (Section 6.3.5) 
Harman’s single factor test   
407 
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 Data Entry Procedures 6.3.1
Out of 79 recorded online questionnaires, 44 cases were recorded as “unfinished” and were 
deleted, leaving 35 usable online cases. Collected paper-based questionnaires were also 
manually entered into the RMIT Qualtrics and each questionnaire was clearly labelled with a 
unique reference number representing the agent collecting that questionnaire. Returned 
questionnaires were screened for any obvious signs of random answers (e.g. ticked on all same 
ratings) or multiple copies completed by a single participant (e.g. same handwriting, sample 
participant profile). Thirty one of the 408 returned paper-based questionnaires were deemed not 
useable through visual inspection. This resulted in a total of 412 cases were usable for further 
analysis. Treatment of missing data was discussed in the following section. 
 Missing Data Analysis and Remedies 6.3.2
Missing data patterns were analysed using SPSS 22.0 and shown in Figure 6-1. SPSS data 
missing pattern output shows 346 or 1 per cent data points out of 36,886 data points (named as 
values in SPSS) were missing, 315 cases (71.11 per cent) had no missing values and 128 cases 
(28.89 per cent) had missing values, finally 77 out of 84 variables in total had missing data. 
 
Figure 6-1: Overall Summary of Missing Values 
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If the cases with missing data were deleted, the total sample size available for analysis would be 
strongly affected (less than 120 cases). Further breakdown of missing data showed 62 out of 120 
missing data cases were due to missing demographic questions (see Figure 6-2), which have less 
impact on the structural model. 
 
Figure 6-2: Overall Summary of Missing Values without Demographic Data 
Five cases were deleted due to more than 10 per cent of missing data, leaving 407 cases for 
further analysis. All other missing data cases and variables were below 10 per cent threshold and 
were not excluded. There were 37 cases with missing data for dependent variables ranging from 
one to ten questions. Two out of the 37 cases had ten missing questions of 29 dependent items of 
the study. These two cases were also included in the high missing cases of more than 10 per cent 
above and were already excluded. The remaining 35 cases had only one missing question (33 
cases) and two missing questions (two cases). Given the extremely low level of missing data of 
these cases, they were not excluded from the analysis. 
There is no firm guideline on how much missing data can be tolerated for a given sample size. 
This study employed five per cent threshold to indicate high missing data. Random missing data 
of five per cent or less in a large dataset, any remedy applied yields similar results (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007). In the study data, no variables (except control data) had more two per cent of 
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missing data and three other cases been missing between five to nine per cent data. Table 6-7 
shows four control variables with highest percentage of missing data (>5 per cent). 
Table 6-7: Summary Statistics for Survey Items with Missing Data Greater Than 5 Per 
Cent 
Survey items 
Number of 
valid cases 
Number of 
missing cases 
Percentage 
 Last IT policy access 384 23 5.5 
 Job position 386 21 5.3 
 IT department 384 23 5.5 
 Level of IT use 381 26 6.4 
Given that only control variables had more than 5 per cent missing data and were not part of the 
structure model, the randomness of missing data would be of minimal concern. Therefore, any 
remedy for missing data can be used in this study. Expectation Maximization was used in the 
current study to derive the final data set. 
 Testing For Outliers 6.3.3
Outliers of the survey items were checked at both univariate and multivariate levels. An outlier 
histogram for each item was generated from SPSS and eleven possible outliers were detected for 
item SCL4 (see Appendix 6). However, no decision was yet made about these outliers until 
multivariate outliers were checked to affirm whether the identified univariate outlier cases were 
also multivariate outliers. No case of multivariate outliers was found with the M2/df threshold of 
4. Thus, the eleven univariate outlier cases did not require further review and remained 
unchanged. 
 Testing Of Normality 6.3.4
As discussed in Section 5.6.3 in Chapter 5, normality testing for sample size greater than 300 
can use the absolute values of skewness and kurtosis. Substantial departure from normality is 
associated with absolute skewness and kurtosis values larger than 2 (West et al. 1997, Curran 
1996). The results of normality testing show absolute skewness and kurtosis values for all items 
were less than 2 (see Appendix 7). The highest values for both skewness and kurtosis bordered 
 134 
 
on 1 (e.g. SCL1, SCL4 for skewness, SSE6, SE2, and SE3 for kurtosis). Thus, no variables are 
found violating normal distribution assumption. 
 Testing For Common Method Bias 6.3.5
The test detected no significant bias in the data due to the data measurement method. The 
Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003) showed that one general factor accounted for 
24.7 per cent of the total variance, which does not account for the majority (greater than 50 per 
cent) of total variance (see Appendix 8). The test used exploratory factor analysis to examine 
unrotated factor solution of all 54 factors of the study to determine the levels of variance 
accounted for by each factor. The exploratory factor analysis was conducted with the number of 
extracted factors set to 1, and no rotation method was used. 
 ASSESSING MEASUREMENT MODEL VALIDITY 6.4
The previous section described the data preparation and preliminary analysis process including 
data entry procedure, missing data analysis, normality testing, outliers and common method bias. 
All missing data has been rectified and the collected data satisfied multivariate analysis 
assumption. 
This study employed both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) to refine and validate the measurement model. Section 6.4.1 reports the initial construct 
reliability testing to purify construct measures. Section 6.4.2 describes assessment of factorial 
validity through Exploratory Factor Analysis. The resulting model from EFA was further 
verified using CFA in Section 6.4.3. 
 Initial Reliability Testing 6.4.1
The reliability of the constructs was tested to ensure the measures of the same construct are 
related to each other before testing the construct validity. Reliability can be measured using two 
statistical indicators: item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha (Hair et al. 2010). 
The item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha were calculated for each item in the same 
construct separately. Table 6-8 shows the constructs, construct items, item-total correlation 
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coefficients, the Cronbach’s alpha “if item deleted” and the construct’s Cronbach’s alpha value. 
Item-total correlation and squared multiple correlation values of all items within their designated 
constructs were greater than the cut-off values (>0.5 for Item-Total correlation; >0.3 for squared 
multiple correlation) (Hair et al. 2010) except for ASP2 (.424 and .187) and SCL5 (.420 and 
.287). Deleting ASP2 item would increase the Cronbach’s alpha value of ASP construct to 0.793 
from 0.786, while deleting SCL5 item would not increase the Cronbach’s alpha value of SCL 
construct. In a further review of the ASP2 and SCL5, the researcher found out that item ASP2 
(“I’m required to know a lot of existing written policies and guidelines to security my computer 
system” and SCL5 (“I do not store confidential information on a non-protected storage device 
(e.g. portable hard disk, USB) may not be practical to users in Vietnamese organisations’ 
context. For example, item SCL5 did not realistically reflect safe security practice, as the users 
would have no other choices in storing and transferring confidential data. Therefore, item ASP2 
and SCL5 were removed and the final research instrument contained 54 variables from 12 
constructs. 
Table 6-8: The Item-Total Correlation Matrix 
Construct Item Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
(>0.5) 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
(SMC) 
(>0.3) 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Status Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Security 
Compliance 
Overload 
SCO1 0.763 0.62 0.859   
0.889 SCO2 0.846 0.716 0.786   
SCO3 0.741 0.575 0.878   
Access to 
Security 
Policies 
ASP1 0.594 0.362 0.733   
0.786 
ASP2 0.472 0.227 0.793 Removed 
ASP3 0.676 0.48 0.69   
ASP4 0.638 0.448 0.711   
Security Skill 
Requirements 
SSR1 0.689 0.475 0.75   
0.824 SSR2 0.682 0.465 0.753   
SSR3 0.674 0.455 0.766   
Security 
Communication 
Efficacy 
SCE1 0.615 0.401 0.722   
0.786 SCE2 0.646 0.442 0.707   
SCE3 0.588 0.359 0.737   
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SCE4 0.525 0.281 0.767   
Security Skill 
Use and 
Development 
SSUD1 0.623 0.489 0.835   
0.848 
SSUD2 0.773 0.61 0.771   
SSUD3 0.739 0.559 0.783   
SSUD4 0.619 0.466 0.835   
Organisational 
Rewards 
ORW1 0.672 0.525 0.844   
0.864 
ORW2 0.758 0.601 0.809   
ORW3 0.733 0.567 0.819   
ORW4 0.692 0.539 0.836   
Organisational 
Sanctions 
OS1 0.689 0.516 0.847   
0.87 
OS2 0.735 0.607 0.829   
OS3 0.71 0.547 0.838   
OS4 0.761 0.631 0.817   
Security Self-
Efficacy 
SSE1 0.756 0.622 0.908   
0.92 
SSE2 0.799 0.677 0.902   
SSE3 0.8 0.645 0.902   
SSE4 0.771 0.616 0.906   
SSE5 0.739 0.55 0.91   
SSE6 0.772 0.609 0.906   
Security 
Exposure 
SE1 0.584 0.341 0.726   
0.779 
SE2 0.514 0.266 0.761 
Low 
SMC  
SE3 0.609 0.395 0.713   
SE4 0.632 0.417 0.702   
Security 
Compliance 
Burnout 
SCB1 0.702 0.505 0.886   
0.899 
SCB2 0.769 0.6 0.872   
SCB3 0.794 0.635 0.866   
SCB4 0.757 0.581 0.875   
SCB5 0.723 0.536 0.882   
Security 
Engagement 
SEN1 0.71 0.529 0.905   
0.914 
SEN2 0.774 0.606 0.897   
SEN3 0.743 0.575 0.901   
SEN4 0.794 0.651 0.893   
SEN5 0.764 0.614 0.898   
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SEN6 0.767 0.615 0.897   
Security 
Compliance 
SCL1 0.667 0.58 0.834   
0.858 
SCL2 0.617 0.602 0.84   
SCL3 0.568 0.419 0.844   
SCL4 0.607 0.406 0.841   
SCL5 0.42 0.287 0.86 Removed 
SCL6 0.577 0.41 0.843   
SCL7 0.633 0.443 0.838   
SCL8 0.571 0.438 0.844   
SCL9 0.607 0.415 0.841   
 Assessing Factorial Validity through Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 6.4.2
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for all remaining 54 items of the research 
instrument. Factors that are conceptually related together were grouped and tested together. The 
first group was security demands that expected to have three factors including security 
compliance overload, access to security policies, and security skill requirements. The second 
group was organisational security resources, theorised to have four factors: security 
communication efficacy, security skill use and development, rewards and sanctions. The third 
group was personal resources that should have two factors, namely security self-efficacy and 
security exposure. The fourth group was security motivation sources as a result of complying 
with security demands and receiving organisational security resources and should have two 
factors including security compliance burnout and security engagement. Finally, security 
compliance was a single unidimensional dependent factor. 
Each group of factors was put through the EFA iterative procedure where factor loadings, cross-
loadings, and other factor analysis criteria were examined. Results of EFA for all groups are 
shown in Table 6-9. The EFA results indicate the number of factors for all groups except 
security compliance were as expected. All item loadings were above 0.6 on their theorised 
factors and did not cross load highly on other factors, indicating unidimensionality of each 
construct. 
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Table 6-9: Summary of the Factor Analysis Results 
 
EFA 
Requirements 
Research Constructs 
Security 
Demands 
Organisational 
Security 
Resources 
Personal 
Security 
Resources 
Security 
Motivation 
Security 
Compliance 
Case-to-
variable ratio 
> 5:1 44.67 25.44 40.7 37 45.22 
Factor loading > 0.4 >0.6 >0.6 >0.7 >0.8 >0.6 
Barlett’s Test 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KMO 
> 0.5 0.755 0.856 .890 .883 .847 
Percentage of 
variance 
> 60 % 76.171 69 67.17 70.747 63.50 
Number of 
factors 
extracted 
 3 4 2 2 2 
Expected 
factors 
 3 4 2 2 1 
The factor structure of security compliance produced two sub-dimensions with Eigenvalues 
greater than 1 instead of one sub-dimension, as theorised (see Table 6-10). 
Table 6-10: Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.057 50.709 50.709 4.057 50.709 50.709 
2 1.024 12.797 63.505 1.024 12.797 63.505 
3 .643 8.033 71.538 
   
4 .586 7.323 78.861 
   
5 .544 6.800 85.661 
   
6 .482 6.031 91.692 
   
7 .424 5.305 96.997 
   
8 .240 3.003 100.000 
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Security compliance describes safe security practice including use of security technology and 
common security care that were measured with a 9-item scale. Item SCL5 was removed due to 
low internal consistency as described in Section 6.4.1. The factor matrix of security compliance 
shows items SCL2, SCL3 and SCL4 loaded highly (greater than 0.6) on one factor, SCL6 to 
SCL9 loaded highly (greater than 0.6) on another factor. Item SCL1 (“I often follow IT requests 
to check viruses”) cross-loaded highly (greater than 0.4) on both two factors, hence SCL1 was 
deleted (see Table 6-11). 
Table 6-11: Rotated Factor Matrix of Security Compliance 
Survey item 
Factor Loading 
1 2 
SCL1 .429 .683 
SCL2 
 
.876 
SCL3 
 
.792 
SCL4 
 
.660 
SCL6 .728 
 
SCL7 .713 
 
SCL8 .801 
 
SCL9 .701 
 
After item SCL1 was deleted, EFA was repeated for security compliance factor and a two-
dimension security compliance was reproduced (see Table 6-12). 
Table 6-12: Rotated Factor Matrix of Security Compliance after Deletion of SCL1 
Survey Item 
Factor Loading 
1 2 
SCL2  .842 
SCL3  .829 
SCL4  .696 
SCL6 .727  
SCL7 .722  
SCL8 .808  
SCL9 .708  
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The two-dimension factor of security compliance may reflect different forms of security 
compliance. Items SCL2 (I often install software updates if I am asked by IT staff), SCL3 (I do 
not install software on company computers without consulting IT staff), and SCL4 (I take 
extreme precaution when installing freeware from Internet) describe more common security 
practice, which can often be monitored by IT staff, making them a routine practice to the 
participants. Other items SCL6 (I do not click on links in Yahoo chat, Skype chat, or email 
without checking the source of the link), SCL7 (I often consult with IT staff about security 
warnings when I am not sure of the risks), SCL8 (I use strong passwords for all work-related 
accounts), and SCL9 (I log out of the system when finished working) describe less common 
security practice that require users’ extra caution as such practice may not be easily monitored 
by IT staff and may not be a routine practice to them. Hair et al. (2010) recommend labelling 
factors based on their appropriateness for representing the underlying dimensions, thus routine 
security compliance (R_SCL) and non-routine security compliance (NR_SCL) were named to 
represent the two dimensions of security compliance respectively. 
Table 6-13 summarises the final numbers of factors together with associated items produced by 
the exploratory factor analysis. The factor analysis resulted in a final set of 53 items representing 
13 factors. 
Table 6-13: Summary of Factor-Item Results 
Construct Factor Items 
Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Security Demands 
Security Compliance 
Overload (SCO) 
SCO1, SCO2, SCO3 3 0.889 
Access to Security 
Policies (ASP) 
ASP1, ASP3, ASP4 3 0.793 
Security Skill 
Requirements (SSR) 
SSR1, SSR2, SSR3 3 0.824 
Organisational 
Security Resources 
Security Communication 
Efficacy (SCE) 
SCE1, SCE2, SCE3, SCE4 4 0.786 
Security Skill Use and 
Development (SSKU) 
SSKU1, SSKU2, SSKU3, 
SSKU4 
4 0.848 
Organisational Rewards 
(ORW) 
ORW1, ORW2, ORW3, ORW4 4 0.864 
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Organisational Sanctions 
(OS) 
OS1, OS2, OS3, OS4 4 0.87 
Personal Security 
Resources 
Security Self-Efficacy 
(SSE) 
SSE1, SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, 
SSE5, SSE6 
6 0.92 
Security Exposure (SE) SE1, SE2, SE3, SE4 4 .779 
Security Motivation 
Security Compliance 
Burnout (SCB) 
SCB1, SCB2, SCB3, SCB4, 
SCB5 
5 0.899 
Security Engagement 
(SEN) 
SEN1, SEN2, SEN3, SEN4, 
SEN5, SEN6 
6 .914 
Security Compliance 
Routine Compliance 
(R_SCL) 
SCL2, SCL3, SCL4 3 0.775 
Non-routine Security 
Compliance (NR_SCL) 
SCL6, SCL7, SCL8, SCL9 4 0.781 
 Total number of items: 53  
The structure of all factors except security compliance remained the same as in the initial 
reliability check in Section 6.4.1, hence Cronbach’s alpha for the scales remained unchanged. 
Two sub-dimension factors of security compliance including routine security compliance 
(R_SCL) and non-routine compliance (NR_SCL) had Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.775 and 
0.781 respectively, which exceeded the recommended reliability threshold of 0.7, thus they were 
retained in the model. 
The next sections further test these initial factor analysis results for both convergent and 
discriminant validity through confirmation factor analysis. 
 Assessing Construct Validity (Convergent and Divergent) Through 6.4.3
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
The underlying structure identified after exploratory factor analysis was further assessed using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as part of the structural equation modelling (SEM). To 
prepare for AMOS’s assessing the measurement model validity, all 13 constructs were defined 
as reflective constructs as the measured items are interchangeable in the questionnaire and have 
a common theme for each construct (Petter et al. 2007). Each construct has a series of indicators 
that share a similar conceptual meaning, and they are expected to move together empirically. 
Thus, the measurement model is hypothesised as reflective.  
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The following sections present the CFAs used to test and confirm the factor structure for each of 
the constructs in the current study. 
 CFA for Security Compliance Overload (SCO), Access to Security Policies 6.4.3.1
(ASP) and Security Skill Requirements (SSR) 
The security compliance overload (SCO) was theorised to consist of three items, access to 
security policies (ASP) had four items, and security skill requirements (SSR) had three. Item 
ASP2 from ASP construct was removed due to low factor loading during the internal reliability 
testing phase (Section 6.4.1). As AMOS can only test one-factor congeneric models with four or 
more indicators, the three factors SCO, ASP and SSR were tested together. The fit indices and 
factor loadings of three factors are shown in Figure 6-3 and Table 6-14. 
The fit statistics in Figure 6-3 indicate some fit indices below the recommended cut-off values. 
CMIN/df was above 2, however, some authors suggest a higher cut-off CMIN/df of 5 for 
acceptable fit (Byrne 2010). RMSEA was just higher than 0.08, though still below 0.1 of the 
traditional cut-off value. Thus, the measurement model for security compliance overload, access 
to security policies and security skill requirements indicates acceptable fit. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN =97.74 
Df = 24 
CMIN/df = 4.07 
p-value = .00 
CFI = .957 
RMSEA = 0.087, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.069, .106) 
PCCLOSE = .00 
Figure 6-3: Measurement Model for Security Compliance Overload, Access to Security 
Policies and Security Skill Requirements 
Results in Table 6-14 show that all items load onto their respective factor significant at p <0.001 
and the SMC of all items are above the 0.3 threshold, indicating convergent validity for each 
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item. Hence, the measurement model of security compliance overload, access to security polices, 
and security skill requirements are accepted. 
Table 6-14: Regression Weights for Security Compliance Overload, Access to Security 
Policies and Security Skill Requirements 
 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SCO3 <--- SCO 1 
   
0.633 
SCO2 <--- SCO 1.167 0.058 20.156 *** 0.888 
SCO1 <--- SCO 1.04 0.056 18.682 *** 0.687 
ASP4 <--- ASP 1 
   
0.599 
ASP3 <--- ASP 1.079 0.08 13.444 *** 0.658 
ASP1 <--- ASP 0.928 0.076 12.138 *** 0.445 
SSR3 <--- SSR 1 
   
0.575 
SSR2 <--- SSR 1.148 0.082 14.071 *** 0.622 
SSR1 <--- SSR 1.232 0.087 14.133 *** 0.638 
 CFA for Security Communication Efficacy (SCE) 6.4.3.2
The organisational security communication efficacy (SCE) was theorised to consist of four 
items. Figure 6-4 displays the proposed model with fit statistics. Though all items load well on 
the organisational security communication efficacy construct as shown in the Table 6-15, the 
model fit statistics show CMIN/df is higher than even the 5 cut-off value, and RMSEA is also 
higher than the 0.08 threshold. The misfit of the model indicates that the model does not closely 
represent the sample data 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 10.386 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 5.193 
p-value = .006 
CFI = .981 
RMSEA = 0.102, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.047, 0.166) 
PCLOSE = .059 
Figure 6-4: Proposed Measurement Model for Security Communication Efficacy 
Table 6-15: Regression Weights for Security Communication Efficacy 
   
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SCE1 <--- SCE 1.268 0.125 10.169   0.53 
SCE2 <--- SCE 1.365 0.131 10.427 *** 0.61 
SCE3 <--- SCE 1.205 0.123 9.798 *** 0.46 
SCE4 <--- SCE 1     *** 0.34 
To identify potential reasons for misfit model, model respecification statistics including 
standardised residuals and modification indices (MI) were estimated as shown in Table 6-16. 
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Table 6-16: Respecification Statistics for Security Communication Efficacy 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
 
SCE4 SCE3 SCE2 SCE1    MI Par Change 
SCE4 .000 
   
e2 <--> e4 4.993 -.147 
SCE3 .736 .000 
  
e1 <--> e3 4.145 -.137 
SCE2 -.831 .266 .000 
      
SCE1 .500 -.768 .253 .000 
     
Standardised residual covariance refers to the individual differences between observed 
covariance terms and the fitted covariance. Values of standardised residuals less than |2.0| 
indicate good measures, between |2.0| and |4.0| deserves attention if other diagnostics also 
indicate a problem, and greater than |4.0| indicates an unacceptable degree of error of item pairs 
terms (Hair et al. 2010). Table 6-16 shows no major degree of errors with any item pairs. 
The modification index indicates the measurement of error covariance among items; an overall 
model Chi-square (χ2) value would be reduced by the MI amount through freeing a 
corresponding path between items of the same construct. The magnitude of the error covariance 
is indicated by the “par change”. Error terms of items SCE2 (“IT security policies and guidelines 
are written in a manner that is clear and understandable”) and SCE4 (“A variety of business 
communications (notices, posters, newsletters, etc.) are used to promote security awareness”) 
covary higher than other items. Highest MI item pair should be dealt with first before continuing 
other pairs. High MI could indicate duplicate items; i.e. the participants responded similarly for 
those items. Dropping duplicate items or covariance of high MI item pairs would reduce the 
model χ2, thus improving the model fit. SCE2 and SCE4 contents are relatively similar; they 
refer to the effectiveness of security communications in various aspects. Hence, items SCE2 and 
SCE4 were allowed to covary. The resulting measurement model for security communication 
efficacy is illustrated in the Figure 6-5 below. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = .068 
Df = 1 
CMIN/df = .068 
p-value = .794 
CFI = 1.00 
RMSEA = 0.000, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0, .084) 
PCLOSE = .875 
Figure 6-5: Final Measurement Model for Security Communication Efficacy 
The fit statistics of the final measurement model for security communication efficacy now 
indicate excellent model fit. CMIN/df at 0.068 is less than 1, CFI of 1 achieves perfect fit, and 
RMSEA at 0 with PCCLOSE at 0.875 is greater than the 0.05 recommended value. Hence, the 
measurement model for organisational security communication efficacy is accepted.  
 CFA for Security Skill Use and Development (SSUD) 6.4.3.3
The security skill use and development construct consisted of four items. The CFA results of the 
proposed model are displayed in Figure 6-6 which indicates a clear misfit model, as all fit 
indices do not satisfy the recommended fit cut-off values specified in Table 5-6. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 53.51 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 26.75 
p-value = .00 
CFI = .931 
RMSEA = 252, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.196, 0.312) 
PCLOSE = .00 
Figure 6-6: Proposed Measurement Model for Security Skill Use and Development 
To investigate possible sources of misfit, respecification statistics were calculated and the results 
are displayed in Table 6-17. 
Table 6-17: Respecification Statistics for Security Skill Use and Development 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
  SSUD1 SSUD2 SSUD3 SSUD4       MI Par Change 
SSUD1 0       e2 <--> e1 16.53 0.195 
SSUD2 0.905 0     e3 <--> e2 6.596 -0.106 
SSUD3 -0.345 -0.485 0   e4 <--> e1 24.23 -0.313 
SSUD4 -1.931 -0.249 1.767 0 e4 <--> e3 29.09 0.303 
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The higher standardised residual covariances between items “security skill use and 
development” 4 (SSUD4) and SSUD1, and SSUD4 and SSUD3 may indicate a source of misfit. 
Furthermore, the MI between error terms of SSUD4 (“I learn new things from the IT security 
program”) and SSUD3 (“I have the opportunity to be resourceful in fulfilling IT security 
requirements”), SSUD4 and SSUD1 (“The security program at work allows me to use my 
security knowledge and skills”) are much higher than the other items. Theoretically, SSUD1 and 
SSUD2 measure the level that users can use their knowledge and skills in fulfilling security 
requirements, SSUD4 measures the extent one can learn new security knowledge through 
security training at work. Since SSUD4 is the main source of misfit in the measurement model 
for security use and development, this item was deleted. The resulting final model for security 
use and development is illustrated in Figure 6-7 and Table 6-18. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 1.178 
Df = 1 
CMIN/df = 1.178 
p-value = .278 
CFI = 1 
RMSEA = .021, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.0, 0.135) 
PCLOSE = .487 
Figure 6-7: Final Measurement Model for Security Skill Use and Development 
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Table 6-18: Regression Weights for Security Skill Use and Development 
   
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SSUD3 <--- SSUD 0.927 0.065 14.282  *** 0.558 
SSUD2 <--- SSUD 1.063 0.071 14.909 *** 0.806 
SSUD1 <--- SSUD 1       0.551 
The fit statistics for the final congeneric measurement model indicate acceptable model fit and 
convergent validity (SMC above 0.3 for each item). Thus, the measurement model for security 
skill use and development is accepted. 
 CFA for Organisational Rewards (ORW) 6.4.3.4
Organisational compliance evaluation was theorised to contain organisational rewards and 
sanctions constructs. In this section, the organisational rewards construct was tested first. 
Organisational sanctions construct was tested in the following section. Organisational rewards 
construct contained four items. 
The model fit statistics shown in Figure 6-8 indicate a clear misfit model, as no fit indices satisfy 
the recommended fit cut-off values. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 63.19 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 31.59 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .924 
RMSEA = .275, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.219, 0.335) 
PCLOSE = .000 
Figure 6-8: Proposed Measurement Model for Organisational Rewards 
To identify possible sources of the model misfit, respecification statistics were calculated and the 
results are displayed in Table 6-19. 
Table 6-19: Respecification Statistics for Organisational Rewards 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
  ORW1 ORW2 ORW3 ORW4       MI Par Change 
ORW1 .000 
   
e3 <--> e1 4.328 -.137 
ORW2 1.323 .000 
  
e3 <--> e2 10.177 -.177 
ORW3 -.590 -.699 .000 
 
e4 <--> e1 18.860 -.303 
ORW4 -1.355 -.440 1.664 .000 e4 <--> e3 35.554 .388 
Table 6-19 shows high standardised residual covariances among items ORW4, ORW1 and 
ORW3 though still within the acceptable range (<|2|). MI between error terms of ORW4 (“I will 
be recognised for my expertise in IT security”) with ORW3 (“I will be rewarded if I comply with 
the requirements of the IT security system”) has the highest value among other item pairs. 
Concerning the posited theoretical perspective, ORW3 measures performance-based rewards for 
security compliance, whereas ORW4 measures recognition of security expertise. Hence, ORW3 
and ORW4 are not duplicate items and needs to be kept. To improve model fit, ORW3 and 
ORW4 error terms are covaried. The resulting final model for organisational rewards is reported 
in Figure 6-9 and Table 6-20. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 4.361 
Df = 1 
CMIN/df = 4.361 
p-value = .037 
CFI = .996 
RMSEA = .091, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.018, 0.185) 
PCLOSE = .141 
Figure 6-9: Final Measurement Model for Organisational Rewards 
Table 6-20: Regression Weights for Organisational Rewards 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
ORW1 <--- ORW 1.000 
   
 .61 
ORW2 <--- ORW 1.089 .068 16.073 ***  .81 
ORW3 <--- ORW .873 .062 14.026 ***  .49 
ORW4 <--- ORW .841 .063 13.257 ***  .44 
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The fit statistics in Figure 6-9 show the CMIN/df is higher than the recommended 2 cut-off, 
however, it is still under 5 for the more generous cutoff value. The RMSEA at 0.091 (>.08) and 
CFI at 0.996 show a very good fit for the final congeneric measurement model. Overall, the 
model has adequate fit and acceptable convergent validity (SMC above 0.3 for each item). Thus, 
the measurement model for organisational rewards is accepted. 
 CFA for Organisational Sanctions (OS) 6.4.3.5
The second dimension of organisational security evaluation was theorised to contain 
organisational sanctions. The organisational sanctions construct consisted of four items. The 
CFA results of the proposed measurement model for organisational sanctions are displayed in 
Figure 6-10. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 67.233 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 33.616 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .923 
RMSEA = .283, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.228, 0.344) 
PCLOSE = .000 
Figure 6-10: Proposed Measurement Model for Organisational Sanctions 
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This model displays a clear misfit, as no fit indices conform to the recommended fit cut-off 
values. CMIN/df at 33.61 is much higher than the recommended 2 or even 5 cut-off. RMSEA at 
0.282 is way above the 0.08 cut-off value. Further examination of model respecification statistics 
is required to identify sources of misfit. The results of respecifictation statistics are shown in 
Table 6-21. 
Table 6-21: Respecification Statistics for Organisational Sanctions 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
 
OS1 OS2 OS3 OS4 
   
MI Par Change 
OS1 .000 
   
e3 <--> e1 4.328 -.137 
OS2 -.269 .000 
  
e3 <--> e1 46.945 .433 
OS3 2.442 -1.047 .000 
 
e3 <--> e2 16.942 -.256 
OS4 -.990 .631 -.194 .000 e4 <--> e1 17.078 -.236 
Table 6-21 shows errors of OS1 and OS2 highly covaried (MI=46.945) and has a standardised 
residual above the absolute 2 which indicates a source of misfit. Items OS1 (If I breach the IT 
security system, I can be penalised) and OS3 (If I do not practice safe IT security, I will receive 
a warning or bad work report) measure the extent a penalty can be applied for poor security 
compliance. The two items are quite similar in meaning thus that may lead to high error 
covariance between them. To improve model fit, one of the two items can be deleted. Given that 
OS1 has lower factor loading than OS3 and has higher MI with other items, OS1 was deleted 
from the construct. The resulting final model for organisational sanctions is illustrated in Figure 
6-11 and Table 6-22. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = .931 
Df = 1 
CMIN/df = .931 
p-value = .335 
CFI = 1.0 
RMSEA = .000, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.000, 0.129) 
PCLOSE = .541 
Figure 6-11: Final Measurement Model for Organisational Sanctions 
Table 6-22: Regression Weights for Organisational Sanctions 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
OS4 <--- OS 1.000 
   
.82 
OS3 <--- OS .701 .049 14.374 *** .47 
OS2 <--- OS .945 .056 16.828 ***         .70 
The fit statistics for the final congeneric measurement model of organisational sanctions in 
Figure 6-11 represent excellent model fit and convergent validity (SMC above 0.3 for each item 
in Table 6-22). Thus, the measurement model for organisational sanctions is accepted. 
 CFA for Security Self-Efficacy (SSE) 6.4.3.6
The security self-efficacy construct composed of six items. First round of CFA analysis found 
acceptable fit indices, however, with high MI between items SSE1 and SSE2. SSE1 (I know how 
to set the security levels of the Web browsers when I am using the Internet) and SSE2 (I know 
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how to use different programs to protect my computer from IT security risks (e.g. firewalls, pop-
up blockers, clearing cache files) measure different security skills in protecting computer 
information from various cyber risks. These skills can be equally high or low as they refer to 
specific software application administration. Hence, it is theoretically reasonable to covary these 
two items to improve model fit. The final measurement model for security self-efficacy is shown 
in Figure 6-12 and Table 6-23. All model fit indices in Figure 6-12 for the final model of 
security self-efficacy exceed acceptable fit levels, which demonstrate an excellent model fit. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 15.889 
Df = 8 
CMIN/df = 1.986 
p-value = .044 
CFI = .995 
RMSEA = .049, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.008, 0.008) 
PCLOSE = .462 
Figure 6-12: Final Measurement Model for Security Self-Efficacy 
 157 
 
Table 6-23 shows all items have good convergent validity with SMC above 0.3. Hence, the 
measurement model for security self-efficacy is accepted. 
Table 6-23: Regression Weights for Security Self-Efficacy 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SSE1 <--- SSE 1.000 
   
  .57 
SSE2 <--- SSE 1.068 .050 21.246 *** .65 
SSE3 <--- SSE 1.117 .064 17.559 *** .72 
SSE4 <--- SSE 1.045 .061 17.044 *** .68 
SSE5 <--- SSE 1.054 .066 16.027 *** .61 
SSE6 <--- SSE 1.184 .070 16.950 *** .67 
 CFA for Security Exposure (SE) 6.4.3.7
Security exposure construct was theorised to contain four items. The model CFA testing results 
are depicted in Figure 6-13 and Table 6-24. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 4.55 CFI = .994 
 158 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 2.275 
p-value = .103 
RMSEA = .056, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.000, 0.126) 
PCLOSE = .343 
Figure 6-13: Proposed Measurement Model for Security Exposure 
Table 6-24: Regression Weights for Security Exposure 
   
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SE1 <--- SE 1.000 
   
 .44 
SE2 <--- SE .842 .088 9.535 *** .34 
SE3 <--- SE 1.064 .095 11.253 *** .54 
SE4 <--- SE 1.070 .094 11.413 *** .58 
All factor loadings for Security Exposure are significant and all items have a sufficient SMC > 
0.3 for convergent validity. Model fit statistics in Figure 6-13 indicate very good fit with CFI at 
.994 above the .95 threshold, RMSEA at .056 less than the 0.08 threshold and CMIN/df less than 
3. However, factor loading of SE2 (I have received a fraudulent online request for my personal 
information or money in the last 12 months) is less than 0.6 recommended for exploratory study 
(Hair et al. 2010). Given that SE2 also had low SMC of 0.266 during the internal reliability 
check in Section 6.4.1, item SE2 is deleted from the security exposure construct. The final model 
is reported in Figure 6-14. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 1.767 
Df = 1 
CMIN/df = 1.767 
p-value = .184 
CFI = .997 
RMSEA = .043, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.000, 0.148) 
PCLOSE = .383 
Figure 6-14: Final Measurement Model for Security Exposure 
Fit indices of the final model slightly improve from the proposed model: CMIN/df reduces from 
2.27 to 1.17, RMSEA from .056 to 0.043 with PCLOSE at 0.383. Hence, the measurement 
model of security exposure is accepted. 
 CFA for Security Compliance Burnout 6.4.3.8
The security compliance burnout construct is composed of five items. The CFA results of the 
proposed measurement model of security compliance burnout construct are shown in Figure 
6-15 which indicates an acceptable fit for the measurement model. However, as CMIN/df is 
above 2, which is a stricter fit threshold, respecification statistics are examined for any source of 
misfit. The respecification statistics are displayed in Table 6-25 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 12.441 
Df = 5 
CMIN/df = 2.488 
p-value = .029 
CFI = .994 
RMSEA = .061, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.018, 0.104) 
PCLOSE = .000 
Figure 6-15: Proposed Measurement Model for Security Compliance Burnout 
Table 6-25: Respecification Statistics for Security Compliance Burnout 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
  SCB5 SCB4 SCB3 SCB2 SCB1       MI Par 
Change 
SCB5 0         e2 <--> e4 5.061 -0.128 
SCB4 0.549 0                 
SCB3 -0.256 0.052 0               
SCB2 0.235 -0.528 0.095 0             
SCB1 -0.616 0.093 0.07 0.279 0           
Residual covariances for SCB do not show any significant error (<|2|) between the model’s 
predicted covariances and the sample covariance matrix. Items SCB2 (It does not matter if I get 
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involved in resolving IT security issues or not) and SCB4 (I think too much fuss is made about 
IT security) have higher covariance with other items. Covarying the error terms of these two 
items would improve Chi-square by 5.061 units and improve the model fit. Theoretically items 
SCB2 and SCB4 measure two aspects of cynicism towards security compliance, if one thinks 
security does not require that much concern than he/she would less likely enhance personal 
security effort. Hence, items SCB2 and SCB4 were allowed to covary. The final results of CFA 
for the measurement model of security compliance burnout are illustrated in Figure 6-16 and 
Table 6-26. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 4.143 
Df = 4 
CMIN/df = 1.036 
p-value = .387 
CFI = 1.000 
RMSEA = .009, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.000, 0.076) 
PCLOSE = .773 
Figure 6-16: Final Measurement Model for Security Compliance Burnout 
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Table 6-26: Regression Weights for Security Compliance Burnout 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SCB1 <--- SCB 1.000 
   
  .55 
SCB2 <--- SCB 1.234 .074 16.580 *** .71 
SCB3 <--- SCB 1.195 .070 17.086 *** .71 
SCB4 <--- SCB 1.218 .075 16.242 *** .69 
SCB5 <--- SCB 1.098 .071 15.478 *** .59 
Fit indices of the final model slightly improve from the proposed model: CMIN/df reduces from 
2.488 to 1.036, CFI increases from 0.994 to 1, and RMSEA from .061 to 0.009 with PCLOSE at 
0.773. All item loadings are significant with SMC greater than the 0.3 threshold, thus convergent 
validity holds. Hence, the measurement model of security compliance burnout is accepted. 
 CFA for Security Engagement (SEN) 6.4.3.9
Security engagement construct consisted of six items. Initial CFA of the construct shows some 
model misfits (see Figure 6-17) and all item loadings are significant and above 0.70 (see Table 
6-27). 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 51.453 
Df = 9 
CMIN/df = 5.717 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .973 
RMSEA = .108, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.080, 0.137) 
PCLOSE = .000 
Figure 6-17: Proposed Measurement Model for Security Engagement 
Table 6-27: Regression Weights for Security Engagement 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SEN1 <--- SEN 1.000 
    
SEN2 <--- SEN 1.029 .063 16.379 ***  
SEN3 <--- SEN 1.071 .068 15.791 ***  
SEN4 <--- SEN 1.120 .065 17.122 ***  
SEN5 <--- SEN 1.040 .063 16.448 *** 
 
SEN6 <--- SEN 1.142 .069 16.534 *** 
 
Fit statistics in Figure 6-17 indicate a model misfit. In particular, the CMIN/df at 5.717 is much 
higher than the upper-bound 2 cut-off value; the RMSEA at 0.108 is also higher than the upper-
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bound 0.08 threshold with the PCLOSE less than the lower-bound 0.5. To identify sources of 
model misfit, standardised residual covariances and modification indices are examined (see 
Table 6-28). 
Table 6-28: Respecification Statistics for Security Engagement 
Standardised Residual Covariances Modification Indices 
 
SEN6 SEN5 SEN4 SEN3 SEN2 SEN1    MI Par 
Change 
SEN6 .000 
     
e5 <--> e6 12.321 .154 
SEN5 .845 .000 
    
e3 <--> e6 5.386 -.114 
SEN4 .027 .328 .000 
   
e3 <--> e5 8.237 -.130 
SEN3 -.612 -.766 .584 .000 
  
e3 <--> e4 6.006 .109 
SEN2 -.007 -.447 -.379 .196 .000 
 
e1 <--> e4 7.031 -.123 
SEN1 -.532 -.284 -.697 .707 1.119 .000 e1 <--> e3 4.814 .117 
       e1 <--> e2 14.146 .178 
Standardised residual covariances do not show significant covariance errors (no item-pair 
residuals>|2|) between the model’s predicted and the sample covariance matrix, though item 
SEN1 has the highest residual covariances with SEN2. However, MI table indicates some 
problematic items. Item SEN1 (I talk to my colleagues about IT security issues at work) and 
SEN3 (When I find an IT security risk, I am excited to work with the IT department to look for 
others in case there has been a breach) covary highly with three other items. SEN1 and SEN2 (I 
am enthusiastic about complying with IT security measures at work) have the highest MI. 
Freeing items SEN1 and SEN2 would reduce Chi-square an approximate 14.14 points, thus 
improving model fit. As a standard practice, largest MI should be dealt with first, respecification 
statistics are then recalculated and further examination continues. After several rounds of 
examination of the standardised residual covariances and the modification indices, it is clear that 
item SEN1 and SEN3 covary strongly with other items of the model. Hence, both items SEN1 
and SEN3 were deleted and the resulting final model of security engagement is displayed in 
Figure 6-18.  
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 3.172 
Df = 2 
CMIN/df = 1.586 
p-value = .205 
CFI = .999 
RMSEA = .038, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.000, 0.113) 
PCLOSE = .494 
Figure 6-18: Final Measurement Model for Security Engagement 
Model fit statistics of the final measurement model of security engagement in Figure 6-18 
indicate an excellent fitting model with p=0.205 well above the significance level of 0.05. Other 
fit indices CMIN/df, CFI and RMSEA indicate an exact model fit. Furthermore, all factor 
loadings have acceptable SMC values (above 0.3) (see Table 6-29). Hence, the final model of 
security engagement is accepted. 
Table 6-29: Regression Weights for Security Engagement (Final) 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SEN2 <--- SEN 1.000 
   
  .60 
SEN4 <--- SEN 1.124 .064 17.454 ***  .70 
SEN5 <--- SEN 1.088 .062 17.517 ***  .70 
SEN6 <--- SEN 1.194 .068 17.609 ***  .71 
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 CFA for Security Compliance (SCL) 6.4.3.10
As found in the factor analysis process, the security compliance construct is composed of two 
dimensions: routine compliance (R-SCL), which was measured with three items and non-routine 
compliance (NR_SCL) with four items. The fit indices and factor loadings of two factors are 
shown in Figure 6-19 and Table 6-30. 
The measurement model’s initial CFA results showed most fit indices conformed or exceeded fit 
thresholds. CMIN/df at 2.576 is higher than the strict threshold of 2 but can still be accepted. 
CFI of 0.978 is higher than the lower-bound 0.95 cut-off value, RMSEA at 0.062 is less than the 
upper-bound 0.8 accepted threshold. Hence, model fit is accepted. 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 33.482 
Df = 13 
CMIN/df = 2.576 
p-value = .001 
CFI = .978 
RMSEA = .062, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.037, 0.089) 
PCLOSE = .195 
Figure 6-19: Measurement Model for Security Compliance 
Furthermore, Table 6-30 shows all item loadings are significant and have SMCs above the 0.3 
minimum requirements, thus the measurement model for security compliance is accepted. 
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Table 6-30: Regression Weights for Security Compliance 
  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P SMC 
SCL6 <--- NR_SCL 1.000 
   
.41 
SCL7 <--- NR_SCL .961 .089 10.796 *** .49 
SCL8 <--- NR_SCL .940 .086 10.961 *** .50 
SCL9 <--- NR_SCL 1.034 .094 10.976 *** .50 
SCL2 <--- R_SCL 1.000    .59 
SCL3 <--- R_SCL .945 .076 12.494 *** .51 
SCL4 <--- R_SCL .858 .068 12.521 *** .51 
 CFA for Overall Measurement Model 6.4.3.11
The CFAs in sections above have examined each construct separately and have established the 
one-factor congeneric measurement models. These models formulate the full measurement 
model to be examined in this section. All constructs were allowed to correlate with each other 
and regress weights were set following AMOS standard. Directionality of correlations was 
ignored when assessing measurement model results. Table 6-31 presents the fit statistics of the 
full measurement model. 
Table 6-31: Fit Statistics of Full Measurement Model 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 1963.666 
Df = 997 
CMIN/df = 1.970 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .912 
RMSEA = .049, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.046, 0.052) 
PCLOSE = .717 
The statistics for the full CFA measurement model summarised in Table 6-31 indicate an 
adequate fit for the full CFA measurement model. The CMIN/DF at 1.97 is less than the upper-
bound 2 cut-off value. The RMSEA at 0.049 is much less than the upper limit of 0.07 and the 
PCLOSE at 0.717 is much greater than the upper-bound 0.05 threshold. The 90 per cent 
confidence interval for this RMSEA shows that even with the upper of RMSEA (0.052) is still 
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adequate. CFI at 0.912 is just below the 0.92 fit index for models of more than 30 variables (Hair 
et al. 2010), however, still above the 0.9 traditional cut-off value. 
 Convergent and Divergent Validity of First Order Constructs 6.4.4
Table 6-32 summarises the results of reliability and convergent validity testing of all 13 
constructs. Composite reliability (CR) values of all constructs are above the 0.7 threshold. 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values of all constructs except NR_SCL are greater than 0.5. 
The AVE of NR_SCL at 0.49 lies just below the 0.5 threshold and has a high CR of 0.794, thus 
it can be considered satisfying the convergent validity test. Hence, all constructs have acceptable 
reliability and convergent validity.  
Table 6-32: Reliability and Convergent Validity of the First Order Measurement Model 
 
CR > 0.7 AVE (>0.5) 
SCB 0.902 0.649 
NR_SCL 0.794 0.490 
R_SCL 0.777 0.537 
SSR 0.825 0.612 
ASP 0.796 0.567 
SCO 0.893 0.737 
SCE 0.804 0.507 
SSUD 0.841 0.638 
ORW 0.855 0.597 
OS 0.854 0.664 
SSE 0.918 0.650 
SE 0.765 0.522 
SEN 0.893 0.677 
Table 6-33 below presents the divergent validity test results. The bold diagonal elements in the 
table represent the squared root of AVE of each construct. The off-diagonal elements are the 
correlation values between constructs. Squared root of AVE for all constructs except NR_SCL is 
greater than any corresponding inter-construct correlations. Constructs with squared root of AVE 
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greater than correlations with other constructs have greater variance with their own measures 
than with other constructs in the study model, thus providing evidence of discriminant validity. 
Table 6-33: Squared Root of AVE and Correlation between Constructs of the First-Order 
Measurement Model 
 
SCB 
NR_ 
SCL 
R_ 
SCL 
SSR ASP SCO SCE SSUD ORW OS SSE SE SEN 
SCB 0.81                         
NR_SC
L 
-0.15 0.70 
           
R_SCL -0.12 0.70 0.73 
          
SSR -0.03 0.34 0.25 0.78 
         
ASP 0.35 0.14 0.19 0.39 0.75 
        
SCO 0.41 -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.39 0.86 
       
SCE 0.00 0.54 0.44 0.22 0.12 0.10 0.71 
      
SSUD -0.11 0.45 0.51 0.43 0.17 0.04 0.48 0.80 
     
ORW 0.10 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.52 0.59 0.77 
    
OS 0.02 0.31 0.31 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.30 0.42 0.58 0.81 
   
SSE -0.02 0.40 0.34 0.10 -0.02 -0.06 0.37 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.81 
  
SE 0.15 0.25 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.10 0.43 0.72 
 
SEN -0.14 0.50 0.42 0.39 0.09 -0.03 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.43 0.63 0.41 0.82 
* The bolded diagonal elements are the squared root of the AVE scores 
NR_SCL almost has a similar variance within its own measures with another construct R_SCL 
indicating low divergent validity. As this study later incorporates two dimensions (i.e. R_SCL 
and NR_SCL) of security compliance into a second-order construct, NR_SCL remains in the 
model for subsequent processing. 
 Convergent and Divergent Validity of Second-Order Constructs 6.4.5
Study One identified three characteristics of security demands (SCD), four types of 
organisational security resources (OSR), and two of personal security resources (PSR). No 
existing theories have theorised whether SCD, OSR and PSR can be established as second-order 
constructs. Furthermore, the EFA result performed in Section 6.4.2 found two dimensions of 
security compliance, namely routine and non-routine security compliance (R_SCL and NR_SCL 
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respectively). It was theoretically relevant and meaningful to examine SCD, OSR, PSR and SCL 
at a higher construct level. 
Therefore, a second CFA was conducted to confirm if SCD, OSR, PSR, and SCL could be 
theorised as second-order constructs. The following second-order constructs are created and 
tested to validate their reliability and convergent and divergent validity. Second-order construct 
SCD was created to account for three characteristics of SCD including first order constructs 
SCO (security compliance overload), ASP (access to security policies), and SSR (security skill 
requirements). Similarly, second-order construct OSR was created to capture four organisational 
resources including security communication efficacy (SCE), security skill use and development 
(SSUD), organisational rewards (ORW) and organisational sanctions (OS). A second-order 
construct PSR was created to account for security self-efficacy (SSE) and security exposure 
(SE). Finally, second-order construct security compliance (SCL) was created to represent two 
dimensions of security compliance including routine security compliance (R_SCL) and non-
routine security compliance (NR_SCL). R_SCL and NR_SCL are practically related since they 
describe different aspects of safe security practice. All second-order constructs in the research 
are hypothesised as reflective constructs that cause multiple first order factors, which in turn 
cause the measured factors. 
As a rule of thumb for developing a good measurement model, each factor in the model should 
have a minimum of three items, preferably four, to ensure model over identification (Hair et al. 
2010). All 13 first-order constructs have at least three items (see Table 6-8). However, second-
order constructs PSR and SCL consist of only two indicators. It is possible to achieve an over 
identified CFA model when unidimensional two-item constructs are integrated into the overall 
measurement model. 
Testing validity for a second-order factor model follows the same procedure for first order factor 
model (Hair et al. 2010). First-order constructs become measured indicators for second-order 
ones. SCD has three measured indicators SCO, ASP and SSR; OSR has four measured indicators 
SCE, SSUD, OS and ORW; PSR has two measured indicators SSE and SE; and SCL has two 
indicators R_SCL and NR_SCL. 
 171 
 
The second-order measurement model was then assessed using AMOS v.22. Similar to testing 
first-order measurement model, AMOS produced model fit testing results and composite 
reliability (CR) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of all constructs. Table 6-34 summarises 
reliability and convergent validity testing results of the second-order measurement model. 
Table 6-34: Reliability and Convergent Validity of the Second-Order Measurement Model 
Second-order 
construct 
First-order 
construct 
SFL (>0.5) SMC (>0.3) 
CR 
(>0.7) 
AVE 
(>0.5) 
Convergent 
Validity 
SCD 
SCO 0.559 0.312 
0.584 0.328 Unsatisfactory ASP 0.704 0.496 
SSR 0.42 0.176 
OSR 
SCE 0.645 0.416 
0.793 0.492 Satisfactory 
SSUD 0.746 0.57 
OS 0.62 0.385 
ORW 0.781 0.610 
PSR 
SSE 0.902 0.813 
0.667 0.522 Satisfactory 
SE 0.481 0.231 
SCL 
R_SCL 0.805 0.648 
0.824 0.701 Satisfactory 
NR_SCL 0.868 0.754 
SFL (standard factor loading); SMC (Squared Multiple Correlation); CR (Composite 
Reliability); AVE (Average Variance Extracted). 
CR values of both second-order constructs SCD and PSR (0.584 and 0.667 respectively) are 
below the 0.7 threshold, which indicate low internal consistency reliability. Factor loading of 
SSR on SCD at 0.42 below the 0.5 threshold and SMC at 0.176 is much below the 0.3 threshold. 
Similarly, factor loading of SE on PSR is below 0.5 and low SMC value at 0.231 less than the 
0.3 threshold. Moreover, AVE of SCD at 0.328 is below the 0.5 threshold, indicating 
unsatisfactory convergent validity. Second-order constructs OSR and SCL have good CR at 
0.793 and 0.824 respectively. All first order constructs of OSR and SCL have high loadings 
(>0.5) and adequate SMC values (>0.3). AVE of OSR at 0.492 is just below the 0.5 minimum 
threshold, whereas AVE of SCL is above the 0.5 threshold. 
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In summary, second-order constructs OSR, PSR and SCL evidence satisfactory convergent 
validity. Second-order construct SCD has unsatisfactory reliability and convergent validity. 
Though PSR has acceptable convergent validity, it has low CR (<0.7) and one of its two 
measured items (SE) has unsatisfactory reliability (SFL at 0.481 and SMC at 0.231). It is not 
theoretically meaningful to remove low loading item SE to improve second-order construct PSR 
reliability. Furthermore, if SE was removed, PSR became 1-item factor and did not justify to be 
theorised as a second-order construct. 
Discriminant validity of second-order constructs was examined by comparing the squared root of 
AVE values with the correlations among the constructs (see Table 6-35). 
Table 6-35: Squared Root of AVE and Correlation between Constructs (Second-Order 
Measurement Model) 
 
SCD SCB SEN OSR SCL PSR 
SCD 0.57           
SCB 0.49 0.81         
SEN 0.18 (0.14) 0.82       
OSR 0.35 0.01 0.68 0.70     
SCL 0.28 (0.16) 0.55 0.66 0.84   
PSR 0.03 0.00 0.71 0.68 0.50 0.72 
All second-order constructs SCD, OSR, PSR, and SCL have satisfactory discriminant validity 
with squared root of AVE smaller than the correlation with another construct. 
Overall, only second-order constructs OSR and SCL demonstrated satisfactory reliability, 
convergent and discriminant validity. It is also theoretically meaningful to assess organisational 
security resources at the aggregate level of second-order construct, which is consistent with the 
Job Demands-Resources model. Similarly, security compliance can also be assessed at the 
aggregate level of various forms of compliance. Second-order construct SCD had unsatisfactory 
reliability and convergent validity, thus SCD was not created to capture three characteristics of 
security demands. Second-order construct PSR also had low reliability and one of its two 
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measured items (SE) did not load highly enough on the construct, hence making no theoretical 
meaning to be constructed as second-order construct.  
The resultant second-order measurement model was tested again for model fit. The fit statistics 
are shown in Table 6-36 (refers to Appendix 9 for AMOS’ full measurement model results). 
Table 6-36: Fit Statistics of Full Second-Order Measurement Model 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 2094.398 
Df = 1033 
CMIN/df = 2.027 
p-value = .00 
CFI = .904 
RMSEA = .050, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.047, 0.053) 
PCLOSE = .431 
The statistics for the full second-order measurement model summarised in Table 6-36 indicate 
an adequate model fit. The CMIN/DF at 2.027 is almost at the upper bound 2 cut-off value. The 
RMSEA at 0.05 is much less than the upper limit of 0.07 and the PCLOSE at 0.431 is much 
greater than the upper 0.05 threshold. The 90 per cent confidence interval for this RMSEA 
shows that even with the upper bound of RMSEA at 0.053 is still adequate. The CFI at 0.904 is 
lower than the 0.92 threshold for model of over 30 variables (Hair et al. 2010), though still above 
the 0.90 rule of thumb cut-off fit value (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
The resulting CFA second-order measurement model is now ready to be transformed into a 
structural model for structural model validity testing in the next chapter. 
As a result of adequate second-order measurement model testing, the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4 (refer to Table 4-3) were updated to reflect the second-order construct of 
organisational security resources (see Table 6-37). Hypotheses H2 and H3 were assessed for the 
effect of the second-order organisational resources on compliance burnout, engagement and 
compliance. the testing results of these hypotheses are described in the next chapter. 
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Table 6-37: Table of Hypotheses after Measurement Model Validity Test 
Updated Hypotheses Comments 
H1a: Security compliance overload is positively related to security 
compliance burnout 
H1b: Access to security policies is positively related to security compliance 
burnout 
H1c: Security skill requirements are positively related to security compliance 
burnout 
Three characteristics of security 
demands were assessed at first-
order construct 
H2: Organisational security resources are negatively related to security 
compliance burnout 
H3: Organisational security resources are positively related to security 
engagement 
Security communication efficacy, 
security skill use and development, 
rewards, and sanctions were 
assessed at second-order construct 
of organisational security resources 
H4a: Security self-efficacy is negatively related to security compliance 
burnout 
H4b: Security exposure is negatively related to security compliance burnout 
H5a: Security self-efficacy is positively related to security engagement 
H5b: Security exposure is positively related to security engagement 
Two types of personal security 
resources were assessed at first 
order construct 
H6: Security compliance burnout is negatively related to security compliance  
H7: Security engagement is positively related to security compliance  
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 6.5
This chapter described step one of the two-step model building process of SEM, which involved 
validating the measurement model through a scientific process. First, internal consistency 
reliability was tested in Section 6.4.1, followed by factorial validity examining by EFA in 
Section 6.4.2. The resulting factors from EFA were further assessed and refined through CFA in 
Section 6.4.3. CFA was employed to check the model fit, convergent and discriminant validity 
of all constructs and of the whole measurement model. Both first-order and second-order full 
measurement models evidenced sufficient convergent and discriminant validity as well 
acceptable model fit.  
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 - ASSESSING STRUCTURAL MODEL CHAPTER 7
VALIDITY AND STUDY RESULT DISCUSSION 
This chapter reports the results of the structural model validity test and discusses the thesis’ key 
findings. Study Two followed a two-step SEM model testing approach, the first step involved 
assessment of the validity of the measurement model, which was discussed in Chapter 6. The 
results of measurement model testing demonstrated acceptable construct validity and 
measurement model fit. This chapter continues the second step of the SEM model testing by 
validating the structural model including model fit, its corresponding hypothesised theoretical 
relationships and variances explained for the dependent variables. Discussions of the hypothesis 
testing results are then introduced. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the structural model validity is assessed in Section 
7.1. The findings of this research are discussed Section 7.2. Finally, the chapter summary is 
provided in Section 7.3. 
 ASSESSING STRUCTURAL MODEL VALIDITY 7.1
In this section, the final measurement model discussed in Section 6.4.5 in Chapter 6 is used as 
the basis to formulate the structural model that was tested using AMOS v.22. The structural 
model establishes directional paths between constructs, which represent the hypotheses to be 
tested. Model fit, standardised path estimates, and variance explained (i.e. squared multiple 
correlation) for dependent variables were assessed for the structural model validity testing.  
Similar to the model specification procedure used during the measurement model testing in 
Chapter 6, the assessment of the original structural model examined the standardised residuals, 
modification indices (MI), and the paths that had little explanatory power (i.e. insignificant t-
values at 5 per cent), which may be deleted, if this is theoretically justified. The non-significant 
paths were deleted one at a time and the fit indices re-evaluated (Byrne 2010). First, the 
structural model including non-significant paths is described in Section 7.1.1, and then a revised 
structural model without non-significant paths is presented in Section 7.1.2. 
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 Assessing Structural Model Validity Including Non-Significant Paths 7.1.1
Initially the relationships between the research constructs as theorised in the research model 
were analysed, and the original structural model subsequently modified, with the aim of 
developing a model that is theoretically meaningful and yields good statistical results. The 
modification indices (MI) from assessing the original structural model specification suggested 
the inclusion of two new paths: 
1. A direct relationship between organisational security resources and security compliance 
2. A direct relationship between security skill requirements and security engagement 
The two new paths are based on solid theoretical background, not solely on statistics. The first 
path (i.e. a direct relationship between organisational security resources and security 
compliance) is added to explain that provision of organisational security resources can enable IT 
users to take security actions to protect computer systems. Well-structured and clear security 
communications and instructions enable users to apply security measures with little effort, 
whereas rewards and sanctions can be extrinsic motivation sources for users to perform security 
tasks. Moreover, by organising security tasks that match with the users’ security skills, 
organisations can strongly influence security compliance. Thus, organisational security resources 
can have a direct effect on security compliance. The second path (i.e. a direct relationship 
between security skill requirements and security engagement) indicates that high security skill 
requirements to perform security tasks could pose as challenging tasks for users. Challenging 
tasks require higher self-efficacy and enable users to demonstrate their competence. Self-
determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000) indicates that demonstrating competence, which is 
the ability to interact effectively with a work environment, is a main source of intrinsic 
motivation. Thus, higher security skill requirements could enable users to apply their skills and 
motivate users to be more enthusiastic with the tasks. 
The testing results of the revised structural model including two new paths (called model A) are 
depicted in Figure 7-1 (refer to Appendix 10 for full AMOS structural model results). The fit 
statistics for model A in Figure 7-1 indicate an adequate fit. It can be seen that the CMIN/DF at 
2.08 is slightly above the upper-bound 2 cut-off value, the RMSEA at 0.052 is less than the 
upper limit of 0.07, and the PCLOSE at 0.195 is greater than the upper 0.05 threshold. Finally, 
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the CFI at 0.90 is lower than the 0.92 threshold for a model of over 30 variables (Hair et al. 
2010), though it satisfies the 0.90 rule of thumb cut-off fit value (Hu and Bentler 1999). 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 2186.797 
Df = 1051 
CMIN/df = 2.08 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .90 
RMSEA = .052, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.049 0.055) 
PCLOSE = .193 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p <0.05, N/S (not significant) at 0.05 level; 𝑹𝟐 shown within each endogenous 
construct  
 Dotted lines represent non-significant paths 
Figure 7-1: Final Structural Model with Non-Significant Paths (Model A) 
Furthermore, the overall model fit of model A is also compared with that of the measurement 
model obtained in Chapter 6 (see Table 7-1), the closer the model fit of the structural model to 
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that of the measurement model, the better the structural model fit is (Hair et al. 2010). As shown 
in Table 7-1, the CMIN/DF of model A is 0.05 higher than that of the full measurement model 
(2.08 and 2.03 respectively). The CFIs of both models are almost the same at 0.90 for model A 
and 0.904 for the measurement model. The RMSEA of model A is 0.002 higher than that of the 
measurement model. Overall, the differences of model fit between model A and measurement 
model are minimal. This indicates that no significant model fit improvement can be achieved if 
all co-variations between constructs are to be added as done in the measurement model. As the 
structural model has fewer paths to be estimated, has more degree of freedom, and is more 
parsimonious than the measurement model, it is preferred. 
Table 7-1: Model Fit Statistics between Structural and Measurement Models 
Model fit statistics of model A 
Model fit statistics of the full 
measurement model 
CMIN = 2186.80 
Df = 1051 
CMIN/df = 2.08 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .90 
RMSEA = .052 
90% CI for RMSEA = (0.049, 
0.055) 
PCLOSE = .19 
CMIN = 2094.40 
Df = 1033 
CMIN/df = 2.03 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .904 
RMSEA = .050 
90% CI for RMSEA = (0.047, 
0.053) 
PCLOSE = .43 
Table 7-2 below describes the structural path estimates and their statistical significance between 
constructs of the model A. 
Table 7-2: Path Estimates of Model A 
 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SCB <--- SCO 0.268 0.048 5.538 *** 
SCB <--- ASP 0.271 0.065 4.162 *** 
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SEN <--- OSR 0.654 0.143 4.57 *** 
SEN <--- SSE 0.312 0.064 4.85 *** 
SEN <--- SE 0.116 0.05 2.343 0.019 
SCB <--- SSR -0.155 0.062 -2.525 0.012 
SEN <--- SSR 0.158 0.045 3.538 *** 
SCB <--- OSR -0.133 0.16 -0.829 0.407 
SCB <--- SSE 0.005 0.077 0.07 0.944 
SCB <--- SE 0.122 0.062 1.959 0.05 
SCL <--- SCB -0.077 0.041 -1.889 0.059 
SCL <--- SEN 0.151 0.067 2.27 0.023 
SCL <--- OSR 0.766 0.15 5.12 *** 
 
The model R2 (i.e. squared multiple correlation-SMC) was estimated for each dependent 
variable of the research model including security compliance burnout, security engagement and 
security compliance to determine the extent of its predictive power. This research posited that 
(1) security demands would increase compliance burnout, but organisational and personal 
resources would decrease it; (2) organisational and personal resources would increase security 
engagement; and (3) compliance burnout would reduce while engagement would improve 
security compliance. Table 7-3 below shows R2 for the three dependent variables. 
Table 7-3: Variance Explained of Dependent Variables 
Variance explained 𝐑𝟐 
Security compliance burnout 0.26 
Security engagement 0.54 
Security compliance 0.47 
Table 7-3 indicates that the research model explains 26 per cent of the variance in security 
compliance burnout, 54 per cent in security engagement, and 47 per cent in security compliance. 
The model R2 of the security engagement and security compliance constructs are considered as 
mediocre and R2 for security compliance burnout as weak (Chin 1998), hence the structural 
model provides good validity and utility for explaining the dependent constructs of the study. 
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Finally, based on the path estimates of the model A reported in Table 7-2, the hypothesis testing 
results are shown in Table 7-4 below. 
Table 7-4: Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis 
Standardised 
Path Estimate 
(Effect) 
Hypothesised 
Direction 
P-
value 
Supported? 
Relationship 
Strength 
H1a: Security compliance overload is 
positively related to security 
compliance burnout. 
0.31 Positive *** Yes Medium 
H1b: Access to security policies is 
positively related to security 
compliance burnout. 
0.28 Positive *** Yes Medium 
H1c: Security skill requirements are 
positively related to security 
compliance burnout. 
-0.17 Positive 0.012 No Small 
H2: Organisational security resources 
are negatively related to security 
compliance burnout. 
-0.07 Negative 0.407 No N/A 
H3: Organisational security resources 
are positively related to security 
engagement. 
0.38 Positive *** Yes Medium 
H4a: Security self-efficacy is 
negatively related to security 
compliance burnout. 
-0.01 Negative 0.944 No N/A 
H5a: Security self-efficacy is 
positively related to security 
engagement. 
0.35 Positive *** Yes Medium 
H4b: Security exposure is negatively 
related to security compliance burnout. 
0.12 Negative 0.05 No Small 
H5b: Security exposure is positively 
0.13 Positive 0.019 Yes Small 
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Hypothesis 
Standardised 
Path Estimate 
(Effect) 
Hypothesised 
Direction 
P-
value 
Supported? 
Relationship 
Strength 
related to security engagement. 
H6: Security compliance burnout is 
negatively related to security 
compliance. 
-0.10 Negative 0.059 No N/A 
H7: Security engagement is positively 
related to security compliance. 
0.18 Positive 0.023 Yes Small 
New H8: Security skill requirements 
are positively related to security 
engagement. 
0.19 Positive *** Yes Small 
New H9: Organisational security 
resources are positively related to 
security compliance. 
0.53 Positive *** Yes Large 
 *** p<0.001 
 Strength of construct relationship: >0.5: Large; >0.3: Medium; >0.1: Small (Cohen 1998) 
Of the eleven original hypotheses, six hypotheses are supported with significant relationships at 
a 95 per cent confidence interval and in the hypothesised direction. The two new hypotheses H8 
and H9 were added to capture the two new paths added to the original structural model which 
was explained during the structural model assessment process (see Figure 7-1). Both hypotheses 
H8 and H9 are also supported. 
The construct of security compliance was theorised to be influenced directly and negatively by 
security compliance burnout (H6) and positively by security engagement (H7). The path 
between security compliance burnout and security compliance is not significant (effect=-0.10, 
p>0.05), hence H6 is not supported. Structural path between security engagement and security 
compliance is significant (effect=0.18, p<0.05) and in the theorised direction, thus H7 is 
supported. The path between organisational security resources and security compliance is 
significant (effect=0.53, p<0.001) and in the theorised direction, hence H9 is supported. 
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Security compliance burnout construct was theorised to be influenced, firstly, positively by 
security compliance overload (H1a), access to security policies (H1b) and security skill 
requirements (H1c); secondly, negatively affected by organisational security resources (H2), 
security self-efficacy (H4a), and security exposure (H4b). Both H1a (effect=0.31, p<0.001) and 
H1b (0.30, p<0.001) are supported, though H1c (effect=-0.21, p<0.001) was found to reduce 
security compliance burnout instead, hence H1c is not supported. Both hypotheses H2 (effect=-
0.07, p>0.05) and H4a (effect=-0.01, p>0.05) are not supported due to non-significant 
relationships at 95 per cent confidence interval. H4b is not supported because the relationship is 
significant but in the opposite direction (effect=0.11, p<0.05). Hence, the results demonstrated 
that there is no relationship between organisational security resources or security self-efficacy 
and compliance burnout, which means provision of security resources or possession of security 
self-efficacy may not reduce compliance burnout. The study also did not find a positive 
relationship of security skill requirements or a negative relationship of security exposure with 
compliance burnout. In other words, security skill requirements of security tasks do not increase 
compliance burnout and security exposure does not increase burnout either. 
The security engagement construct was theorised to be influenced positively by organisational 
security resources (H3), security self-efficacy (H5a) and security exposure (H5b). Furthermore, 
the new hypothesis H8 theorised that security engagement was affected positively by security 
skill requirements. All three hypotheses are supported with significant paths in the theorised 
directions: H3 (effect=0.38, p<0.001), H5a (effect=0.35, p<0.001), H5b (effect=0.13, p<0.05), 
and H8 (effect=0.20, p<0.001). 
 Assessing Structural Model without Non-Significant Structural Paths 7.1.2
As part of the structural model re-specification process, model A (see Figure 7-1) was re-
evaluated from the iterative process of removing non-significant paths, recalculating model fit 
and path estimates. The insignificant paths between security self-efficacy and security 
compliance burnout (effect=-0.05, p>0.05), and organisational security resources and security 
compliance burnout (effect=-0.07, p>0.05) were first removed. Model fit indices and structural 
paths were recalculated. The resulting structural model (called model B) is depicted in Figure 
7-2 and Table 7-5. 
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Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 2188.071 
Df = 1053 
CMIN/df = 2.08 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .90 
RMSEA = .052, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.049 0.055) 
PCLOSE = .202 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p <0.05, N/S (not significant) at 0.05 level; 𝑹𝟐 shown within each endogenous 
construct  
Figure 7-2: Structural Model B without Insignificant Paths 
The fit statistics for model B in Figure 7-2 indicate a similar fit to that of model A. Most fit 
indices of model B are similar to those of model A. The CMIN/DF of model B remains at 2.08, 
the RMSEA at 0.052, and the CFI at 0.90. Only the PCLOSE increases slightly to 0.202 from 
0.19 in model A. Hence, model B also indicates a good fit.  
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Table 7-5 below depicts the structural model testing results of model B including the 
standardised path estimate changes between model A and B. 
Table 7-5: Structural Paths of Model B 
  Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardised 
Path Estimate 
(Effect) 
Path Estimate 
Change from 
Model A 
SCB <--- SCO 0.263 0.048 5.45 *** 0.31 0.31 
SCB <--- ASP 0.28 0.064 4.411 *** 0.29 0.28 
SEN <--- OSR 0.64 0.142 4.5 *** 0.38 0.38 
SEN <--- SSE 0.316 0.064 4.922 *** 0.35 0.35 
SEN <--- SE 0.115 0.05 2.32 0.02 0.13 0.13 
SCB <--- SSR -0.184 0.05 -3.68 *** -0.17 -0.17 
SEN <--- SSR 0.161 0.045 3.613 *** 0.20 0.19 
SCB <--- SE 0.113 0.053 2.145 0.032 0.11 0.12 
SCL <--- SCB -0.083 0.04 -2.069 0.039 
-0.11 
(Significant at 
95%) 
-0.10 (Non-
significant at 
95%) 
SCL <--- SEN 0.156 0.066 2.349 0.019 0.19 0.18 
SCL <--- OSR 0.758 0.148 5.124 *** 0.53 0.53 
The statistical significance of the structural paths between the remaining constructs in model B is 
almost the same as those in model A, except that of the newly significant path between 
compliance burnout and security compliance. In model B, the relationship between compliance 
burnout and security compliance becomes significant (effect=-0.11, p<0.05) and is slightly 
stronger than that in model A. The change in the path significance between security compliance 
burnout and security compliance in model B (after direct paths between security self-efficacy, 
resources and compliance burnout were removed) may imply that though security skills and 
organisational resources do not have a significant impact on compliance burnout, they can, 
however, reduce the impact of compliance burnout on security compliance. 
The following sections provide further in-depth discussions of this research’s findings. 
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 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 7.2
Sections 7.2.1 provide a descriptive overview of the extent of the 12 security compliance 
constructs among Vietnamese IT users. Then comparisons of security compliance burnout, 
engagement and compliance between manager and employee groups are presented in Section 
7.2.2. Section 7.2.3 describes frequencies of IT policy access from the participants. Finally, 
Sections 7.2.4 to 7.2.6 discuss analytical findings of the hypothesis testing results. 
 Overview of Security Compliance Constructs 7.2.1
To understand the overall rating levels of the constructs included in the study model among the 
participants, the average means of 12 study constructs are shown in Figure 7-3. All variables 
were measured on a seven-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
The validated measurement model presented in section 6.4 in Chapter 6 is the basis for 
calculating the average mean of each construct. 
 
Figure 7-3: Average Means of Security Compliance-Based Constructs 
The results in the Figure 7-3 indicate that security compliance overload and security compliance 
burnout constructs are below the scale medians (i.e. 4), while the remaining constructs are above 
the scale medians. The highest average means are from the constructs of security compliance, 
security skill requirements, and security engagement.  
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Regarding three categories of security demands, security skill requirements has the highest mean 
(4.86), followed by the mean of access to security policies (4.22), and the least is that of security 
compliance overload (3.71). The studied IT users appeared to need more IT training and 
organisational support to keep up with security requirements. Familiarising with the IT policies 
and knowing what security measures need to be taken presented themselves as an obstacle to the 
users. However, it seems that users disregarded the degree of inconvenience or productivity 
reduction due to implementation of security measures as a major issue. A low security demand 
overload may indicate effective security measures were implemented in the organisation 
resulting in minimising the negative impact of security measures on productivity. It can also 
mean that organisations did not implement extensive security measures at all; hence security 
compliance overload is not a major issue to IT users. 
In terms of organisational security resources, the mean of security communication efficacy and 
skill use and development are equal at 4.52, sanctions and rewards at 4.24 and 4.11 respectively. 
The lowest mean value for rewards construct among organisational security resources could be 
interpreted as the use of rewards for security compliance is not yet common in Vietnamese 
organisations. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Guo and Yuan 2012, Hu et al. 2011) 
which explained that the impact of rewards on security compliance was not significant due to 
non-existence of a rewards scheme in companies. 
The average means of security self-efficacy and security exposure of personal resources are 
relatively similar (4.28 and 4.25 respectively) and just above the scale medians. The figures 
indicate that most users did not rate themselves highly in term of security skills or experience of 
security incidents. 
The average mean of security engagement (4.66) is much higher than that of security compliance 
burnout (3.76). A high mean of security engagement implies that Vietnamese IT users may 
recognise the importance of protection against cyber security and demonstrate dedication in their 
security practice. Low compliance burnout mean indicates IT users did not take a cynical view 
towards cyber security issues and they acknowledged personal compliance could contribute to 
effective security programs. Finally, security compliance had the highest mean value (5.04) of 
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all constructs, which indicates that on average IT users in organisations self-reported satisfactory 
security compliance. 
To further investigate the security compliance and its direct antecedent impacts on security 
compliance burnout and engagement, the effects of job positions on the constructs are examined 
and discussed in the following section. 
 Experience of Security Compliance, Security Compliance Burnout and 7.2.2
Engagement between Managers and Employees 
Participants were asked about their job position in their current organisation as to whether they 
were in managerial or non-managerial positions. Managerial staff or managers are those who 
have supervisory duties such as hiring, performing employee evaluations, and monitoring 
employee work performance. Employees in non-managerial positions normally do not supervise 
other staff. Of the whole sample, 84 (20.64 per cent) were managers and 292 (71.74 per cent) 
were employees (see Table 6-3 in Chapter 6). Managers in organisations often have more 
responsibilities, which could include ensuring security compliance in their department. Previous 
studies found that staff positions, such as staff, middle manager, or senior manager, had a 
significant effect on security violation, though no specific details of what effect that had on 
security compliance were provided (Guo and Yuan 2012). Thus, the following section examines 
whether manager and employee users experience different levels of security compliance burnout, 
engagement and compliance. 
Figure 7-4 below shows the average means of security compliance burnout, engagement and 
compliance between two user groups. 
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Figure 7-4: Mean Comparisons among Managers and Employees 
 Security Compliance between Managers and Employees 7.2.2.1
The average means for security compliance among managers and employees’ groups were 
almost equal at 5.06 and 5.05 respectively, which are above the scale median of 4 (refer to 
Figure 7-3). To assess whether managers and non-managers complied similarly or not with 
security requirements, an independent t-tests was conducted to compare the differences in 
security compliance between managers and non-managers groups. Table 7-6 shows group 
statistics and the Levene’s test for equality of compliance between the two groups. Levene’s 
significant value for equality test was p=0.849 > 0.05, thus there was not a significant difference 
in variability of the two groups. The 2-tailed significant value was p=.989 > 0.05, which means 
that there was not a statistically significant difference between managers and non-managers in 
their compliance levels; hence both managers and non-managers evidenced a similar level of 
compliance. 
 
 
Manager Employee
Security Compliance Burnout 3.57 3.82
Security Engagement 4.83 4.60
Security Compliance 5.06 5.05
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
Comparison among Managers and Employees 
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Table 7-6: Independent t-test for Security Compliance between Managers and Employees 
Position N 
Mean of 
Security 
Compliance  
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
  
Managers 84 5.06 1.04 0.114   
Employees 292 5.05 1.05 0.061   
          
 
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Equal variances 
assumed 
0.036 0.849 -0.014 374 0.989 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
    -0.014 135.814 0.989 
 Compliance Burnout between Managers and Employees 7.2.2.2
In terms of compliance burnout, the average means for managers and employees were 3.57 and 
3.82 respectively. To assess whether managers and non-managers experienced different levels of 
compliance burnout, an independent t-test was conducted to compare differences in security 
compliance burnout between manager and employee groups.The Levene’s test for equality of 
compliance burnout between the two groups is shown in Table 7-7. Levene’s significant value 
for equality test was p=0.679 > 0.05, thus there was not a significant difference in variability of 
the two groups. The 2-tailed significant value was p=.146 > 0.05, which means that there was 
not a statistically significant difference between managers and employees in compliance burnout 
levels. The finding implies that both managers and employees experienced similar compliance 
burnout. In other words, implementation of security measures can equally affect compliance 
burnout regardless of their position in the organisation. 
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Table 7-7: Independent t-test for Security Compliance Burnout between Managers and 
Employees 
Position N 
Mean of 
Compliance 
Burnout 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 Managers 84 3.57 1.38 0.151 
 Employees 292 3.82 1.35 0.079 
           
 
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.172 0.679 -1.456 374 0.146 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
    -1.438 132.139 0.153 
 Security Engagement among Managers and Employees 7.2.2.3
In terms of security engagement, the average means for manager and employee groups were at 
4.83 and 4.60 respectively. Another independent t-test was conducted to determine if managers 
and employees’ groups had different levels of security engagement. The Levene’s equality test 
for security engagement between the two groups is illustrated in Table 7-8. First, Levene’s 
significant value for equality test was p=0.586 > 0.05, hence there was not a significant 
difference in variability of the two groups. Second, the 2-tailed significant value at p=0.167 > 
0.05 means there is not a statistically significant difference in security engagement levels 
between managers and employees. 
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Table 7-8: Independent t-test for Security Engagement between Managers and Employees 
Position N 
Mean of 
Security 
Engagement  
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 Managers 84 4.82 1.19 0.13 
 Employees 292 4.61 1.31 0.077 
           
 
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.297 0.586 1.385 374 0.167 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    1.461 145.983 0.146 
In summary, the descriptive analysis indicates that manager and employee groups experienced 
similar levels of security compliance, compliance burnout and engagement. In other words, IT 
users, regardless of their position, experienced similar compliance burnout and demonstrated 
similar engagement and compliance.  
 Frequencies of IT Policy Access 7.2.3
As IT policies are often the formal source for describing IT security responsibilities and IT usage 
guidance to IT users (Cox 2012, Son 2011), the survey in Study Two also asked participants to 
report their last access to IT policies in their organisation. Figure 7-5 shows that 19 per cent of 
the participants had never read the IT policies and 17 per cent reported no IT policies available 
in their organisations. Of the 64 per cent participants who reported recent access to IT policies, 
16 per cent accessed in the last 12 months, 24 per cent in the last six months, and 24 per cent in 
the last month from the time they completed the survey. 
 192 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Frequencies of IT Policy Access 
To examine how manager and employee groups accessed IT policies, a breakdown of IT policy 
access between the two groups is depicted in Figure 7-6. 18 per cent of managers and 23 per cent 
of employees reported never accessing IT policies; 36 per cent of managers accessed the policies 
last month compared with 27 per cent of employees; 47 per cent of managers compared with 50 
per cent of employees accessed the policies between last six to 12 months. 
 
Figure 7-6: Access to IT Policies by Job Positions 
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A high number of participants (18 per cent for managers and 23 per cent for employees) reported 
never accessing the policies and a low mean value of “communication efficacy” construct (4.52) 
stress the need to more effectively communicate security requirements in organisations. Study 
One (the qualitative study) pointed out that security practice guidance should be expressed in 
simple terms and in graphical posters. Organisations should not simply rely on IT users to access 
complex written security documents for security information. This view is supported by findings 
in Albrechtsen (2007) which claimed that employees often do not have time to read the policies, 
not knowing where to find them, and lack of knowledge for understanding the instructions. 
Based on the researcher’s own experience, Vietnamese organisations which do not have formal 
IT and security policies are not rare. As evidenced in the survey, 17 per cent of participants 
reported non-existence of IT policies at work or not being aware of the policy’s existence. 
Compliance with security policies is often the dependent construct of many studies (Pham et al. 
2015, Johnston and Warkentin 2010, Bulgurcu et al. 2010, Herath and Rao 2009b), hence it is 
important to ensure that IT users are clearly aware of the policies and know what security 
measures should be taken as part of their compliance. Only then can the construct of compliance 
be meaningfully measured and explained. 
 Direct Antecedents of Security Compliance 7.2.4
Based on the JD-R model (Demerouti et al. 2001), this research proposed that IT users’ security 
compliance could be affected by different categories of security compliance requirements, and 
organisational and personal resources. Furthermore, compliance burnout and engagement were 
the two motivational processes, which moderated the impacts of security demands, and 
organisational and personal resources on security compliance. Three characteristics of security 
demands were identified including security compliance overload, access to security policies, and 
security skill requirements. The construct of organisational security resources in this research 
was examined at a second-order, which included security communication efficacy, security skill 
use and development, rewards and sanctions. Personal resources comprised security self-efficacy 
and security exposure. 
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Security compliance burnout did not significantly affect security compliance, so hypothesis H6 
(‘Security compliance burnout is negatively related to security compliance’) was not supported. 
The structural path between security engagement and compliance was positive and significant so 
hypothesis H7 (‘Security engagement is positively related to security compliance’) was accepted. 
Moreover, the post-hoc structural analysis identified a significant and positive relationship 
between the construct of organisational security resources and security compliance. The 
hypothesis H9 (‘Organisational security resources are positively related to security 
compliance’) was added to capture this significant structural path. Of the two direct determinants 
of security compliance, organisational resources had a much stronger impact on compliance than 
security engagement (effect=0.53 and 0.18 respectively). 
Overall, the theoretical model developed in this research explained 47 per cent of the variance in 
IT users’ security compliance. To compare the results of Study Two with those of previous 
studies on security compliance, Table 7-9 below illustrates variance explained results (i.e. the 
predictive power of the model) of security compliance constructs from similar studies. 
Table 7-9: Comparison of Variance Explained For Security Compliance 
Authors Findings Variance 
Explained 
Herath and Rao 
(2009b) 
Based on deterrence framework and protection motivation theory, the 
study found detection certainty had positive impacts on compliance 
intention. Response efficacy and self-efficacy had positive impacts on 
security compliance intention, whereas severity of security breach and 
response cost negatively influenced security attitudes. Resource 
availability enhances self-efficacy, which in turn strongly influences 
policy compliance. Social norm has a significant impact on compliance 
intention. Finally, organisational commitment can influence both 
compliance intention as well as perceived response efficacy. 
0.47 
Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) 
Security intention towards spyware was affected by severity of the 
security threat, response efficacy, self-efficacy and social influence. 
0.27 
Ifinedo (2011) 
Combining protection motivation theory and theory of planned behaviour, 
the study found perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, 
0.70 
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attitude towards compliance and subjective norms contributed to security 
policy compliance intention. 
Son (2011) 
Security compliance is more influenced by intrinsic motivation (perceived 
legitimacy and value congruence) than extrinsic motivation coming from 
deterrence theory, such as deterrent severity and certainty. 
0.415 
Cox (2012) 
Security behaviour can be strongly affected by perceived vulnerability, 
subject norms, and self-efficacy and security intention.  
0.25 
The variance explained for security compliance construct from previous studies ranges from 
0.25 to 0.70 in Table 7-9. Antecedents of security compliance have been explored from several 
theoretical perspectives. Herath and Rao (2009b) employed a deterrence framework and 
protection motivation theory to explain security compliance intention. Factors from the 
deterrence framework such as detection certainty, and from protection motivation theory, such as 
response efficacy and self-efficacy, had a direct and significant impact on compliance intention 
(Herath and Rao 2009b). Resource availability was identified to increase employees’ abilities to 
perform security practice, which then positively influenced both compliance attitudes and 
intentions. Other factors, such as social norms and organisational commitment, also positively 
influenced compliance intentions. Herath and Rao (2009b)’s theoretical model was tested with 
IT users in US organisations and explained 47 per cent of the variance in compliance intention 
which was similar to Study Two’s result. 
Similar studies from Johnston and Warkentin (2010), Ifinedo (2011) and Cox (2012) also 
employed protection motivation theory and theory of planned behaviour to study security 
behaviour. All three studies investigated the impacts of similar factors, such as severity of 
security threats, response efficacy, self-efficacy and social influence, on security compliance 
attitudes and intentions. All three studies indicated that the studied factors positively contributed 
to compliance attitudes and/or intention with security measures, such as spyware detection 
software in Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and general security policies in Ifinedo (2011) and 
Cox (2012). Johnston and Warkentin (2010)’s model explained 27 per cent of the variance in 
security compliance, 70 per cent in Ifinedo (2011), and 25 per cent in Cox (2012). 
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Son (2011) examined security compliance from two contrasting perspectives including intrinsic 
motivation sources such as perceived legitimacy and value congruence versus extrinsic sources, 
such as severity and certainty of sanctions. In Son (2011)’s study, intrinsic motivation was 
reported to more significantly influence security behaviour than extrinsic motivation did. Overall 
Son (2011)’s study model explained 41.7 per cent of the variance in security policy compliance. 
The previous studies discussed above explored a wide range of antecedents of security 
compliance from IT users. Some of the factors, such as response cost, deterrent severity, and 
intrinsic motivation sources, are somewhat similar to compliance overload, sanctions and 
security engagement respectively in this research. Direct antecedents of security compliance 
examined in this research have extended the current body of knowledge in understanding how 
security compliance can be affected by organisational and personal factors. Overall, the research 
model explained 47 per cent of the variance of security compliance, which is on the high range 
of comparable studies. 
The following sections discuss further the direct impacts of security compliance burnout, 
security engagement and organisational resources on compliance. 
 Non-Significant Impact of Security Compliance Burnout on Security 7.2.4.1
Compliance 
Study One observed that participants had experienced compliance burnout due to overloading 
security tasks that negatively affected work productivity, complexity of security tasks, and 
requirements to access to written security policies for instructions. People with high compliance 
burnout were less likely to involve with security activities. Study Two, however, did not find a 
significant relationship between security compliance burnout and security compliance. The 
insignificant relationship between security compliance burnout and security compliance is not 
consistent with the main argument in the Job Demands-Resources model where work burnout 
such as emotional strains leads to health issues, lower commitment and performance (Demerouti 
et al. 2001). D'Arcy et al. (2014) also examined the impact of stressful security demands on 
security behaviour, and claimed that security overload, complexity and uncertainty increased 
moral disengagement, which could justify employees’ security violations. This research extends 
D'Arcy et al. (2014) by assessing the impacts of demanding security requirements on security 
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compliance as opposed to security violations. Moreover, this research also examined the impact 
of positive factors including security resources and self-efficacy on compliance. Several 
explanations can justify the finding of the insignificant relationship between security compliance 
burnout and security compliance. 
Security compliance burnout reported by the survey participants was not very high and below 
the scale mean (3.76) which was the lowest among all studied constructs (see Figure 7-3). 
Hence, the effect of security compliance burnout on security compliance is not significant in the 
studied sample. D'Arcy et al. (2014) did not report a mean value of stressful security 
requirements so it was not possible to compare the findings between the two studies.  
The non-significant relationship between security compliance burnout and security compliance 
may result from the nature of security tasks the users have to perform at work. Users at the 
surveyed organisations may consider security compliance as simple tasks, such as changing 
passwords, seeking IT permissions, or not sharing account information. However, some security 
tasks could be more complex, such as checking spoof emails, contacting IT to verify suspicious 
emails or safely running freeware. Complying with complex security tasks often requires more 
time, technical expertise and higher effort, thus experience of such burnout would more likely 
affect security compliance. During the interviews in Study One, most participants considered 
security compliance as simple or not interfering much with work. However, when being asked to 
respond to security warnings when running Excel Macros or verifying trusted software sources, 
the participants immediately complained that it would be too complex or take too much time to 
complete the requisite tasks. For most participants, complex security tasks should be the 
responsibilities of the IT professionals. This argument was consistent with findings in 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden 2009). Future research needs to clearly distinguish different forms of 
compliance with different types of security tasks (i.e. simple to complex, short to long time spent 
on tasks) to examine further the impact of compliance burnout on security compliance.  
When measuring the impact of security compliance burnout on compliance, how long it takes for 
a user to respond to a security task should be examined. Some participants in Study One 
highlighted the fact that they would delay security compliance as much as they could. For 
example, fulfilling security tasks can be in the form of changing passwords just before it expires, 
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not reporting computer hardware issues until it becomes unusable, or not reporting unsafe 
software installation until it was detected by IT staff. Delays in performing security tasks can be 
deemed an unsafe security practice, as timely actions are essential in minimising security threats. 
Most security compliance studies including the current research have not captured this aspect of 
security compliance. Future research should examine delays in compliance as a form of low 
compliance to examine the impacts of the studied factors on security compliance. 
Finally, users may realise that having a secure information system requires a trade-off for 
inconvenience or reduction in work productivity. Thus, users can still comply despite 
experiencing compliance burnout. In this regard, organisations need to clearly communicate the 
necessity of protecting information security and the significant role that each individual can 
contribute so that employees can tolerate compliance burnout. 
 Positive Impact of Security Engagement on Security Compliance 7.2.4.2
As the employees are more enthusiastic about their security role, they would be more likely to 
perform the recommended security measures. The data analysis in Study Two recorded a direct 
and positive relationship between security engagement and security compliance. The positive 
impact of security engagement on performing security tasks was consistent with the Job-
Demands Resources model which posits that work engagement would lead to better performance 
and job commitment (Bakken and Torp 2012). 
This section elaborates the mediating effect of security engagement on security compliance (see 
Appendix 11 for details of testing mediating effects of compliance burnout and engagement). 
Security engagement partially mediated the effect of organisational security resources on 
security compliance. Provision of security resources has more positive effect on security 
compliance than engagement (effect=0.53 and 0.18 respectively) (see Figure 7-1). The stronger 
impact of organisational sources on compliance indicates that users highly emphasise the need 
for effective and engaging resources for better compliance even they are engaging in security 
tasks. Clear communications, matching security skills, rewards or sanctions for performing 
security measures are some resources to start with. 
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The SEM structural analysis showed security engagement fully mediates the effects of security 
self-efficacy and security exposure on security compliance. In other words, security self-efficacy 
and security exposure do not directly affect security compliance but indirectly through 
increasing security engagement. The indirect impact of security exposure on security compliance 
in this research is consistent with Rhee et al. (2009)’s findings that security exposure indirectly 
enhances security practice through the mediating role of security self-efficacy. A successful 
experience in dealing with security risks would increase self-efficacy, whereas an unsuccessful 
experience would decrease self-efficacy (Rhee et al. 2009). The insignificant direct influence of 
self-efficacy on compliance reported in this study contradicts findings in other studies (Cox 
2012, Vance et al. 2012, Rhee et al. 2009). A possible explanation is that security self-efficacy 
and exposure only affect compliance when IT users emotionally commit to support security 
programs at work. IT users’ ability to perform security measures or their experience of security 
incidents are necessary but not sufficient to lead to compliance. This finding further emphasises 
the importance of gaining security engagement from IT users to achieve security compliance. 
 Positive and Direct Impact of Organisational Security Resources on Security 7.2.4.3
Compliance 
The research’s original theoretical model did not propose a direct impact of organisational 
security resources on security compliance in accordance with the Job Demands-Resources 
model. The post-hoc analysis of the structural model, however, suggested a direct structural 
relationship between organisational resources and security compliance. Hence, this research 
extends the Job Demands-Resources model by theorising that resources can have direct impacts 
on security compliance, in addition to an indirect impact through security engagement (see 
Section 7.2.6.1). Furthermore, this research extends findings in terms of organisational resources 
in Herath and Rao (2009a) in a number of ways. First, the construct of organisational resources 
in this study is assessed at a second-order which included four different resources instead of 
being assessed at a first-order construct in Herath and Rao (2009a). Second, Herath and Rao 
(2009a) detected availability of organisational resources indirectly influenced security 
compliance through enhancing IT users’ self-efficacy which then positively affected security 
compliance. This study discovered a direct and significant impact of organisational resources on 
security compliance. Third, security engagement in this study was considered as a direct 
 200 
 
outcome of receiving organisational resources which was not assessed in Herath and Rao 
(2009a)’s study. Though this research did not examine the impact of organisational security 
resources on security self-efficacy, future research can examine further this effect in the overall 
model. 
Though the structural analysis in Study Two assessed organisational resources at a second-order 
construct comprising four security resources, it is worth highlighting how the four forms of 
security resources in this research have extended current research in a number of ways. All four 
types of security resources were consistently rated just above the median of 4 (see Figure 7-3). 
This indicates that the participants agreed that proper resources were provided by the 
organisation to facilitate user security compliance. First, effective security communication or 
quality and usefulness of security information has been recognised as a source of improving 
security compliance directly (Pahnila et al. 2007). Second, security skill use and development 
positively influenced security compliance, which was consistent with findings in Study One. For 
example, interviewed participants pressed the need to be able to use their own skills in deciding 
what software to use, rather than their computer usage is dictated by strict technical security 
controls. 
Lacking opportunities to use security skills was quoted as a reason for having low desire to 
develop security knowledge, attend training, or stay alert with security notices (Pham et al. 
2015). Similarly, Parker et al. (2010) noticed higher self-determined employees experienced 
greater dedication to work if they were given higher job controls, such as ability to use skills or 
control the work practice. 
The positive impact of some security resources, such as rewards and sanctions, on security 
compliance discovered in Study Two was consistent with previous studies (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, 
Padayachee 2012, Vance et al. 2012). Other studies, however, found neither sanctions 
(Sommestad et al. 2014, Li et al. 2010) nor rewards (Pahnila et al. 2007, Boss et al. 2009) had a 
significant impact on security compliance.In Study One, participants explained that rewards and 
sanctions for security behaviour emphasised how seriously the organisation treated IT users’ 
security compliance, just like another work task. Then the employees would consider their 
compliance as significant and necessary. Boss et al. (2009) argued clear specification of security 
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measures and evaluation of security compliance led to perceived mandatories of compliance, 
which then positively affected security precautions taken.  
Another notice on the effect of rewards and sanctions on controlling security behaviour, in 
moving people along the spectrum from passive compliance towards self-determination, the 
incentives and rewards need to become less externally applied and more intrinsic. As external 
regulations, such as tangible rewards and strict sanctions can have mixed impacts on security 
behaviour (Siponen et al. 2014, Vance and Siponen 2012) and only produce short-term effects 
resulting from poor-quality motivation (Stone et al. 2008), other forms of incentives should be 
employed. For example, formal recognition of security skills development can intrinsically 
motivate users to maintain their efficacy and practice recommended security tasks. Incentives for 
compliance should not promote over-protecting security activities but get the users interested 
and engaged with security practice on a regular basis. Such incentives should make the users 
find security skills and practices are essential work skills, not just simply following prescribed 
steps in the security policies. 
 Direct Antecedents of Security Compliance Burnout 7.2.5
Study Two showed that three categories of security demands had different impacts on 
compliance burnout, while organisational resources and security self-efficacy were not 
significantly related to burnout (H2 and H4a were not supported), and security exposure was 
positively related to it (H4b was not supported). Overall, the theoretical model developed in this 
research explained 26 per cent of the variance in IT users’ burnout, which is considered a weak 
but adequate level for practical implications (Cohen 1998). 
Each of the antecedents to security compliance burnout is discussed in the following sections. 
 Mixed Impacts of Security Demands on Compliance Burnout 7.2.5.1
Study One of the research identified three characteristics of security demands, including 
compliance overload, access to security policies and security skill requirements, could influence 
compliance burnout. The structural analysis in Study Two found security compliance overload 
and access to security policies were positively related to compliance burnout, whereas security 
skill requirements were negatively related to it. 
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Security compliance overload was positively relate to and had the strongest impact on security 
compliance burnout (effect=0.31, p<0.001) of the three components of security demands. This 
finding is consistent with that of Study One describing users mostly complained about the 
negative impact of time consuming and repetitive security tasks on work productivity and mental 
fatigue. The positive relationship between security compliance overload and burnout further 
emphasises the issue of techno-overload effect where professionals have to work more and faster 
while simultaneously dealing with multiple applications and tasks (Salanova et al. 2013). 
Fulfilling security measures can add an extra workload on already stressed staff. Performing a 
high and/or frequent volume of security measures requires IT users to spend extra time and 
handle workflow disruption while still being required to quickly respond to other work demands 
that can create anxiety, tension and make sustained mental attention difficult (Salanova et al. 
2013). 
Security compliance overload had the lowest mean value (3.68) of the three categories of 
security demands can be due to the following reasons. 
 Organisations may not clearly require IT users to perform security tasks as some 
organisations may emphasise more reliance on technical measures than users’ 
compliance. These organisations can automate most security measures and minimise the 
impact of security compliance on employees’ work. Study One found some participants 
did not perceive the amount of security workload as significant and negatively affecting 
their work. 
 Organisations may not implement security measures to protect their information assets, 
thus users do not experience the impact of security measures on their work. 
 Users may ignore or delay security tasks. As IT users may not exert time and effort to 
protect the information assets of the organisation, thus they may not experience much 
compliance overload (Herath and Rao 2009b). 
The second category of stressful security demands is access to security policies that describes the 
availability and easy access to the documented security policies and procedures. (e.g. a survey 
item such as “I need to spend a lot of time to be familiar with the organisation’s IT security 
policies and guidelines”). Security policies provide formal guidelines and specification of user 
responsibilities and resources when dealing with organisational information (von Solms and von 
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Solms 2004). Users need to access the security policies to search relevant information for their 
compliance needs. Participants in Study One complaint that security policies were lengthy and 
often written in highly technical language and that they could not clearly understand and it was 
time-consuming for information searching. The importance of providing clear security 
specification to achieve desired security compliance was also acknowledged in Boss et al. 
(2009). Similarly, perceived quality and usefulness of the information in security policies could 
positively affect actual security compliance (Pahnila et al. 2007). 
The third characteristic of security demands is security skill requirements which refer to the 
levels of IT knowledge needed in order to perform security tasks (e.g. a survey item such as “I 
need to acquire new skills to comply with the requirements of the IT security system”). Contrary 
to the original expectation, high skill requirements were observed to significantly and negatively 
relate to security burnout instead. This finding indicates that users may treat skill-demanding 
security tasks challenging and less tedious, which encourage them to obtain skills to be more 
competent and engage in security activities. 
Security skill requirements had the highest mean (4.86) of the three security demands, which 
implies the participants emphasised the issue of providing skills to exercise necessary security 
tasks. Similar to previous studies (Cox 2012, Son 2011, Rhee et al. 2009), IT users’ self-efficacy 
has been identified as an important determinant of security compliance. The finding on security 
skill requirements further highlights the need to equip users with necessary skills to perform 
organisational security tasks. 
 Non-Significant Impact of Organisational Security Resources on Compliance 7.2.5.2
Burnout 
In Study Two, organisational security resources were assessed as a second-order construct. This 
research theorised that provisions of adequate security resources could reduce IT users’ security 
compliance burnout and increase engagement. 
The structural analysis in Study Two did not detect a significant relationship between 
organisational security resources and security compliance burnout (effect=0.07, p>0.05). In 
other words, the provision of organisational resources does not reduce IT users’ compliance 
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burnout. The following reasons may explain the insignificant relationship between 
organisational security resources and security compliance burnout. 
First, the surveyed participants reported a below median value of compliance burnout (3.76), 
hence the effect of organisational security resources on security compliance burnout was not 
identified in the data analysis. Future research can examine the relationship between 
organisational security resources and security compliance burnout from users in organisations, 
which impose higher security demands. Second, it is the nature of some security tasks that would 
incur certain response cost, such as additional time, work disruption, or complexity, regardless 
of what organisational resources are provided. Such costs would result in users’ burnout despite 
receiving adequate security resources. In fact, an organisation that provides adequate and 
effective security resources such as technical support, training, or rewards for compliance is 
often the one that imposes more security measures and conducts more regular security check-
ups, which can affect work productivity and lead to even higher burnout. Third, some 
components of security resources included in the study may not be available at the surveyed 
organisation and affected the impact of resources on burnout. For example, several studies 
mentioned that organisations rarely introduced financial rewards security compliance (Guo and 
Yuan 2012, Hu et al. 2011). 
 Non-Significant Impact of Personal Security Resources on Compliance 7.2.5.3
Burnout 
Security self-efficacy was not observed to have a significant relationship with compliance 
burnout (effect=0.01, p>0.05) (H4a was not supported) and security exposure was significantly 
and positively related to compliance burnout instead negatively affecting it as hypothesised 
(effect=0.12, p<0.05) (H4b not supported). The following explanations can justify the non-
significant impact of security self-efficacy on compliance burnout. First, users may not have a 
great number of opportunities to use their security skills, as security tasks could be simple 
enough that do not require much security self-efficacy. For example, Study One revealed that IT 
users are mostly asked to follow simple security tasks such as password updates that do not 
require high security skills. Second, performing some security tasks may result in burnout 
regardless of the user’s security skills. For example, virus scanning may slow down the 
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computer system and affect work productivity, and users cannot do much to speed up the 
process. In that case, an employee can experience burnout regardless of his/her self-efficacy. 
Third, users may find certain security measures unnecessary or excessive and become distant 
towards overall security initiatives regardless his/her security skills. Consequently, these users 
can experience compliance burnout even if they are self-efficacious to perform required security 
tasks. 
The positive effect of security exposure on compliance burnout explained the different roles of 
security exposure on compliance. Experiencing a serious security incident may increase the 
perceived cost of non-compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) and create a negative emotional state, 
such as anxiety or stress, hence, increasing the level of burnout. Similarly, Rhee et al. (2009) 
reasoned that prior security failure incidents reduce perceived security competences which 
consequently reduce intention to strengthen security effort. 
 Direct Antecedents of Security Engagement 7.2.6
Security engagement is a dependent construct of the research model, which is a result of 
receiving organisational security resources and employing users’ self-efficacy and exposure. 
Study Two’s results show that security engagement was positively influenced by security 
resources (H3 supported), security self-efficacy (H5a supported), and security exposure (H5b 
supported). Additionally, the post-hoc analysis in Study Two demonstrated high security skill 
requirements was significantly and positively related to security engagement (H8 supported). 
Overall, the theoretical model developed in this research explained 54 per cent of the variance in 
its users’ security engagement. In terms of the impact strengths, organisational resources 
influenced the most to engagement (effect=0.38, p<0.001), followed by security self-efficacy 
(effect=0.35, p<0.001), then security skill requirements (effect=0.19, p<0.001), and the weakest 
impact was security exposure (effect=0.13, p<0.05).  
Each of the antecedents to security engagement is discussed in the following sections. 
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 Positive Impact of Organisational Security Resources on Security 7.2.6.1
Engagement 
The positive influence of organisational resources on security engagement was consistent with 
the JD-R model, in which resources are theorised to increase employees’ involvement, energy 
and dedication to work (Demerouti et al. 2001). Besides, this research has contributed to the 
applicability of JD-R model to explain security compliance by identifying four types of 
resources that can positively increase security engagement. Given that organisational resources 
have the strongest impact on security engagement and directly increase security compliance, it is 
important that organisations should provide adequate and relevant resources to IT users.  
 Positive Impact of Personal resources on Security Engagement 7.2.6.2
Security self-efficacy has the second strongest impact on security engagement among the four 
factors, namely organisational resources, skill requirements, self-efficacy and security exposure, 
that emphasises the importance of providing IT users with sufficient security skills to enhance 
engagement, which partly predicts security compliance. However, it is interesting that Study 
Two did not detect a direct impact of security self-efficacy on compliance, which is inconsistent 
with previous studies (Vance et al. 2012, Ifinedo 2011, Herath and Rao 2009b, Rhee et al. 2009). 
The answer to this finding can be sourced from Study One, which demonstrated that many 
participants did not consider the expected security tasks as difficult or needing much IT skills to 
perform. In contrast, the participants often expect the IT department to be responsible for any 
complex security tasks (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2009, Pham et al. 2015). This conflicting 
behaviour toward security skills emphasises the push for educating IT users of the importance of 
having adequate security knowledge as their work competence, not simply for the purpose of 
prescribed compliance. 
The positive impact of security exposure on both compliance burnout and engagement supported 
the argument in Bulgurcu et al. (2010), which stated that awareness of security incidents could 
have a wide range of impacts on security compliance. Users’ exposure of genuine security cases 
can increase perceived benefits of compliance and cost of non-compliance, which influence the 
overall assessments of security consequences and compliance attitude (Bulgurcu et al. 2010, 
Pham et al. 2016). Security training should demonstrate to IT users the impacts of job-related 
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security threats and that anyone could be a victim of cyber threats to encourage them to 
undertake cautious security practice. 
 Positive Impact of Skill Requirements on Security Engagement 7.2.6.3
This research did not theorise how security demands can influence security engagement. The job 
demands-resources model that this research employed as the theoretical foundation argued that 
work demands would have no positive impact on engagement (Demerouti et al. 2001). However, 
the structural analysis in Study Two found a significant and positive relationship between high 
skill security demands and security engagement (effect=0.19, p<0.001). High skill security 
demands may present opportunities to IT users to learn, achieve, and demonstrate competence. 
The need to learn and acquire competence in performing security tasks was also highlighted in 
Study One that most participants considered security tasks as simple, tedious and they did not 
learn much from doing the tasks. Since IT users did not find performing security tasks as 
challenging and fulfilling they reduced their engagement accordingly. 
 Differentiating Security Demands (Challenge and Hindrance) and Their 7.2.7
Impacts on Security Compliance 
The mitigating effect of a security demand (i.e. security skill requirements) on burnout (effect= -
0.17, p<0.001) and their positive impact on security engagement (effect=0.19, p<0.001) were not 
consistent with the JD-R model, which theorises that any job demands would increase work 
burnout and had no impact on engagement (Crawford et al. 2010). However, according to 
Crawford et al. (2010), not all security demands can have the same impact on burnout and they 
are irrelevant to engagement, and that security tasks can be classified into challenge or 
hindrance.  
Challenging security demands can facilitate users to learn and demonstrate competence. 
Acquiring and demonstrating competence can be a source of intrinsic motivation as posited in 
self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000). Challenging tasks could enable users to apply 
their skills and motivate users to be more enthusiastic with the tasks.  
In contrast, hindrance security requirements are those that can be perceived as stressful, 
potentially obstructing personal growth, learning, and security goal attainment (Crawford et al. 
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2010). Users may view security compliance overload and the need to access to written security 
policies as inconvenient and obstructing their daily routine work. Such hindrance tasks not only 
reduce work productivity but also restrict users to use and develop their self-efficacy. 
Distinguishing security demands into challenge and hindrance has practical implications to 
security managers. Hindrance security demands can lead to compliance burnout. Challenge 
demands, however, encourage users to learn more about security and engage with security 
activities as part of the self-competence development. Organisations need to assess security tasks 
assigned to users so that security tasks do not have to be only time-consuming, simple and 
tedious to comply as most users expect. Security measures can be designed to be interesting, 
challenging and enabling the users to utilise their skills or eager to acquire new skills. By doing 
that, the users would find compliance less a burnout. 
 CHAPTER SUMMARY 7.3
This chapter presented the analysis of survey data to test the validity of the structural model and 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The structural model (model A) was reported to have 
acceptable fit and was deemed suitable to proceed with hypothesis testing. Overall, seven out of 
12 original hypotheses were supported by the survey data in Study Two developed in Chapter 6. 
Besides, two additional hypotheses (H8 and H9) were added to capture significant relationships 
between organisational resources and compliance, and security skill requirements and security 
engagement. 
Study Two found security engagement partially mediated the effect of organisational security 
resources on security compliance, and fully mediated the effects of security self-efficacy, 
security exposure, and security skill requirements on security compliance. Security compliance 
burnout did not have a significant impact on compliance, though that impact became significant 
when organisational resources and self-efficacy were not included in the model, implying that 
organisational resources and self-efficacy helped reduce the impact of burnout on security 
compliance. Security compliance overload, difficult access to security policies and security 
exposure were showed to increase security compliance burnout, while security skill requirements 
reduced compliance burnout, which was contrary to the initial expectation. Organisational 
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security resources and self-efficacy were demonstrated not to influence compliance burnout as 
hypothesised. 
The next chapter provides an overview of major research findings, contributions, limitations and 
conclusion to this research thesis. 
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 - OVERVIEW OF KEY RESEARCH CHAPTER 8
FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 INTRODUCTION 8.1
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the research questions of this thesis have been 
addressed and provide a summary of the research’s key findings. The chapter outlines the 
contributions of the research to both theory and practice. It then acknowledges a number of 
limitations of the research and suggests directions for future research. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 8.2 outlines how this research addressed 
research questions developed in Chapter 2, and presents key findings to these questions. Section 
8.3 discusses main contributions of this research to theory and practice. Limitations of the 
research and future directions are represented in Section 8.4. Finally, Section 8.5 concludes this 
thesis. 
 REVISITED RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND KEY FINDINGS 8.2
Previous research has employed several behavioural theories, such as theory of planned 
behaviour, protection motivation, rational choice and general deterrence theory, to understand 
determinants of users’ compliance intention and behaviour. Little research has been done to 
understand how stressful security demands can negatively affect users’ psychological 
exhaustions and what can be organisational and personal determinants of the energetic aspect of 
security involvement. This PhD study aimed to explain how organisational and personal factors 
can affect security compliance through the dual processes of compliance burnout and 
engagement underpinned by a work stress model – the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model 
(Demerouti et al. 2001). Hence, this research put forward its main research question:  
 How do security demands, organisational and personal resources affect security 
compliance? 
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The research model developed in Chapter 2 acknowledged prior research and hypothesised the 
mediating effect of compliance burnout between security demands, organisational and personal 
resources and compliance. It also hypothesised the mediating effect of compliance engagement 
between organisational and personal resources and compliance. To examine the mediating 
effects of burnout and engagement between organisational and personal factors on security 
compliance, the main research question was further deconstructed into two following questions 
which were tested in Study Two: 
 RQ1: To what extent does security compliance burnout mediate the impact of (1) security 
demands, (2) organisational and (3) personal resources on security compliance? 
 RQ2: To what extent does security engagement mediate the impact of (1) organisational 
and (2) personal resources on security compliance? 
Since the JD-R model does not specify the characteristics of demands or resources that affect 
burnout and engagement in a particular context, and organisations need to know which demands 
or resources can have greater impacts on compliance, three more questions were constructed. 
Security demands and organisational and personal resources are broad constructs and can be 
built on other factors, the following research questions (RQ) were first explored in Study One. 
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout?  
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and 
engagement? 
 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
An exploratory sequential design of mixed methods approach was developed to investigate these 
five research questions. Study One of the thesis identified three characteristics of security 
demands including (1) security compliance overload, (2) access to security policies and (3) skill 
requirements, which all contributed to compliance burnout. Three forms of organisational 
security resources, which are (1) security communication efficacy, (2) skill use and 
development, and (3) compliance evaluation, were hypothesised to reduce burnout and increase 
engagement. Finally, Study One proposed that security self-efficacy and exposure would 
negatively relate to burnout and positively affect engagement. Figure 8-1 displays an overview 
of the revisited research model. 
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Figure 8-1: Research Model Revisited 
Eight out of 13 hypotheses were supported at a 95 per cent confidence interval and the research 
model explained 47 per cent of the variance of security compliance. The following sections 
revisit research questions that were examined in Study One and Two and summarise key 
findings based on the previous research and insights from this PhD study. 
 RQ3: Which security demands affect compliance burnout? 
Complying with security requirements can incur costs, such as extra time, disruption to the work 
process, or reduction in productivity. Previous research has found mixed results for the impact of 
compliance cost on security intention. Compliance burnout, which is the psychological 
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exhaustion and cynicism towards security tasks, can be a result of dealing with security 
requirements over time. Few studies have explored which characteristics of security 
requirements would lead to users’ compliance burnout. Hence, Study One through in-depth 
interviews explored how the users experienced burnout from various security tasks and 
requirements. Findings from Study One helped develop and revise existing research instruments 
to measure characteristics of security demands. 
The structural model and hypothesis testing conducted in Chapter 7 found that compliance 
overload has a stronger effect on compliance burnout than does difficult security policy access, 
while security skill requirements reduce burnout and increase engagement. The mean values of 
three security demand characteristics indicate that users did not experience a great deal of 
compliance overload, and agreed that access to policies was difficult.  
The findings of the impact of security requirements on compliance burnout highlight several 
important implications. Lack of visible security measures or unclear communication of security 
expectations for users may contribute to low perceived compliance overload, which nevertheless 
may not contribute to better compliance. Easy access to clear security policies and procedures is 
very important to encourage users to find security tasks less of a burden. Finally, security tasks 
can be perceived as challenging or a hindrance, which can have the opposite effects on burnout. 
Challenging tasks (e.g. high skill requirements) can pose as learning opportunities and can 
demonstrate one’s competence. While hindrance tasks are perceived as tedious, obstructing the 
learning and work achievement, they will likely increase compliance burnout and the users will 
avoid performing the tasks if possible. This PhD study is the first to highlight the need to 
distinguish two types of security demands and further assess the impact on security compliance.  
 RQ4: Which organisational security resources affect compliance burnout and 
engagement? 
As organisational security resources refer to a range of activities that an organisation can provide 
to assist users to comply with security requirements, this PhD study was interested to examine 
which resources that users need to reduce burnout and increase engagement. Three types of 
organisational resources (communication efficacy, opportunities to use and develop skills, and 
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compliance evaluation (i.e. rewards and sections) were identified and theorised to directly reduce 
burnout and increase engagement. 
The assessment of the measurement model validity performed in Chapter 6 demonstrated that 
organisational security resources could be assessed at the second-order construct, which 
provided a higher level view of all four resources. The results of the structural model and 
hypothesis testing conducted in Chapter 7 showed organisational resources had different effects 
on burnout, engagement and compliance. Provision of organisational resources does not have a 
significant influence on compliance burnout, though it has direct positive and significant effects 
on both security engagement and compliance. 
This PhD study is the first to explore categories of organisational resources that can positively 
affect security engagement, whereas previous studies explored how perceived effectiveness of 
security measures affected intention to comply. Study One found that people tend to rely on their 
IT department and disengaged with security initiatives, if they are confident with the 
organisation’s security systems. The four organisational resources (clear communication, 
opportunities to use skills, sanctions and rewards) identified and validated in this study provide a 
foundation to further study the engaging effects of different resources. Organisations need to 
develop and deliver security resources that users find interesting and enthusiastic, not just 
reducing compliance burnout. 
The mean value of compliance burnout indicates that the studied participants experienced low 
compliance burnout, which might explain the insignificant effect of organisational resources on 
burnout. It could be interesting to replicate this study to assess the effect of resources on burnout 
with users in organisations that set higher security requirements resulting in higher burnout. 
More importantly, the direct impact of resources on both engagement and compliance indicate 
that organisations need to focus on providing effective communication, security tasks matching 
users’ skills, and intrinsic rewards to users. This PhD study suggests that effective resources 
should not just ease users’ compliance effort but also promote skill development and intrinsic 
motivation by competence recognition, which in turn improve their active security practice. 
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 RQ5: Which personal resources affect compliance burnout and engagement? 
Similar to organisational resources, this research also aimed to identify which particular personal 
resources users employed in dealing with security requirements and resources. Security self-
efficacy and exposure were hypothesised to directly reduce burnout and enhance engagement. 
The assessment of the structural model and hypothesis testing in Chapter 7 revealed that neither 
self-efficacy nor security exposure significantly reduce compliance burnout, while both factors 
positively and significantly increase security engagement. Security self-efficacy creates the 
second strongest impact on users’ engagement of all four determinants: 
 organisational resources, 
 skill requirements, 
 security self-efficacy, and 
 security exposure 
Hence, security training should focus developing employees’ security skills and competence to 
promote their dedication and interest in security activities. Further, genuine experience of 
security incidents can change people’s attitudes towards the significance and relevance of 
security measures. Any training programs should include real security examples to demonstrate 
how security threats can materialise and affect information assets. 
 RQ1: To what extent does security compliance burnout mediate the impact of (1) 
security demands, (2) organisational and (3) personal resources on security 
compliance? 
One of the main aims of this research was to examine whether compliance burnout (i.e. 
psychological exhaustion and cynicism) mediates the effects of organisational factors, such as 
security demands and resources, and personal factors, such as security self-efficacy and 
exposure, on compliance. This PhD study did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between security-related stress and compliance. Only some security demands contribute to 
compliance stress, such as compliance overload and difficult policy access, organisational 
resources, self-efficacy and exposure are not significantly related to it. Post-hoc analysis of the 
structural model, however, revealed that when removing self-efficacy and resources from the 
 216 
 
model, compliance burnout negatively and significantly affects compliance. In other words, self-
efficacy and organisational resources may not reduce users’ compliance burnout, but they help 
reduce its negative impact on compliance. This finding further emphasises the importance of 
providing adequate and effective resources to both support compliance and enhance self-efficacy 
of users. 
While the JD-R model highlights the need to understand how stress due to work demands can 
affect health and work performance, Salanova et al. (2013) examined technology-related stress 
among users of information communication and technology (ICT). Fulfilment of security tasks 
and requirements can be stressful if they impose time-consuming, complex, and ever changing 
tasks to users. However, people may experience burnout but still perform required tasks if 
receiving motivating resources such as clear security objectives, competence-based training and 
competence recognition. 
Findings of this research reveal another important aspect of compliance stress: stress-free 
compliance does not necessarily guarantee better compliance. People may ignore stressful tasks, 
or pass the responsibilities to others (e.g. IT department). As findings in Study One demonstrate 
people did not experience much compliance burnout when they did not care much about security 
issues. This PhD study is the first to conceptually and empirically examine the security 
compliance burnout construct. This research provides practitioners and researchers with a 
validated framework to assess the aspect of compliance burnout further. 
 RQ2: To what extent does security engagement mediate the impact of (1) 
organisational and (2) personal resources on security compliance? 
Security engagement, which describes vigour and dedication in doing security tasks, has been 
identified to be an essential factor for sustained compliance (Bakken and Torp 2012, Schaufeli 
and Bakker 2004). This research found that security engagement fully and positively mediates 
the impact of security self-efficacy, exposure, and skill-demanding tasks on compliance. It also 
partially and positively mediates the influence of organisational resources on compliance. 
Finally, provision of organisational resources has the greatest positive effect on the extent of 
engagement, followed by security self-efficacy, skill-demanding tasks, and lastly, security 
exposure. 
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The resulting mediating effect of security engagement helps understand how organisational and 
personal resources can affect users’ compliance. Engagement was shown to fully mediate the 
relationship between self-efficacy and compliance, which can have an important implication for 
IT practitioners. Organisations should not just provide skills and knowledge, but they also need 
to make security objectives clear and intrinsically motivate users to emotionally engage with 
security activities and utilise their skills for compliance. Since engagement also fully mediates 
the impact of skill-demanding tasks and security exposure on compliance, which further 
emphasises the significant role of promoting users’ task-related energy and dedication to cope 
well with stressful security tasks. 
Work in the field of work stress literature has identified positive aspects, such as positive 
emotions (i.e. security engagement) and enabling organisations (i.e. resources), can have a 
greater impact than negative factors such as stressful demands and burnout on achieving desired 
security behaviour (Seligman et al. 2005, Seligman 2002). The positive mediating effects of 
engagement between self-efficacy, security exposure, skill-demanding tasks, organisational 
resources and compliance affirm the significance of achieving users’ positive feeling and 
enthusiasm towards security programs in the quest for improved security practice. Organisations 
should emphasise the role of users in achieving effective security systems.  
 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS PHD RESEARCH 8.3
 Theoretical Contributions 8.3.1
This research contributes to the emerging body of knowledge regarding behavioural and 
organisational issues of information security. The literature review extensively investigated the 
factors, which could influence behavioural security compliance, originating from the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, Deterrence Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, Rational Choice Theory, 
and the extended Job Demands-Resources model. To the best of my knowledge, this PhD 
research is the first attempt that, underpinned by the extended job demands-resources (JD-R) 
model, offers a theoretical explanation and empirical support for the impact of security 
compliance burnout and engagement on security compliance. The results of this thesis showed 
that fulfilment of stressful security requirements, and provision of security resources and 
personal resources are the immediate antecedents of compliance attitudes including burnout and 
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engagement. The stress-based security compliance model developed in this research accounted 
for 47 per cent of the variance for security compliance of the sample participants. The research 
adds to the body of knowledge by demonstrating the relationships between the nature of security 
tasks, organisational and personal resources and security compliance.  
The research extends the JD-R model in a number of ways.  
 Similar to the JD-R model the proposed compliance model in Figure 7-1 showed that 
security demands contributed to compliance burnout, and that both organisational and 
personal resources increased security engagement. On the other hand, this research 
demonstrated that security engagement increased security compliance, while compliance 
burnout had an insignificant effect on compliance, contradicting the JD-R model and 
previous studies of this nature.  
 The studied theoretical model did not support the mitigating effect of resources (both 
organisational and personal) on compliance burnout as theorised in the JD-R model.  
 Organisational resources had both a direct and indirect effect on the performance of security 
compliance, while the JD-R model only theorises the indirect effect of resources on 
organisational performance, such as job commitment and satisfaction through job 
engagement (Demerouti et al. 2001, Schaufeli and Bakker 2004).  
 Finally, this research found evidence of opposite security demands such as hindrance (e.g. 
security compliance overload and difficult access to security policies) and challenging (e.g. 
security skill requirements). Hindrance demands can increase burnout while challenging 
ones ease it and promote engagement. This is consistent with the identification of hindrance 
and challenging work demands proposed in Crawford et al. (2010). 
This research extends existing work on security the impact of technology stress, policy 
information quality, and sanctions and rewards on compliance intentions by arguing and testing 
for the mediating influence of compliance burnout and engagement, which are the two 
motivational outcomes of the security environment, on security compliance. 
Employing the mixed method approach in investigating security compliance, this research has 
responded to calls for more qualitative studies in behavioural compliance research to gain more 
insights into how users respond towards security tasks (Crossler et al. 2013). By conducting 
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semi-structured interviews as part of Study One, relevant elements of organisational security 
environment were identified that were subsequently tested in the following study (Study Two).  
The results of the exploratory factor analysis for the security compliance construct highlight the 
need to distinguish between the different types of security tasks, such as routine and non-routine 
ones. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first call to explore different 
dimensions of security compliance, and not to simply treat it as a single dimension construct as 
in most current studies (Siponen et al. 2014, Vance and Siponen 2012, Vance et al. 2012).  
Finally, a validated framework is developed in this research to assess the impact of 
organisational and personal factors, which can be extended to account for more types of security 
demands and organisational and personal characteristics, on security behaviour. For example, 
personal resources such as hope, optimism and resilience (Luthans et al. 2008), can be 
incorporated into the model to assess their moderating effect on burnout and engagement. 
 Practical Contributions 8.3.2
The results of this research offer important practical contributions to information security 
practitioners and organisations designing security systems. The findings demonstrated that 
implementations and operations of IT security systems can have an impact on users’ burnout and 
engagement, which to some extent influence compliance with security policies. In particular, 
having to deal with security overload and poor access to security policies may cause users to 
experience burnout, which can negatively affect compliance without adequate supporting 
resources. The provision of adequate organisational resources increases not only the strength of 
engagement, which reinforces compliance, but it also has a direct positive effect on compliance. 
Security practitioners should focus on providing adequate resources to promote engagement and 
compliance. The four types of resources examined in this research - effective communications, 
opportunities to use and develop skills, and rewards and sanctions - may provide a starting point 
to redesign organisational security operations and planning. Details of such development are also 
discussed in the following sections.  
Study One found that users may become disengaged with security tasks if they find that the IT 
department adequately acts as a safety net for information security protection. The employees in 
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this case consider security tasks, especially the ones that require extra effort and skills are the IT 
department’s responsibilities. Clear communication of how individuals can contribute to 
information security and quality of security policies should help the employees appreciate the 
value of their own compliance effort, consequently engaging more with security tasks.  
In addition to regular financial rewards, formal recognition of security skills can intrinsically 
motivate users to maintain their efficacy and to practice recommended security tasks. Intrinsic 
rewards for compliance should not promote over-protective security activities but encourage the 
users to become interested in and enthusiastic with security tasks. Such rewards should motivate 
users to regard security skills and practices as essential work skills, not just as simple acts of 
following prescribed steps in the policies. Therefore, security practitioners should introduce 
recognition of security competence as part of the organisational reward system. 
Study Two demonstrated that skill-demanding security tasks can reduce compliance burnout and 
increase engagement, hence improving overall security compliance. Organisations can design 
security programs to create learning opportunities that extend existing skills, rather than 
requiring staff to simply follow prescribed security procedures. Security training should provide 
clear security objectives and explain the significance of security protection to an individual’s job 
and the whole organisation. Similarly, security skills can be framed to be challenging and critical 
to one’s job, which will positively impact their compliance. Employees should be advised that 
higher security skills come with more responsibilities and making a significant contribution to 
the success of the overall security programs. 
This research observed that matching the employees’ self-efficacy with security requirements 
can increase security engagement and compliance. Organisations should consider customising 
security control levels and compliance responsibilities for user groups with different security 
skill levels. The security control levels should enable the employees to satisfy work needs taking 
into account their security self-efficacy. 
The format of security communications and policies can significantly influence compliance 
burnout, which results in less interest in accessing security policies for information. Existing 
complex security policies and time-consuming access for security information discourage users 
to locate and use security policies for guidance or instructions. Organisations should present 
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information security practice, procedures, and requirements in graphical formats such as posters 
or infographics and place them in visible locations in the workplace so that the employees can 
refer to them more easily and conveniently. Organisations should not rely on the employees to 
consult complex written security documents as their main source of security guidance and 
instructions. 
Although compliance burnout was not found to influence compliance, the experience of burnout 
can have a significant implication on security practitioners. If employees perceive performing 
certain security tasks as major impediments to work-related activities, they will avoid or delay 
performing the tasks as much as possible. Delay in performing security tasks can be a security 
risk for the organisation since timely performance of security tasks is also an essential part of 
compliance. Security practitioners should strive to simplify security procedures, integrate 
security requirements into the work process, and facilitate access to security guidance and 
instructions. Organisations should provide adequate self-efficacy to the employees so they will 
not perceive the security requirements as burdensome and impeding work activities. 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 8.4
This research has several limitations that need to be acknowledged and taken into consideration 
when discussing the findings and developing future research. 
The cross-sectional design of both Study One and Two captured a snapshot of security demands, 
resources and security compliance of the sample participants. With data collected at only one 
time point, it is a challenge to infer causal associations between antecedents and dependent 
constructs. Furthermore, the longitudinal or over time impact of security demands and provision 
of resources on compliance burnout and engagement cannot be observed in this research. 
Likewise, the cross-sectional nature of this research makes it difficult to monitor how 
compliance burnout builds up over time due to fulfilment of continuing security requirements. 
Sample participants in the qualitative pilot study were from three organisations in Ho Chi Minh 
City, Vietnam and may not fully represent the entire population in each organisation selected, 
which may include biases unique to the sample. Similarly, participants in Study Two were not 
randomly selected among Vietnamese employees, making this research’s findings less 
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generalisable. Hence, replicating this research in different industries and geographical locations 
is necessary to validate the generalisation of the findings. 
Typical examples of security compliance behaviour were used to gauge responses from the 
survey participants. Although these compliance examples were rigorously validated for content 
validity, it is possible that actual compliance may be different for other security situations. 
Employees can comply with some security tasks and fail to comply with others. For example, a 
user regularly changes system passwords but rarely backs up business data from his/her laptop. 
In fact, during the EFA for assessing the construct validity in Chapter 6, two dimensions of 
security compliance were discovered namely routine and non-routine compliance. It was found 
that users were not performing all security tasks similarly, and future research can explore how 
similar organisational and personal factors can affect compliance with different types of security 
tasks and practice. 
This research set out to assess the impacts of security demands and resources on security 
compliance burnout, engagement and compliance of IT users across industries. Hence, the 
primary purpose was to investigate how security contexts can affect security compliance and 
how the JD-R model can explain security compliance. For the sake of parsimony, this research 
did not address specific industries, such as financial and software development institutions, that 
may impose higher security demands. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) explained that financial 
organisations introduced more deterrent measures and applied stiffer deterrent severity (i.e. 
sanctions) than organisations in other sectors. In these industries, due to the more sensitive and 
risky nature of corporate information users often have to perform more security tasks and receive 
more security resources. Hence, the impact of security demands and resources on compliance 
could be studied exclusively for users in industries with high security demands, such as in 
banking and financial businesses. 
The stress-based compliance model in this research followed the JD-R model by theorising that 
security demands including security compliance overload, difficult access to security policies 
and skill requirements for security tasks would increase compliance burnout, which 
consequently reduces compliance. However, Study Two indicated higher skill requirements for 
security tasks reduce compliance burnout instead and increase engagement. Future research 
 223 
 
should distinguish between hindrance and challenging nature of security tasks and study their 
impact on compliance burnout, engagement and compliance using the model developed in this 
research. 
The construct of security resources was examined at the second-order following the extended 
JD-R model. Security resources were found to positively relate to security engagement and 
compliance. Security resources were composed of security communication efficacy, skill use 
and development, rewards and sanctions. The impact of each resource on security engagement 
and compliance was not available in this research due to the resource construct being assessed at 
the second-order. Further research can examine each resource at first-order construct to ascertain 
how each resource contributes comparatively to security engagement and compliance, which can 
guide IT practitioners to focus even more on providing the most effective resources to improve 
security compliance. 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, the constructs of security compliance burnout and 
engagement were the very first constructs introduced into behavioural security research. It is the 
first attempt to quantitatively measure security compliance burnout and security engagement in 
the same research. Although these two constructs went through rigorous instrument development 
process and validity tests, replicate studies might be needed to further validate the two 
motivational outcomes due to security demands and resources, hence increasing the applicability 
of the stress-based security model in this thesis. 
Finally, during the validation of the measurement model, some items were dropped due to low 
reliability and high modification indices (see Section 6.4 in Chapter 6). This could result in over-
fitting of models and might generate data-driven results (Hair et al. 2010). To prevent removing 
items due to measurement errors, each item removal and model re-specification was only 
conducted with strong theoretical justifications, which were documented together with each 
modification. 
 FINAL CONCLUDING REMARKS 8.5
An important factor that influences organisational security effectiveness is users’ safe security 
practice and compliance with security policies and procedures, which minimises user-related 
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security risks. The literature review of this research has investigated a range of factors that could 
influence behavioural security compliance, rooted in behavioural theories, such as Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, Rational Choice Theory, Protection Motivation Theory, and General 
Deterrence Theory. Factors including perceived behavioural control, subjective norms, and 
attitudinal factors towards compliance help explain partly why or why not users are motivated to 
comply with organisational security policies. However, little research has examined how 
characteristics of security tasks together with organisational and personal resources affect 
security compliance. Whether users’ burnout from fulfilment of security tasks or engagement 
from receiving organisational resources and personal resources together affect security 
compliance. 
The security compliance model developed in this research was based on theoretical perspectives 
that psychological burnout from fulfilling security tasks and energetic engagement by receiving 
organisational resources and owning self-efficacy and security experience can affect compliance. 
This PhD study, through a process of theoretical model development and rigorous model testing, 
has provided empirical evidence for the mediating effect of security engagement on compliance. 
The results of this PhD research demonstrate that (1) provision of adequate organisational 
resources directly and positively contribute to both engagement and security compliance; and (2) 
security engagement partially and positively mediates the impact of organisational resources and 
(3) fully and positively mediates the impact of security self-efficacy and exposure on 
compliance. This research also finds that security compliance overload and access to security 
policies positively influence compliance burnout. Interestingly, compliance burnout does not 
significantly reduce security compliance when users receive adequate organisational resources 
and possess self-efficacy. 
In conclusion, motivating and maintaining employees’ security compliance become increasingly 
important in the digital age where cyber security risks have threatened most IT systems. Many of 
the threats materialised due to users’ unsafe security practice. This research has contributed to 
both theoretical and practical aspects in the area of understanding and developing security 
measures and organisational initiatives that likely improve compliance. The model validated in 
this research provides an open framework for further work to explore the impacts of security 
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tasks, and other organisational and personal factors on users’ security practice. Given that the 
model only partly accounts for variances in security compliance (47 per cent), in security 
engagement (54 per cent) and compliance burnout (26 per cent), more research can be conducted 
to identify determinants that can contribute to these three significant factors. Hence more 
effective security programs can be developed to improve compliance attitudes and encourage 
security compliance. 
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Appendix 2: Discussion Guide for The Interviews 
Section Interviewer Completed 
1.  Introduction: 
My name is Hiep Pham and I am a PhD student at RMIT University. 
I am currently conducting a research to understand various aspects of 
Internet information security compliance behaviours.  
The interview should run for just under an hour. It has no formal 
structure. I’m just going to ask you some questions and you should 
answer them as honestly and openly as you can. We’ll see where the 
flow of conversation takes us. 
Do you have any questions? 
 
2.  Written Consent to Participate (Compulsory) 
Before we start, I need to get you to fill out a consent form. It gives 
me written permission to ask you questions. This is just for RMIT 
records. None of your personal information will be handed over to 
any other parties. Everything will be kept confidential. 
Also, is it OK if I record this conversation? All recordings will be 
erased afterwards. I’m just going to use it to record our conversation 
so I can go back and make accurate notes with it. No one else is going 
to listen to them. 
Action: Participants to fill out consent form and agree to be audio 
recorded. 
 
 
PART TWO 
Please note: these questions are a guide. The interview is not meant to follow a formal structure 
but designed to extract information about the most important issues according to the participants. 
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Section  Interviewer 
1.  Investigating information 
Potential questions to be asked for both groups of participants (IT experts and IT 
users):  
1. Identify some forms of information security policies in organisations 
2. Describe your information security experience (Internet, corporate network) 
3. Which security demands cause the most burnout to you? 
4. Which organisational resources do you think help you the most in engaging 
with security activities in your organisation? 
5. Which personal resources that you think can most enable and motivate your 
security compliance? 
6. What are the best approaches to motivate ongoing information security 
compliance behaviour? 
7. Any other issues 
3.  Action: 
Begin to close interview at around 50-60 minutes 
Thank participants for their cooperation and give them gift cards. 
Ensure that they are aware that they can withdraw their data.  
End interview. 
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Appendix 3: Invitation Letter to Participate in The Survey 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET (QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY) 
Project Title: Security demands, organisational and personal resources: stress-based 
security compliance model 
Investigators: 
Hiep Pham, hiep.pham@rmit.edu.vn, 08-3776-1463 (Office), 0933538539 (Mobile) 
Associate Professor Joan Richardson, joan.richardson@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Linda Brennan, linda.brennan@rmit.edu.au 
Dr France Cheong, france.cheong@rmit.edu.au 
Dear participants, 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University. Please 
read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding 
whether to participate. If you have any questions about the project, please ask the investigators.  
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
Hiep Pham, a PhD student at RMIT University, is conducting a research on exploring the 
motivational factors that influence users’ information security compliance. Organisations have 
found that it is essential to motivate system users to comply with information security policies 
on a regular basis. The research aims to obtain an understanding of the relationship between 
users’ own purposes of information security compliance and the corresponding information 
security compliance behaviour. 
 
 
 
 245 
 
Why have you been approached? 
You have been invited to participate in this project because you have been identified as a 
suitable participant in the Information Technology field who can provide useful insight about 
information security compliance issues. 
What are the questions being addressed?  
You are asked to complete a questionnaire covering several information security scenarios and 
corresponding questions. 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
You will need to complete a questionnaire covering several information security scenarios and 
questions on information security perceptions. 
The questionnaire survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
There are no perceived risks or disadvantages to participating in the survey other than your time 
commitment.  
 What are the benefits associated with participation?  
The intention is to use the information obtained from the survey to test the developed theory of 
information security compliance. The findings would provide useful information to develop 
more effective information security compliance program. 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
Your participation is completely voluntary and any data you give will be anonymous. You are 
able to withdraw from the survey at any time. 
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others from 
harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researchers with written permission.  
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The results of the research will be included in a final project report and may be disseminated via 
journal and conference publications. Data use in publications will be aggregated or coded so that 
individuals will not be identifiable.  
Project documentation will be stored in the researcher’s RMIT staff office in a locked drawer 
and/or on a password protected network drive, for five (5) years after the last publication. At the 
end of the five (5) year term data will be destroyed.  
What are my rights as a participant?  
 The right to withdraw from participation at any time 
 The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant.  
 The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
Whom should I contact if I have any questions?  
 Hiep Pham, 08-3776-1463 (office), 0933538539 (mobile), email: 
hiep.pham@rmit.edu.vn 
If you have any complaints about your participation in this project please see the complaints 
procedure at Complaints with respect to participation in research at RMIT [ctrl + click to 
follow]/ http://www.rmit.edu.au/research/human-research-ethics  
 
INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT 
 
1. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet  
2. I agree to participate in the research project as described 
3. I agree to participate in a focus group whereby my voice will be audio recorded. 
4. I acknowledge that: 
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(a) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied 
(unless follow-up is needed for safety). 
(b) The project is for the purpose of research. It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only 
disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.  
(d) The information security of the research data will be protected during and after 
completion of the study. The data collected during the study may be published, and a 
report of the project outcomes will be provided to RMIT University. Any information 
which will identify me will not be used. 
Participant Consent 
 
Participant Name : ____________________________________ 
 
 
Participant Signature : _________________________________ 
 
 
Date : 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire Sample (English version) 
Survey: Impacts of Security Environment and Personal Resources on Information Security 
Compliance at Work 
Information security (also known as IT security) is designed to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of business information from both technical and human risks. 
This survey aims to assess the impacts of both security environment and personal factors on the 
users' IT security behaviour. You do not require any IT expertise to complete the survey. 
The survey has 6 sections comprising of 12 issues. Please select the choice that best indicates 
your level of disagreement or agreement with each of the statements on the scale of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). You can save your responses to complete at a later time. 
================================== 
 Section 1: Characteristics of IT Security Demands at Work  
The following questions are intended to measure the time and effort you need to spend to get 
familiar with the organisation's IT security policies and guidelines. 
1 – Strongly disagree 2-Disagree 3-Somewhat disagree 4-Neither agree nor disagree 5-
Somewhare agree  6-Agree  7-Strongly agree 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
1. I need to spend a lot of time to be familiar 
with the organisation’s IT security policies 
and guidelines. 
              
2. I am required to know a lot of existing written 
policies and guidelines to secure my computer 
system. 
              
3. It is difficult to find the information I need 
from the existing IT security policies and 
guidelines to secure my computer system. 
              
4. It is time consuming to know what IT security 
precautions I should take at work. 
              
The following questions are intended to measure the extent of knowledge and skills that you 
need to acquire to practice IT security at work. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5. I need to acquire new skills to comply with the 
requirements of the IT security system. 
              
6. I need to rely on others’ help to effectively 
comply with the requirements of the IT 
security system. 
              
7. I need additional training to acquire sufficient 
knowledge to comply with the requirements of 
the IT security system. 
              
The following questions are intended to measure the impact of IT security system on your work. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
8. The IT security system holds me back from 
doing my actual work. 
              
9. The IT security system slows down my 
response time to my colleagues, customers, 
and managers. 
              
10. Overall, the time spent on complying with the 
requirements of the IT security system hinders 
my productivity at work. 
              
Section 2: Availability and Effectiveness of IT Security Resources at Work  
The following questions are intended to measure the availability and effectiveness of IT security 
resources in assisting the users' security compliance. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
11. IT security policies and guidelines are made 
available to employees online. 
              
12. IT security policies and guidelines are written 
in a manner that is clear and understandable. 
              
13. Users receive adequate security training before 
getting a network account. 
              
14. A variety of business communications 
(notices, posters, newsletters, etc.) are used to 
promote security awareness 
              
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The following questions are intended to measure the extent that you can utilise or develop your 
skills from the security program. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
15. The security program at work allows me to 
use my security knowledge and skills. 
              
16. Security training contributes to my personal 
development. 
              
17. I have the opportunity to be resourceful in 
fulfilling IT security requirements 
              
18. I learn new things from the IT security 
program. 
              
The following questions are intended to measure the level of rewards and sanctions that can be 
applied to security compliance in your organisation. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
19. My performance reviews at work depend on 
whether or not I comply with the requirements 
of the IT security system. 
              
20. I will receive a personal mention in work 
reports if I comply with the requirements of 
the IT security system. 
              
21. I will be rewarded if I comply with the 
requirements of the IT security system. 
              
22. I will be recognised for my expertise in IT 
security. 
              
23. If I breach the IT security system, I can be 
penalised. 
              
24. I can be fired if I breach the IT security 
system. 
              
25. If I do not practice safe IT security, I will 
receive a warning or bad work report. 
              
26. I can be demoted or receive pay cut if I breach 
the IT security system. 
              
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Section 3: Security self-efficacy and security experience 
The following questions are intended to measure your IT security knowledge. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
27. I know how to set the security levels of the 
Web browsers when I am using the Internet.  
              
28. I know how to use different programs to 
protect my computer from IT security risks 
(e.g firewalls, pop-up blockers, clearing cache 
files).  
              
29. I rate my IT security knowledge level as 
advanced.  
              
30. I can comfortably read and use the user’s 
guides for IT security. 
              
31. I am confident that I can update my 
computer’s security software when it is 
needed. 
              
32. I know how to check online spoofing attacks 
(e.g. a fake website impersonates another 
website to collect your account information). 
              
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 The following questions are intended to measure your experience with IT security incidents in 
the last 12 months. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
33. I have had a virus on my computer in the last 
12 months. 
              
34. I have received a fraudulent online request for 
my personal information or money in the last 
12 months. 
              
35. I have had to restore my computer files after 
an IT security issue in the last 12 months. 
              
36. I have a colleague at my work who has had 
issues with IT security (e.g. virus infected 
computer, lost account information...) in the 
last 12 months. 
              
 
Section 4: Impacts of IT Security Systems on Individual Burnout and Engagement with 
Security Tasks  
The following questions are intended to measure your level of burnout from the impact of IT 
security system. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
37. I do not think IT security is a big issue. 
38. It does not matter if I get involved in resolving 
IT security issues or not. 
              
39. I am not interested in helping the company 
with IT security issues. 
              
40. I think too much fuss is made about IT 
security. 
41. I feel tired when I have to face a day of 
dealing with IT security issues at work. 
              
The following questions are intended to measure your level of engagement with security 
activities at work. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
42. I talk to my colleagues about IT security 
issues at work. 
              
43. I am enthusiastic about complying with IT 
security measures at work. 
              
44. When I find an IT security risk, I am excited 
to work with the IT department to look for 
others in case there has been a breach. 
              
45. I find identifying and controlling IT security 
risks challenging and rewarding. 
              
46. I am proud of my safe security practices at 
work.  
              
47. I really enjoy learning about IT security.               
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Section 5: Individual IT Security Compliance and Security Practice 
The following questions are intended to measure your security compliance at work. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
48. I often follow IT requests to check viruses.               
49. I often install software updates if I am asked 
by IT staff. 
              
50. I do not install software on company 
computers without consulting IT staff. 
              
51. I take extreme precaution when installing 
freeware from Internet. 
              
52. I do not store confidential information on a 
non-protected storage device (e.g. portable 
hard disk, USB). 
              
53. I do not click on links in Yahoo chat, Skype 
chat, or email without checking the source of 
the link. 
              
54. I often consult with IT staff about security 
warnings when I am not sure of the risks. 
              
55. I use strong passwords for all work-related 
accounts. 
              
56. I log out of the system when finished working.               
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Section 6: Personal Background and Characteristics of the Organisation 
1. How old are you? 
18-25  26-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  Above 65 
2. What is your gender? 
Male Female 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
High School  Diploma Certificate Bachelor  Postgraduate 
4. What is your current job role? 
Manager  Staff   Other roles ____________________ 
5. Are you working in the IT department? 
o Yes 
o No 
6. In which industry are you employed? 
o Information Technology (IT) (1) 
o Finance or insurance (2) 
o Educational services (3) 
o Trading (4) 
o Construction and manufacturing (5) 
o Transportation (6) 
o Health care (7) 
o Other industries (please name) (8) ____________________ 
7. What is the extent of IT usage in your organisation? 
o Extensive use of IT in most business functions 
o Limited use of IT in most business functions 
8. What is your best estimate of the number of your organisation&#39;s full-time employees: 
o 1-10 
o 11-200 
o 201-500 
o 501-1000 
o Over 1000 
9. When was the last time you read your company's IT security policies? 
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o My organisation does not have an IT security policy 
o Last month 
o Last 6 months 
o Last year 
o Never 
Thank you for your participation in the survey. 
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire Sample (Vietnamese version) 
Khảo sát về hành vi an ninh mạng của người sử dụng tại công ty 
An ninh mạng là vấn đề về bảo vệ tính bảo mật, chính xác của tài nguyên thông tin và hoạt động 
ổn định của hệ thống công nghệ thông tin (IT) của doanh nghiệp khỏi các rủi ro kĩ thuật và yếu 
tố con người 
Bản khảo sát này nhằm đánh giá mức độ ảnh hưởng của yếu tố môi trường an ninh mạng ở công 
ty và cá nhân đến việc tuân thủ qui định về an ninh mạng của người sử dụng. Kết quả của cuộc 
nghiên cứu sẽ giúp đề ra các qui trình an ninh mạng và hỗ trợ người sử dụng hiệu quả hơn. 
Bản khảo sát có tổng cộng 6 phần chính với 12 chủ đề. Bạn hãy lựa chọn câu trả lời mà bạn cho 
là phù hợp nhất với mình trên thang điểm từ 1 (hoàn toàn không đồng ý) đến 7 (hoàn toàn đồng 
ý).  
Xin vui lòng cho trả lời tất cả các câu hỏi thật với suy nghĩ của bạn để chúng tôi có được kết quả 
chính xác. Bạn không cần chuyên môn về IT để trả lời bản khảo sát.  
================================== 
 Phần 1: Đặc điểm về yêu cầu tuân thủ an ninh mạng tại công ty. 
A. Bạn hãy đánh giá về lượng thời gian và nỗ lực bạn dành ra để nắm bắt các quy định và yêu 
cầu về an ninh mạng ở công ty. 
 
1 – Hoàn toàn không đồng ý  2- Không đồng ý  3- Phần nào không đồng ý  4- 
Trung lập  5- Phần nào đồng ý 6- Đồng ý 7- Hoàn toàn đồng  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
1. Tôi thấy mất nhiều thời gian để tìm hiểu các 
quy định và hướng dẫn về an ninh mạng. 
              
2. Tôi cần phải biết rất nhiều quy định và hướng 
dẫn về an ninh mạng theo yêu cầu của công ty. 
              
3. Tôi cảm thấy khó khăn khi phải tìm những 
thông tin mình cần từ những quy định và 
hướng dẫn về an ninh mạng. 
              
4. Tôi thấy mất nhiều thời gian cho việc xác định 
biện pháp an ninh mạng cần áp dụng trong 
công việc. 
              
B. Bạn hãy đánh giá mức độ kỹ năng mà bạn cần có để đáp ứng các quy định và yêu cầu an 
ninh mạng ở công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5. Tôi cần có thêm các kỹ năng mới nhằm đáp 
ứng được các quy định và yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng. 
              
6. Tôi cần có người hỗ trợ thường xuyên để có 
thể đáp ứng được các quy định và yêu cầu về 
an ninh mạng. 
              
7. Tôi cần được đào tạo thêm để có đủ kiến thức 
và kỹ năng nhằm đáp ứng được các quy định 
và yêu cầu về an ninh mạng. 
              
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C. Bạn hãy đánh giá tác động của việc tuân thủ quy định và yêu cầu về an ninh mạng đến hiệu 
quả công việc của bạn ở công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
8. Tuân thủ các quy định và yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng gây trở ngại cho các công việc chính mà 
tôi được giao. 
              
9. Tuân thủ các quy định và yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng làm chậm tiến độ công việc của tôi với 
các đồng nghiệp, khách hàng cũng như đối với 
người quản lý của mình. 
              
10. Nhìn chung, tuân thủ các quy định và yêu cầu 
về an ninh mạng làm giảm năng suất làm việc 
của tôi. 
              
Phần 2: Sự hiện hữu và hiệu quả của việc hỗ trợ tuân thủ an ninh mạng tại công ty 
A. Bạn hãy đánh giá hiệu quả của việc hỗ trợ người sử dụng trong việc tuân thủ quy định và yêu 
cầu về an ninh mạng tại công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
11. Các quy định và hướng dẫn về an ninh mạng 
có sẵn trực tuyến để người sử dụng có thể 
tham khảo. 
              
12. Các quy định và hướng dẫn về an ninh mạng 
được viết rõ ràng và dễ hiểu. 
              
13. Người sử dụng được đào tạo cơ bản về an 
ninh mạng trước khi được giao tài khoản 
đăng nhập hệ thống thông tin. 
              
14. Các biện pháp truyền thông như thông báo, 
áp phích, bản tin v.v được dùng để nâng cao 
              
 262 
 
nhận thức của người sử dụng về an ninh 
mạng. 
B. Bạn hãy đánh giá mức độ mà bạn có thể sử dụng hay phát triển các kỹ năng của bạn từ việc 
hỗ trợ và đào tạo an ninh mạng tại công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
15. Hỗ trợ và đào tạo an ninh mạng ở công ty cho 
phép tôi sử dụng kiến thức và kỹ năng của tôi. 
              
16. Hỗ trợ và đào tạo an ninh mạng ở công ty góp 
phần phát triển các kỹ năng của tôi. 
              
17. Hỗ trợ và đào tạo an ninh mạng ở công ty tạo 
cho tôi cơ hội chứng tỏ khả năng của mình khi 
thực hiện các yêu cầu về an ninh mạng. 
              
18. Hỗ trợ và đào tạo an ninh mạng ở công ty giúp 
tôi học hỏi thêm được những kiến thức mới. 
              
C. Bạn hãy nhận xét chế độ khen thưởng, xử phạt cho hành vi tuân thủ quy định và yêu cầu an 
ninh mạng tại công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
19. Việc thực hiện tốt các quy định và yêu cầu về 
an ninh mạng sẽ được đánh giá vào kết quả 
làm việc của tôi. 
              
20. Nếu thực hiện tốt các quy định và yêu cầu về 
an ninh mạng, tôi sẽ nhận được lời khen khi 
đánh giá công việc. 
              
21. Nếu thực hiện tốt các quy định và yêu cầu về 
an ninh mạng, tôi sẽ được thưởng. 
              
22. Nếu thưc hiện tốt các quy đinh và yêu cầu về               
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an ninh mạng, tôi sẽ được công nhận trình độ 
của mình trong lĩnh vực an ninh mạng. 
23. Nếu vi phạm quy định hay yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng, tôi có thể bị khiển trách. 
              
24. Nếu vi phạm quy định hay yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng, tôi có thể bị sa thải. 
              
25. Nếu vi phạm quy định hay yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng, tôi sẽ nhận được cảnh cáo hoặc báo 
cáo công việc không tốt. 
              
26. Nếu vi phạm quy định hay yêu cầu về an ninh 
mạng, tôi có thể bị cách chức hay hạ mức 
lương. 
              
 
Phần 3: Kiến thức, kĩ năng và kinh nghiệm an ninh mạng của người sử dụng 
A. Bạn hãy đánh giá về mức độ kiến thức và kĩ năng an ninh mạng của bạn. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
27. Tôi biết cách thiết lập các chế độ bảo mật trên 
các trình duyệt Web khi tôi sử dụng Internet. 
              
28. Tôi biết cách sử dụng những chương trình 
khác nhau để bảo vệ thông tin máy tính (ví dụ 
như tường lửa, chặn pop-up, xóa các dữ liệu 
tạm). 
              
29. Tôi đánh giá mức độ kiến thức về an ninh 
mạng của tôi ở mức cao. 
              
30. Tôi có thể dễ dàng đọc và sử dụng hướng dẫn 
dành cho người dùng đối với an ninh mạng. 
              
31. Tôi tin tưởng mình có thể tự cập nhật phần 
mềm bảo mật máy tính khi cần thiết. 
              
32. Tôi biết cách kiểm tra các cuộc tấn công giả 
mạo (ví dụ như một trang web giả mạo một 
trang web khác để thu thập thông tin tài 
khoản của bạn). 
              
B. Bạn hãy xác nhận các kinh nghiệm của bạn với các sự cố an ninh mạng dưới đây trong 
khoảng 12 tháng qua. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
33. Tôi đã phát hiện ra virus trên máy tính của tôi 
trong 12 tháng qua. 
              
34. Tôi nhận được yêu cầu trực tuyến giả mạo đòi 
cung cấp thông tin cá nhân hoặc chuyển tiền 
trong 12 tháng qua. 
              
35. Tôi đã phải khôi phục lại các tập tin máy tính 
của mình sau khi gặp vấn đề về an ninh mạng 
              
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trong 12 tháng qua. 
36. Đồng nghiệp của tôi đã gặp phải vấn đề về an 
ninh mạng (như máy tính nhiễm virus, mất 
thông tin tài khoản...) trong 12 tháng qua. 
              
Phần 4: Sự tích cực của bạn với các hoạt động an ninh mạng ở công ty.  
A. Bạn hãy mô tả thái độ về các hoạt động liên quan đến an ninh mạng ở công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
37. Tôi nghĩ an ninh mạng không phải là vấn đề 
quan trọng với tôi. 
38. Tôi nghĩ việc tuân thủ của tôi không đóng 
góp gì nhiều cho việc bảo vệ an ninh mạng. 
              
39. Tôi không quan tâm đến việc giúp đỡ công ty 
trong các vấn đề liên quan đến an ninh mạng. 
              
40. Tôi nghĩ tầm quan trọng của an ninh mạng 
đang bị thổi phồng. 
41. Tôi cảm thấy mệt mỏi khi phải tuân thủ các 
quy định hay yêu cầu về an ninh mạng. 
              
B. Bạn hãy đánh giá mức độ cần thiết của việc tham gia các hoạt động liên quan đến an ninh 
mạng ở công ty. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
42. Tôi trao đổi với đồng nghiệp về vấn đề an 
ninh mạng. 
              
43. Tôi nhiệt tình thực hiện các biện pháp an ninh 
mạng.  
              
44. Khi tôi phát hiện lỗ hổng hệ thống an ninh 
mạng, tôi cảm thấy hứng thú khi hỗ trợ bộ 
              
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phận IT truy tìm thêm các lỗi khác để bảo vệ 
hệ thống thông tin. 
45. Tôi thấy việc tìm kiếm và kiểm soát các nguy 
cơ an ninh mạng là những thử thách bổ ích. 
              
46. Tôi tự hào về việc thực hành và tuân thủ an 
ninh mạng của tôi. 
              
47. Tôi thực sự thích thú học hỏi về an ninh 
mạng. 
              
Phần 5: Sự tuân thủ và thực hành an ninh mạng của người sử dụng 
Bạn hãy tự nhận xét hành vi tuân thủ quy định và yêu cầu an ninh mạng của bạn ở công ty.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
48. Tôi luôn quét virus mỗi khi bộ phận IT yêu 
cầu. 
              
49. Tôi thường xuyên cài đặt các bản cập nhật 
phần mềm khi bộ phân IT yêu cầu. 
              
50. Tôi không cài đặt phần mềm trên máy tính 
của công ty mà không tham khảo ý kiến bộ 
phận IT. 
              
51. Tôi hết sức thận trọng khi tải các phần mềm 
miễn phí từ internet. 
              
52. Tôi không lưu trữ thông tin quan trọng trên 
các thiết bị lưu trữ mà không được bảo mật 
như ổ cứng di động, thẻ USB. 
              
53. Tôi không bấm vào các đường dẫn liên kết 
trong Yahoo chat, Skype chat, hoặc email mà 
không kiểm tra nguồn gốc của đường dẫn. 
              
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54. Tôi thường tham khảo ý kiến của bộ phận IT 
khi gặp những cảnh báo an ninh máy tính mà 
tôi không chắc chắn về những nguy hiểm mà 
nó đem lại. 
              
55. Tôi sử dụng mật khẩu bao gồm các ký tự số 
và chữ có tính bảo mật cao cho tất cả các tài 
khoản liên quan đến công việc. 
              
56. Tôi đăng xuất ra khỏi hệ thống mạng mỗi khi 
hoàn thành công việc. 
              
Phần 6: Thông tin về cá nhân và công ty (khoanh tròn hay gạch dưới chọn lựa cho mỗi câu 
trả lời dưới đây) 
10. Độ tuổi của bạn: 
18-25  26-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  Trên 65 
11. Giới tính của bạn: 
Nam  Nữ 
12. Trình độ học vấn cao nhất của bạn: 
Trung học  Cao đẳng Đại học  Sau đại học 
13. Vị trí công việc của bạn: 
Quản lý  Nhân viên Chức vụ khác (xin ghi rõ) ____________________ 
14. Bạn làm việc ở công ty hiện tại được bao lâu? 
Dưới 1 năm  1-2 năm  3-5 năm  Trên 5 năm 
15. Bạn có làm việc ở bộ phận IT không? 
Có Không 
16. Công ty bạn đang hoạt động chính trong lĩnh vực nào dưới đây: 
+ Công nghệ thông tin (IT) +Tài chính, bảo hiểm + Giáo dục  + Thương mại  
+ Xây dựng và sản xuất + Giao thông vận tải + Y tế 
+ Các lĩnh vực khác (xin ghi rõ dưới đây): ____________________ 
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17. Mức độ ứng dụng hệ thống công nghệ thông tin trong công ty bạn? 
o Sử dụng sâu rộng trong hầu hết các bộ phận 
o Sử dụng hạn chế ở hầu hết các bộ phận 
18. Ước tính số lượng nhân viên trong công ty nơi bạn đang làm việc: 
1-10  11-200  201-500 501-1000  Trên 1000 
19. Lần cuối cùng bạn tham khảo quy định về an ninh mạng của công ty bạn là khi nào? 
o Công ty của tôi không có quy định về an ninh mạng 
o Tháng trước 
o Cách đây 6 tháng 
o Cách đây hơn 1 năm 
o Chưa bao giờ 
Cảm ơn bạn đã hoàn thành bản khảo sát! 
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Appendix 6: Univariate Outlier Histogram 
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Appendix 7: Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics 
Item 
Mean 
Statistic 
Std. 
Deviation 
Statistic 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
SCO1 3.52 1.652 .221 .121 -.933 .241 
SCO2 3.83 1.630 .145 .121 -.835 .241 
SCO3 3.77 1.654 .151 .121 -.896 .241 
ASP1 4.06 1.805 -.255 .121 -1.063 .241 
ASP2 4.27 1.757 -.312 .121 -1.030 .241 
ASP3 4.31 1.725 -.386 .121 -.923 .241 
ASP4 4.29 1.676 -.238 .121 -.881 .241 
SSR1 4.77 1.616 -.723 .121 -.366 .241 
SSR2 4.82 1.525 -.651 .121 -.278 .241 
SSR3 5.01 1.381 -.706 .121 .036 .241 
SCE1 4.67 1.475 -.516 .121 -.368 .241 
SCE2 4.35 1.476 -.306 .121 -.454 .241 
SCE3 4.48 1.502 -.400 .121 -.632 .241 
SCE4 4.58 1.436 -.600 .121 -.307 .241 
SSUD1 4.47 1.540 -.594 .121 -.329 .241 
SSUD2 4.65 1.386 -.511 .121 -.194 .241 
SSUD3 4.45 1.480 -.410 .121 -.439 .241 
SSUD4 4.90 1.468 -.693 .121 .014 .241 
ORW1 4.31 1.675 -.309 .121 -.787 .241 
ORW2 4.30 1.586 -.256 .121 -.721 .241 
ORW3 3.79 1.645 -.058 .121 -.942 .241 
ORW4 4.04 1.664 -.132 .121 -.950 .241 
OS1 4.69 1.531 -.566 .121 -.461 .241 
OS2 4.14 1.768 -.206 .121 -.989 .241 
OS3 4.44 1.571 -.442 .121 -.648 .241 
OS4 4.13 1.666 -.211 .121 -.811 .241 
SSE1 4.46 1.590 -.357 .121 -.811 .241 
SSE2 4.37 1.594 -.257 .121 -.921 .241 
SSE3 3.99 1.590 -.013 .121 -.902 .241 
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SSE4 4.45 1.529 -.320 .121 -.737 .241 
SSE5 4.38 1.629 -.332 .121 -.857 .241 
SSE6 4.05 1.740 -.075 .121 -1.043 .241 
SE1 4.46 1.839 -.509 .121 -.953 .241 
SE2 4.19 1.782 -.263 .121 -1.205 .241 
SE3 3.88 1.780 .036 .121 -1.263 .241 
SE4 4.41 1.719 -.378 .121 -.884 .241 
SCB1 3.93 1.544 .010 .121 -.843 .241 
SCB2 3.83 1.676 .053 .121 -1.017 .241 
SCB3 3.65 1.632 .168 .121 -.928 .241 
SCB4 3.62 1.684 .268 .121 -.958 .241 
SCB5 3.78 1.643 .179 .121 -.807 .241 
SEN1 4.30 1.501 -.262 .121 -.574 .241 
SEN2 4.71 1.419 -.603 .121 -.096 .241 
SEN3 4.55 1.527 -.515 .121 -.279 .241 
SEN4 4.58 1.481 -.445 .121 -.340 .241 
SEN5 4.66 1.428 -.511 .121 -.175 .241 
SEN6 4.69 1.560 -.551 .121 -.240 .241 
SCL1 4.98 1.721 -1.084 .121 .185 .241 
SCL2 4.93 1.540 -.836 .121 -.110 .241 
SCL3 4.64 1.569 -.498 .121 -.810 .241 
SCL4 5.12 1.419 -.888 .121 .231 .241 
SCL5 4.38 1.705 -.267 .121 -1.091 .241 
SCL6 5.01 1.527 -.775 .121 -.219 .241 
SCL7 4.95 1.500 -.752 .121 -.238 .241 
SCL8 5.35 1.432 -1.040 .121 .481 .241 
SCL9 5.31 1.461 -.888 .121 .131 .241 
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Appendix 8: Common Method Bias Results  
Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 12.354 24.708 24.708 12.354 24.708 24.708 
2 5.480 10.960 35.668 5.480 10.960 35.668 
3 3.424 6.848 42.516 3.424 6.848 42.516 
4 2.941 5.882 48.398 2.941 5.882 48.398 
5 2.114 4.228 52.626 2.114 4.228 52.626 
6 1.784 3.568 56.193 1.784 3.568 56.193 
7 1.731 3.462 59.656 1.731 3.462 59.656 
8 1.547 3.095 62.751 1.547 3.095 62.751 
9 1.435 2.870 65.621 1.435 2.870 65.621 
10 1.275 2.550 68.171 1.275 2.550 68.171 
11 1.160 2.321 70.492 1.160 2.321 70.492 
12 .876 1.752 72.243       
13 .840 1.681 73.924       
14 .725 1.451 75.375       
15 .675 1.349 76.725       
16 .640 1.279 78.004       
17 .615 1.230 79.234       
18 .576 1.152 80.387       
19 .537 1.074 81.461       
20 .525 1.049 82.510       
21 .504 1.009 83.518       
22 .479 .957 84.476       
23 .469 .938 85.414       
24 .432 .865 86.279       
25 .413 .826 87.105       
26 .403 .806 87.911       
27 .392 .784 88.695       
28 .370 .740 89.435       
29 .363 .725 90.161       
30 .345 .690 90.851       
31 .341 .681 91.532       
32 .327 .654 92.185       
33 .316 .632 92.817       
34 .305 .611 93.428       
35 .296 .591 94.019       
36 .288 .576 94.595       
37 .269 .538 95.132       
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38 .243 .486 95.619       
39 .231 .462 96.081       
40 .227 .455 96.535       
41 .213 .427 96.962       
42 .209 .418 97.380       
43 .205 .409 97.790       
44 .191 .381 98.171       
45 .174 .349 98.520       
46 .167 .335 98.854       
47 .155 .310 99.165       
48 .148 .296 99.461       
49 .138 .276 99.737       
50 .132 .263 100.000       
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix 9: CFA Results of Final Measurement Model  
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Appendix 10: SEM Results of Final Structural Model 
 
  
 276 
 
Appendix 11: Structural Model Testing without Mediating Factors 
The current study initially hypothesised that organisational security resources (OSR), security 
self-efficacy (SSE) and security exposure (SE) motivated users to be committed with security 
programs on a regular basis. Higher engagement would lead to better security compliance. 
However, OSR, SSE and SE can also enable users to take security actions directly to protect 
computer systems. OSR provides necessary resources and extrinsic motivation sources, such as 
rewards and sanctions, to directly motivate users to perform security tasks (Vance and Siponen 
2012, Vance et al. 2012). Users with high SSE can perform security tasks effectively (Vance and 
Siponen 2012, Rhee et al. 2009). Thus, OSR, SSE and SE can have a direct effect on security 
compliance (SCL). On the contrary, overloading security demands, difficult access to security 
policies and more complex security tasks can reduce security compliance directly.  
Three categories of security demands, organisational security resources and personal resources 
were set to have direct relationships with security compliance and the structural testing results 
are shown in Figure A and Table A below. The fit statistics of the model without mediating 
factors of burnout and engagement shown in Figure A indicate a poor fit. CMIN/df at 2.26 is 
higher than the strict threshold of 2 but can still be accepted. CFI of 0.896 is lower than the 
lower-bound 0.90 cut-off value, and RMSEA at 0.056 is less than the upper-bound 0.8 accepted 
threshold. 
 277 
 
 
Model Fit Statistics 
CMIN = 1539.813 
Df = 682 
CMIN/df = 2.258 
p-value = .000 
CFI = .896 
RMSEA = .056, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.052, 0.059) 
PCLOSE = .006 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p <0.05, N/S (not significant) at 0.05 level; 𝑹𝟐 shown within each endogenous 
construct  
Figure A: The Structural Model without Mediating Factors of Security Compliance 
Burnout and Engagement 
Table A shows only organisational security resources and security skill requirements have 
significant direct relationships with security compliance (effect=0.54, p<0.001 and 0.17, p<0.01 
respectively), other security demands (i.e. security compliance burnout and access to security 
policies) and personal resources (i.e. security self-efficacy and security exposure) do not have 
significant and direct relationships with security compliance. 
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Table A: Standardised Path Estimates of the Structural Model without Mediating Factors 
of Security Compliance Burnout and Engagement 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SCL <--- OSR 0.77 0.15 5.16 *** 
SCL <--- SCO -0.04 0.04 -1.08 0.28 (NS) 
SCL <--- ASP 0.07 0.05 1.26 0.21 (NS) 
SCL <--- SSR 0.12 0.04 2.63 0.01 (**) 
SCL <--- SSE 0.07 0.06 1.14 0.25 (NS) 
SCL <--- SE 0.04 0.05 0.87 0.39 (NS) 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p <0.05, N/S (not significant) at 0.05 level 
